

Return-Path: <MARK_BROWN.parti@ecunet.org>
Sender: MARK_BROWN.parti@ecunet.org
Date: Wed, 20 May 1998 16:14:05 -0400 (EDT)
Subject: CTBT
To: mupj@igc.apc.org
From: MARK_BROWN.parti@ecunet.org (MARK BROWN)

To: mupj@igc.apc.org

Religious leaders call for ratification of test ban treaty
By DAVID E. ANDERSON and ED BRIGGS
c.1998 Religion News Service

WASHINGTON -- A coalition of some 200 religious leaders, including the heads of major Protestant, Roman Catholic and Jewish denominations and agencies, Tuesday (May 19) called on the Senate to "proceed swiftly" to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

"The United States Senate has within its powers the capacity to take decisive action on some of the most fateful issues affecting the security of our nation and the peace of the planet," the statement said.

The five-paragraph statement was issued in the wake of heightened international concern prompted by India setting off a series of nuclear weapons tests last week and Pakistan's stated willingness to respond with its own testing.

But the statement, which was being prepared long before the latest incidents, is directed primarily at the foot-dragging by the United States in ratifying CTBT.

"The strongest possible rebuttal of India's violation of the international moratorium on nuclear weapons test explosions will be the immediate Senate ratification of the CTBT," said Joe Volk, executive secretary of the Friends Committee on National Legislation.

The CTBT was approved by the United Nations in September 1996 and would ban all test blasts of nuclear weapons worldwide. The Clinton administration has signed the treaty and called for Senate ratification this year. So far, there has been no movement on Capitol Hill.

Overall, 149 nations signed the agreement and 13 have ratified it. But it must be ratified by 44 countries for it to be binding.

"If the (treaty) continues to languish in the Senate, the U.S. will miss an important opportunity to help curb the proliferation of nuclear weapons worldwide," said the Rev. Mark Brown of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America's Office for Governmental Affairs.

In the statement, the religious leaders said the end of the Cold War has changed -- not ended -- the nature of the threat posed by nuclear weapons and "profound moral questions persist."

"The retention of thousands of nuclear weapons, combined with the threats of proliferation and terrorism, requires renewed attention to these issues," the statement said.

"At the moral core of nuclear issues is the credibility of nuclear-weapon states in seeking to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons by or to other states or political groups," it said.

The signers also gave the Senate an implied political threat, saying they were determined "to interpret this issue as a vital matter of religious conscience for for out communities."

Among the signers were:

Bishop McKinley Young, African Methodist Episcopal Church; The Rev. Daniel Weiss, general secretary, American Baptist Churches, USA; the Rev. Richard Hamm, general minister and president, Christian Church (Disciples of Christ); Bishop Nathaniel Linsey, senior bishop, Christian Methodist Episcopal Church; Presiding Bishop Frank T. Griswold, Episcopal Church; the Rev. H. George Anderson, presiding bishop, Evangelical Lutheran Church in America; John Maurer, general secretary, Friends United Meeting; James Schrag, general secretary, General Conference, Mennonite Church; the Rev. Gordon Sommers, president, Moravian Church, Northern Province; the Rev. Joan Brown Campbell, general secretary, National Council of Churches.

Also: the Rev. Willie T. Snead, president, National Missionary Baptist Convention of America; Metropolitan Theodosius, primate, Orthodox Church in America; the Rev. Clifton Kirkpatrick, stated clerk, Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.); the Rev. Tyrone Pitts, general secretary, Progressive National Baptist Convention; Ben Beach, general conference of the Seventh-day Adventist Church; Rabbi Eric Yoffie, president, Union of American Hebrew Congregations; John Buchrens, president, Unitarian Universalist Association; the Rev. Ted Keating, director for peace and justice, Catholic Conference of Major Superiors of Men; Susan Shank Mix, president, Church Women United; Rabbi Arthur Waskow, director, the Shalom Center; and Jim Wallis, executive director, Sojourners.

== 30 ==

Return-Path: <owner-abolition-caucus@igc.org>
Date: Wed, 20 May 1998 17:14:20 -0400
From: "Bill Robinson" <plough@watserv1.uwaterloo.ca>
Sender: owner-abolition-caucus@igc.org
Subject: Analysis of 1998 NPT Prepcom
To: "Abolition Caucus" <abolition-caucus@igc.apc.org>,
"Abolition" <abolition@watserv1.uwaterloo.ca>
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal

"An Analysis of the Second Preparatory Committee Meeting
For the 2000 Review of the Non-proliferation Treaty"

by former Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament Doug Roche

is now available on the web at:

<http://watserv1.uwaterloo.ca/~plough/98prepcom.html>

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Project Ploughshares is a member of the Canadian Network to Abolish
Nuclear Weapons (<http://watserv1.uwaterloo.ca/~plough/cnanw/cnanw.html>)

Return-Path: <owner-abolition-caucus@igc.org>
Date: Wed, 20 May 1998 22:23:43 +0100 (BST)
From: robwcpuk@gn.apc.org (Rob Green)
Sender: owner-abolition-caucus@igc.org
Subject: Nuclear Hypocrisy
To: abolition-caucus@igc.apc.org
X-Authentication-Warning: mail.gn.apc.org: Host ae147.du.pipex.com [193.130.244.147] claimed to be [193.130.253.156]
X-Sender: robwcpuk@pop.gn.apc.org

Dear Abolitionists,

I felt you should see this oped piece by the Foreign Editor of the influential FT, whom WCP(UK) has been cultivating. We're making real progress with the arguments now!

Best wishes,
Rob Green
UK Chair, World Court Project

>
>FINANCIAL TIMES, EDWARD MORTIMER 20 MAY 1998
>
>NUCLEAR HYPOCRISY
>
>Kurt-Georg Kiesinger, otherwise the least memorable of Germany's postwar
>chancellors, deserves to be remembered for one great remark. The nuclear
>non-proliferation treaty, he said, "is like a bunch of notorious drunkards
>inviting everyone else to sign the pledge".
>
>I was reminded of this last week during the explosion of outrage which
>greeted India's nuclear tests.
>
>India has a consistent stand on this issue. It has always refused
>to sign the NPT, which it regards as perpetuating a gross inequality
>between powerful and powerless states: those that have nuclear weapons,
>and those that do not.
>
>It also refused, quite logically, to sign the more recent comprehensive
>test ban treaty. Tests are the method by which a state can confirm
>its status as a nuclear power - to its own satisfaction and, perhaps
>more important, to the rest of the world.
>
>The five nuclear-weapon states recognised by the NPT had all conducted
>many tests before they signed the CTBT. France and China both conducted
>series of tests, provoking worldwide indignation, immediately before
>announcing their agreement to sign.
>
>The French case, especially, offers some parallels to India's behaviour
>and might even have inspired it. Jacques Chirac announced the tests
>shortly after becoming president, just as India's new BJP government
>has acted soon after taking office. Mr Chirac thereby established

>his Gaullist credentials, making it easier for him to proceed to slaughter
>the sacred cow of conscription.

>

>Slaughtering sacred cows would not be the right metaphor for a Hindu
>nationalist government, but some Indian economists do expect that
>the nuclear tests will make it easier for the new government to push
>ahead with economic reforms, which would otherwise run into strong
>opposition from the right of the BJP. India is also hinting it may
>change its position on the test ban treaty, which cannot enter into
>force until India, along with other states that have civilian nuclear
>industries, has ratified it.

>

>The test ban treaty, unlike the non-proliferation treaty, poses no
>issue of principle for India, because it does not discriminate between
>nuclear and non-nuclear powers. The NPT, by contrast, freezes indefinitely
>an arbitrary distinction based on the status quo of the mid-1960s.
>The five states that had tested a nuclear weapon before 1967 are recognised
>as nuclear-weapon states. No one else is allowed to become one.

>

>Under the treaty, however, the nuclear-weapon states did commit themselves
>to strive for general disarmament. And in 1995, as the price of getting
>the treaty extended indefinitely, they accepted that this involves
>the "determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon states of systematic
>and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the
>ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons".

>

>The question is, did they mean it? And if so, what are they doing
>about it? The answer to the second question is that they are doing
>little or nothing. So, in answering the first, the reasonable conclusion
>of most non-nuclear states is that they did not mean it. More than
>that, the current nuclear five assume that the recent crisis with
>Iraq, by demonstrating the danger posed by "rogue" states, has showed
>why it is necessary for "civilised" states like themselves to retain
>a nuclear deterrent.

>

>It is far from clear, however, that nuclear weapons offer any solution
>to the problems of "rogue states". James Baker, who was US secretary
>of state at the time of the Gulf war, reveals in his memoirs that
>the coalition forces in that war decided "not to retaliate with chemical
>or nuclear response even if attacked with chemical munitions".

>

>Why? For reasons made clear in 1996 by the Canberra Commission on
>the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons. "Use of nuclear weapons in response
>to use or threat of use of other weapons of mass destruction," the
>Commission observed, "would cross an important psychological as well
>as military threshold, making the management of future conflicts even
>more uncertain."

>

>Moreover, even the threat of such use against a non-nuclear state
>is contrary to the "negative security assurances" which nuclear-weapon
>states have given. And it is clearly illegal under the terms of a
>world court decision two years ago banning any threat to use nuclear
>weapons by a state unless "in an extreme circumstance of self-defence,
>in which its very survival would be at stake".

>
>Many people still find a nuclear-free world hard to imagine. At best
>it is only a long-term prospect, depending in the first instance on
>further disarmament negotiations between the US and Russia, which
>between them have many times more nuclear weapons as all the other
>nuclear powers together.

>
>Yet that does not let those smaller powers off the hook. Equality
>with China is the specific reason given by India for needing a nuclear
>deterrent of its own (just as Pakistan in turn cites equality with
>India).

>
>France and the UK in particular have a lot to answer for. They, after
>all, live in the safest part of what is now one of the safest continents,
>and in the world's strongest and most successful alliance, guaranteed
>by the only remaining superpower. If they cling to an independent
>nuclear deterrent as supposedly essential to their national security
>or (even worse) to their international status and self-respect, how
>can they expect India and Pakistan to do without one?

ENDS

Return-Path: <owner-abolition-caucus@igc.org>
Date: Wed, 20 May 1998 17:42:11 -0700 (PDT)
From: Jackie Cabasso <wslf@igc.apc.org>
Sender: owner-abolition-caucus@igc.org
Subject: international NGO cooperation/press release on Indian tests
To: abolition-caucus@igc.org, tomatompn+@igc.org
X-Sender: wslf@pop.igc.org (Unverified)

Greetings friends and colleagues. A week ago today, John Burroughs and I were in England visiting anti-nuclear researchers and campaigners, when we learned about the 2nd round of Indian tests. Following is the press release we issued in collaboration with Manchester CND. Although its a week old now, it still seems relevant. -- Jackie Cabasso

GMD-CND
Greater Manchester and District Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament
One World Center, 6 Mount Street, Manchester, M25NS.
Tel: 0161 834 8301 Fax: 0161 834 8187 Email: gmdcnd@gn.apc.org

PRESS STATEMENT

For Immediate Release: 13th May 1998

ANTI-NUCLEAR ACTIVISTS CONDEMN INDIAN NUCLEAR TESTS

The conducting of two further underground nuclear tests by the Indian government today, was denounced by the peace movement worldwide. India's test comes in the wake of United States blockage of any progress in multilateral nuclear disarmament at a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review proceeding in Geneva, 27th April through 8th May, and at the Conference on Disarmament, which began meeting this week, also in Geneva.

With the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the five previously declared nuclear weapon states (Britain, France, US, China and Russia) are attempting to pull up the ladder, limiting the ability of India and other actual or potential nuclear weapon states to develop the weapons through full-scale underground testing. India has refused to play this game, first declining to sign the CTBT and now conducting five tests so far. India is not a party to the NPT.

"This is a wake-up call," said Jacqueline Cabasso, executive director of Western States Legal Foundation in California, currently visiting CND in Manchester, and along with CND part of Abolition 2000: A Global Network to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons. "It has become undeniable that the world cannot sustain a two-tier international system of nuclear haves' and have nots.' The UK, US, and the other nuclear weapon states should respond to the Indian tests by immediately commencing multilateral negotiations on the total elimination of nuclear weapons. This may be necessary to bring India on board the CTBT. And, whether or not the CTBT enters into force worldwide, a global abolition regime is the only true solution to the threat posed by these weapons of mass destruction."

On behalf of GM&D CND, Rae Street said, "It is regrettable to see India act contrary to its long and honourable history of working for nuclear disarmament, beginning with Nehru's advocacy of a CTBT in the 1950's. But the tests also demonstrate the culpability of the nuclear weapon states, because India has been very clear that it is prepared to join in a process leading to the global elimination of nuclear weapons."

CND urges the Foreign Office to call on the Indian High Commissioner and express Britain's outrage at India's nuclear tests. CND also calls for the international community to urgently raise the issue of nuclear disarmament at the G8 meeting in Birmingham this weekend.
Ends

For more information, please call Cath at the number above, or outside of office hours, Rae Street, chair of GM&D CND pm 0176 378043

Greater Manchester CND is part of Abolition 2000

WESTERN STATES LEGAL FOUNDATION

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***** Part of ABOLITION 2000 *****

Global Network to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons

Return-Path: <owner-ctbt-organize@igc.org>
Date: Wed, 20 May 1998 22:56:07 -0400
From: Kathy Crandall <disarmament@igc.org>
Organization: Disarmament Clearinghouse
Sender: owner-ctbt-organize@igc.org
Subject: URGENT -Senate Res. on CTBT
To: ctbt-organize@igc.org

URGENT ACTION ALERT * URGENT ACTION ALERT *URGENT ACTION ALERT *

SENATE RESOLUTION URGES CTBT RATIFICATION THIS YEAR

Senators Specter (R-PA),and Biden (D-DE) plan to introduce a Resolution that they hope to move to a vote *this week.*

The pertinent part of the Resolution reads:

"A Sense of the Senate Resolution that the Foreign Relations Committee should hold hearings on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test- Ban Treaty and that the Senate should take up the treaty for debate and vote on ratification as expeditiously as possible."

*We must assume that the Resolution will be voted on in the next two days *,
although it's possible that the vote will not occur until later.

*We especially need help in states where there are undecided Republican Senators.

*It is crucial that Senators on the Foreign Relations Committee support this Resolution.

The effort of this Resolution is to push the debate forward this year. The Resolution does not force Senators to declare theirs support for the CTBT. Thus, it is not technically a "referendum" on the treaty,

HOWEVER we still need to make sure that as many Senators as possible support this Resolution.

WE NEED YOUR HELP NOW:

Please call your Senators Washington DC Office: (202) 224-3121
(capitol switchboard)

Tell Your Senator:

"Please co-sponsor Senator Specter's Resolution on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Please urge Senate ratification of the CTBT this year."

FOR MORE INFORMATION/ ASSISTANCE:

Disarmament Clearinghouse
Kathy Crandall Coordinator

1101 14th Street NW #700 Washington DC 20005
TEL: 202 898 0150 ext. 232
FAX: 202 898 0172
<disarmament@igc.org>

For WHAT YOU CAN DO for a Nuclear Test Ban Treaty NOW:
<http://www.psr.org/ctbtaction.htm>

Return-Path: <owner-abolition-caucus@igc.org>
Date: Thu, 21 May 1998 01:44:16 +0200
From: Ak Malten <A.Malten@net.HCC.nl>
Sender: owner-abolition-caucus@igc.org
Subject: Minutes NWAD event at NPT PrepComm Geneva 1998
To: a-days@motherearth.org, abolition-caucus@igc.org
X-Sender: amalten@pop4.inter.nl.net

Dear Abolition 2000 and Nuclear Weapons Abolition
Days Friends,

I hereby send you the minutes of the NWAD event
which took place at the NPT PrepComm 30 April 1998
in Geneva.

We had a inspiring meeting round the theme
Citizens' Inspections with members of the
Nuclear Weapons Abolition Days Network and
with others who showed interest in the
subject. We shared reports of Citizens'
Inspections and what happened at the different
sites of crime.

There were reports from:
Jackie Cabasso about Citizens' Inspections
at the Nuclear Ignition Factory in the US.
Greg Mello about Citizens' Inspections at
Los Alamos National Lab in the US.
Pol D'Huyvetter about Citizens' Inspections
in Belgium at NATO HQ and Kleine Brogel
airbase.
Xanthe Hall about Citizens' Inspections in
Germany at Buechel airbase.
After a short emotional introduction, with
a personal story telling his motivation to
undertake this actions, Ak Malten talked
about Actions in the Netherlands at Volkel
airbase.
John Burroughs talked about the International
Law aspects of Citizens' Inspections.
George Farebrother talked about the court
cases around Citizens' Inspections in the UK
which included some information about the
actions them selves.

Although the Citizens' Inspections took place
in different countries and different types of
Nuclear Sites they all had many things in common.

We took notes on the most important aspects of the
Citizens' Inspections reports which can be used as
a model of next Citizens'Inspections.

Goals (Why)

- * Upholding International Law
- * Verifying targets
- * Verify posture of threat (are the bombs ready to go?)
- * Raise consciousness about US Weapons of Mass Destruction - comparison to Iraq
- * Image loss for the lab
- * Deny the authority of the Nuclear Establishment; We are the authority
- * Get Media attention - reach World audience for Abolition 2000
- * Point 11 of the Abolition 2000 Statement - NGO participation
- * Resist Mainline interpretations
- * Initiating a dialogue - enhancing public debate
- * Making the Globe a single community

Laws (Which)

- * Lawful excuse
- * Reference to UNSCOM
- * UN resolutions
- * Opinion of the ICJ
- * ICJ - the or use generally illegal - threat = use - hair trigger alert = threat
- * Humanitarian Law - Civilians as object of attack - indiscriminate nature
- * Nuremberg Principles indirect responsibility Citizens' right to prevent + Law preparations of War Crimes
- * Common conscience
- * Moral authority
- * Societal verification - monitoring elimination + working towards it.
- * Domestic Law; Environmental Law
- * NPT - prevention of terrorism , prevention of disaster
- * Freedom of information act
- * NPT article VI - cessation of the arms race - Nuclear disarmament obligation

Locations (Where)

- * Nuclear Weapons related sites
- * Local Nuclear basis
- * Sites of War Crimes
- * NATO Summit - NATO HQ
- * Targets
- * Nuclear Power Plans (Possibility)
- * India, Pakistan, Iraq, Israel Suspected nuclear installations (possibility)
- * Los Alamos Lab
- * Trident base at Bangor, USA
- * Plutonium facility / Tritium facility
- * Livermore Lab - Fault line
- * Manufacturers
- * Contractors
- * University Campuses
- * US Naval bases in other countries
- * Kleine Brogel in Belgium

- * Buechel in Germany
- * EU COM in Germany
- * Volkel in the Netherlands
- * Nuclear Command Base in France
- * Third World?? - transfer of weapons to South

Dates (When)

- * NATO meeting in Brussels 27th-28th May, 11th-12th June 1998
- * International Peace Camp Brussels 3rd-11th July 1998
- * July 8 th (Anniversary of ICJ Opinion)
- * August 6th + 9th (Hiroshima + Nagasaki Days)
- * September 30th Day of Solidarity with Vanunu
- * October 1th 1946 Nuremberg - Sites of Crime Inspections 1998
- * October 24th UN Disarmament Day
- * NATO 50th birthday 1999
- * Times of Crisis (Iraq)

Types of Inspection + Actions (What)

- * Citizens' Summons
- * Citizens' Inspections
- * Citizens' Verification Teams
- * Non-Violent Direct Actions
- * Photogenic Action
- * Request for entry or meeting
- * Safety inspection
- * Symbolic arrest situation
- * Serve Notice of inspection (mirroring UNSCOM Language)
- * Disclaimer (No intention to Spy or Steal)
- * Pre Inspection - collecting evidence of involvement in Weapons of Mass Destruction
- * Documentary + Legal Evidence
- * Soil samples + photographs
- * Closure of site for War Crimes Inspections - repeated + amplified announcement
- * Entry into site through fence - different places simultaneously
- * Trespass
- * Closed site for War Crime Inspection
- * Cutting the fence
- * Identifying the Bunkers
- * Not civil disobedience, but upholding the law
- * Informing the personnel
- * Health effect monitoring

Inspectors (Who)

- * Scientists
- * Religious Persons
- * Artists
- * Businessmen
- * Nuclear Physicists
- * Famous People
- * Activist + Specialists
- * Doctors / IPPNW
- * Priests

- * Lawyers
- * International / European Delegation
- * Church leaders
- * Marshals ICJ
- * Local People
- * Student Organisations
- * Canberra Commission
- * Mediators

LAW

- * Nuclear Weapons All but illegal (ICJ)
- * Incorporation
- * Particular Nuclear Weapons System illegal
- * Lawful excuse (Believe)
- * Reasonable Force
- * Official channels - Citizens' Summons

Ideas (Questions)

- * Need expert help on Possession = Threat
- * Missiles to Sunflowers - use the symbol - plant sunflowers
- * think through goals of action
- * How can groups in Non Nuclear Weapons countries NNWS- or without nuclear weapon facilities participate
- * Establish links
- * Solidarity messages
- * Send result of inspections to NNWS
- * Problem of conceding / change of dynamic
- * State rights vs terrorist rights

---end---

For those of you who want more background information on the legal aspects of the Citizens' Inspections, please check the following webpage, URL:

or send me a request to send it by e-mail, if you have no access to the World Wide Web (www).

Peace,
or saved by
the pigeon,

Ak Malten,

Global Anti-Nuclear Alliance
Member of Legal Workinggroup of the NWAD Network

=====

The Global Anti-Nuclear Alliance (GANA) -- is a member of
The Abolition 2000 Network, A Global Network to Eliminate
Nuclear Weapons

Address: c/o Ak Malten

Irisstraat 134 Tel:+31.70.3608905
2565TP The Hague Fax:+31.70.3608905
The Netherlands E-Mail: A.Malten@net.HCC.nl

GANAs website:

<http://www.inter.nl.net/hcc/A.Malten/welcome.html>

The ICJ Advisory Opinion on Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,
including ALL the Separate Opinions of ALL the Judges,
the Canberra Report, the CTBT Text and Protocol,
the NPT text (*new*) and the 1925 Gas Protocol (*new*),
the Nuremberg Principles (*new*) and
the MODEL Nuclear Weapons Convention can be found at:

<http://www.inter.nl.net/hcc/A.Malten/docs.html>

=====

Return-Path: <owner-abolition-caucus@igc.org>
Date: Thu, 21 May 1998 11:53:28 +0200 (CEST)
From: "Pol D'Huyvetter" <pol@motherearth.org>
Sender: owner-abolition-caucus@igc.org
Subject: Re: Dalai Lama - Indian nuclear testing
To: abolition-caucus@igc.apc.org
X-Sender: pold@pop.xs4all.be

Please find a response from Tseten Samdup from the Office of Tibet in the UK. The Office of Tibet is the official agency of His Holiness the Dalai Lama.

>From: tibetlondon@gn.apc.org (Tseten Samdup)
>Subject: Re: Dalai Lama supports Indian nuclear testing

>
>Kindly find

>
>His Holiness the Dalai Lama's view on India's Nuclear Tests

>
>His Holiness the Dalai Lama was saddened to hear about the series of
>nuclear tests conducted by India recently.

>
>His Holiness has always been fundamentally against the existence and
>stockpiling of any weapons of mass destruction. He has consistently called
>for the need for efforts to ban nuclear and other weapons of mass
>destruction with the objective of achieving demilitarisation, ultimately
>leading to a nuclear-free world. He strongly endorses the call by the
>People's Republic of China, made some years ago, for a ban on nuclear
>weapons by all countries. As long as some of the major world powers
>continue to possess nuclear weapons, it is not right to outrightly condemn
>India's action. After all, India is a large country with its own security
>perceptions.

>
>His Holiness hopes that a situation could be created in that part of the
>world whereby countries such as India need not have to seek the nuclear
>option. Instead, they could concentrate their resources and talents on
>social and economic advancement of their people.

>
>The Dalai Lama
>NEW DELHI, 19 May 1998

>
>Tseten

>=====

>THE OFFICE OF TIBET, TIBET HOUSE, 1 CULWORTH STREET
>LONDON NW8 7AF, UNITED KINGDOM

>
>The Office of Tibet is the official agency of His Holiness the Dalai Lama

>
>Tel: 0044-171-722 5378 Fax: 0044-171-722 0362

>E-mail: tibetlondon@gn.apc.org

>Internet: <http://www.tibet.com>

>=====

* For Mother Earth International office *

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* Fax +32-9-233 73 02 *
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* WWW:http://www.motherearth.org *

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* For Mother Earth is member of Abolition 2000 - a global *
network to eliminate nuclear weapons, the International Peace
* Bureau (IPB) and World Information Service on Energy (WISE) *

* For Mother Earth has offices in Belgium, Slovakia, Romania, *
* Sri Lanka and USA, aswell as active members/groups in *
* Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Finland, *
* Germany, Netherlands, United Kingdom and Ukraine *

Return-Path: <owner-abolition-caucus@igc.org>
Date: Thu, 21 May 1998 08:47:51 -0400
From: "Ross Wilcock" <rwilcock@execulink.com>
Importance: Normal
Sender: owner-abolition-caucus@igc.org
Subject: Message from India: Nuclear Tests
To: "Abolition-Caucus@Igc. Org (E-mail)" <abolition-caucus@igc.org>
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V4.72.2106.4

Non-member submission from [achin@avk.unv.ernet.in]

-----Original Message-----

From: achin@avk.unv.ernet.in
To: abolition-caucus@igc.apc.org, brucehall@igc.org, dculp@nrdc.org,
johnpike@fas.org, disarmament@igc.apc.org, wagingpeace@napf.org,
Acronym@gn.apc.org
Date: Thu, 21 May 1998 11:05:01
Subject: Nuclear Tests
Organization: Achin Vanaik, Trustee INREP, N.Delhi

HIJACKING THE NUCLEAR AGENDA (pub. in Hindustan Times, May 14th)
By Achin Vanaik

India's bomb tests are morally shameful and politically foolish. Any act which legitimises or promotes the production or deployment of these evil weapons of mass destruction whether it is by the USA, China, India or any other country deserves to be criticised at least on moral grounds even if the overall judgement is that such considerations must be subordinated to 'national security concerns'. Indeed, historically India had always cited the moral factor as a major reason why it would not behave like nuclear elites elsewhere. That nobody amongst the new army of applauders has even bothered to point to the moral dilemma intrinsic to this act reveals most strikingly the general mood of the Indian elite and strategic community. But since nobody barring opponents are bothered by this, let us go to the political dimension.

Amongst the numerous reasons why this act is so foolhardy there is space here only to highlight one-it unleashes a political dynamic which is outside India's control and whose ultimate end cannot yet be forecast. More precisely, there will now be tremendous domestic pressure on Pakistan to carry out its own test in retaliation. If this happens, which is more than likely, the pressure on India to go a step further and openly deploy nuclear weapons will become intense. As it is, there is a powerful lobby both inside the BJP and government as well as outside it which is pushing for India to do this. And of course, once this happens, Pakistan will follow suit and the regional nuclear arms race has begun.

Expect the bomb lobby to react in two ways to such a development. On the one hand there will be the appeal to national chauvinism about the need to counter any Pakistani nuclear threat in the name of national security, ignoring that Pakistani is the reactor. On the other there will be the claim that it doesn't really matter and that, in fact, Pakistani acquisition and deployment of nuclear weapons capability will enhance its self-confidence and therefore improve the prospects of peace through active nuclear deterrence. What will be missing will be any recognition of the simple truth obvious to all but the 'nuclear expert' that the initiation of such nuclear

rivalry both reflects and qualitatively exacerbates the hatreds, tensions and suspicions that have made this the only part of the world that has had for over 50 years a continuous hot-cold war between two countries, and with no end in sight.

It doesn't stop here. For all the talk of the Chinese nuclear threat against India, this supposed threat has always been an utterly abstract one arising not from the actual behaviour of China but from two other directions. First, there has been the deceptive slant given by vested Indian interests to the interpretation of the China-Pakistan relationship. This has falsely been made out to be a near nuclear alliance when it is actually nothing more than a relationship of cooperation in dual use materials and technologies and arms carried out for mutual economic, technological, commercial and political benefit. One can imagine the uproar there would be in this country if China were to supply Pakistan with its most advanced fighter aircraft or help it set up fully two nuclear reactors. Yet this is exactly what Russia is doing with India. The Pakistani hawk who screams that this indicates an alliance between Russia and India which is strategically directed against Pakistan is as fundamentally mistaken as the Indian hawk who makes the opposite but equivalent claim about the China-Pakistan relationship. Second, there has been the deliberate and calculated invocation of China as potential enemy at this juncture, even at the risk of worsening China-India relations for no justified reasons. The purpose of Fernandes's recent tirade against China now stands revealed. It was to lay down the ideological rationale for the bomb tests to come. This could not have been pegged to claims about Pakistani nuclear provocation because of its essentially reactive diplomacy. It could only have been pegged on the need to counter a future threat from a 'potential' enemy, China or on the need for India, too, to be seen as a 'great' power, win world 'respect', etc. This last factor is the real reason for the bomb tests. This action is not the expression of a mature, calm, confident and relaxed nationalism, but of the very opposite! For a long time now what we have been witnessing in India is an insecure, tension-filled mood of frustrated and uncertain nationalism amongst the Indian elite and middle classes. It is precisely because there exists such a milieu and because this promotes the search for a more aggressive 'resolution' of existing problems that the BJP-RSS combine has been able to make the political inroads that it has.

It is not in the least a coincidence that the party which has pursued the most aggressive and viciously communal form of cultural nationalism has also been the party with the most aggressive nuclearist position. It has been the only party whose official position was that it would "exercise the option to induct nuclear weapons" as distinct from merely keeping the option open. Fifty years after independence there is a widespread sense within the Indian elite, that the country has not 'made it' internationally. China has its economic miracle; smaller far eastern countries are greater success stories; India is not listened to seriously, we are a great civilisation, we must shape the twentyfirst century along with other great powers, etc. These are the sentiments that dominate. This is a context eminently suited to the near desperate search for some perceived short-cut that can somehow change such a situation or be thought to do so. There has been no change in the external environment or in threat perceptions that explains what has now happened . It has everything to do with changing self-perceptions.

The sheer lack of sobriety in much of the public response, the near-hysterical character of the adulation is not only pathetic but deeply disturbing because of the out-dated mind-set it reveals. In the more complex

and difficult world we live in, great power status of the conventionally sought kind is neither as important as it was once (and still) thought to be, nor as easy to attain, nor pivoted as significantly on military might. Certainly, nuclear weapons are not only irrelevant to the issue in a way that economic prosperity and strength is not, but so self-defeating as to be part of the problem not the solution.

After what has happened there are still two vital paths to pursue. The first is to call a halt to the line where it now is and to adamantly oppose further movement by India towards open development and deployment of nuclear weapons or indeed any further tests. This is a path which both anti-nuclearists appalled at what has happened and many of those who support the tests can together follow. The other path must be travelled by those who have supported the tests but are rightly hostile or worried by the way in which the BJP has hijacked the nuclear agenda. Even as they may feel or publicly declare that these tests are desirable and will contribute to a strong India it will be the most shameful abnegation of their political and moral responsibility if they do not also declare publicly that they are motivated by a vision of Indian nationalism that is fundamentally opposed to the ugly anti-democratic, communal, intrinsically belligerent Hindutva that is the guiding force of the BJP-RSS project for constructing a Hindu rashtra.

The latter are systematically seeking to hijack the discourses on national security, national interests, national greatness, etc., to legitimise their versions of all these and to use the impact of these tests as part of that larger project. This cannot be effectively confronted by doing what the Congress or UF have done- clamouring for a share of the credit. The feeble official response of the CPI and CPM is equally disgraceful. This can only be done by a consistent differentiation of one's own politics and an equally consistent attack on the ideology of the BJP-RSS even on issues where there seem to be an agreement on final policy. Is it too much to hope that the 'strategic experts' and others who approve of the tests but not of the BJP-RSS will do as much?

THE ILLUSION OF POWER (pub. in Deccan Herald on May 17th)

By Achin Vanaik

Five nuclear tests in all. Perplexity amongst the large majority of Indians, exultation for a much smaller but still very large number, horror and anger amongst the relatively very few. Nuclear weapons are uniquely evil both because of their incredible mass destructive character and the impossibility of distinguishing between combatant and civilian when it comes to either their actual use or even the threat of their use. As such they pose unique moral dilemmas. Any justification of their acquisition on national security grounds should if it is concerned about moral integrity recognise this dilemma and refer to it. Has there been any such reference by the supporters of these tests? Far from it. The moral dimension has been utterly disregarded in favour of a clamour of claims about its political efficacy.

India was not pushed into taking this momentous step because threats to it from Pakistan or China have suddenly risen up. In fact, China became the cats paw (the Fernandes affair) to justify these tests which have been undertaken for basically three crucial reasons. They have been carried out a) to win greater popularity for the Sangh Combine which claims that it is most capable of defining what national security means and how it is to be pursued as well as knowing how best to pursue national greatness. That is to say, the Sangh is deliberately aiming to usurp the agenda and discourse of

nationalism from all rivals and dominate it. b) These tests, unlike the purely symbolic-political one of 1974, is also to obtain necessary technical data relevant to the effort to carry out a warhead weaponisation programme. c) It is an attempt to declare internationally that India is the sixth nuclear weapons power even if not quite a member of club (because it has not yet operationalised i.e. deployed openly a nuclear weapons system) and is now 'great' and must be treated with 'respect' as a major world player. This last justification is the most popular because it responds to a general mood that dominates the Indian elite-an insecure, frustrated and therefore contradictory and aggressive nationalism. In fact, as India will soon enough find out, the power supposedly given by nuclear weapons is utterly illusory. Books can and have been written to substantiate just this one point. Here there is space only for the briefest illustration. Britain has nuclear weapons at a level far ahead of what India might ever attain. Who cares? It is nothing but a lapdog of the USA in its foreign policy and the sick man of Western Europe! France has a significant nuclear arsenal. What does it matter? Apart from bitterly alienating South Pacific Islanders by their tests and feeding the already well-developed sense of French national pomposity, it is of no political relevance. France is losing out progressively to Germany as the significant power in Europe, current and future!

No empire in human history has ever collapsed so comprehensively, so rapidly and with so little rebellion from below as did the USSR with its enormous nuclear arsenal! For all the talk of the supposedly important connection between nuclear weapons and "preserving the security and territorial integrity" of a country, they proved utterly irrelevant. China's nuclear weapons could not prevent it from getting a "bloody nose" by non-nuclear Vietnam in 1979. It could not prevent the USA from selling F-16s to Taiwan. China cannot translate its nuclear might into any tangible gain beyond claiming it is getting more "respect". More than any other government the USA wants to destroy Castro's Cuba. One can easily see how important for achieving this is the USA's conventional military might, its economic power and diplomatic skill. But its nuclear weapons are utterly irrelevant.

Of the many likely consequences of these Indian tests we will briefly cite three. First, it has launched a momentum now very difficult to stop whereby Pakistan will test, India will then openly deploy, followed by Pakistan i.e the launching of an open nuclear arms race in South Asia. Of course, the pro-nuclearists, mesmerised by the 'magical' powers of deterrence, will claim that India-Pakistan relations will actually improve! The tragedy is not that this rubbish is promoted-that is only to be expected-but that it will be widely believed! Second, there will be widespread anger worldwide. This is already evidenced in the declaration of sanctions and other restrictive measures by a number of countries. It is quite possible, probable even, that India will join the CTBT to overcome this temporary hostility but the real damage will have been done to the ongoing hesitant, uneven but nonetheless real and new (it only began after the end of the Cold War) worldwide momentum to actual nuclear disarmament and restraint. Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine (with the third largest arsenal) gave up nuclear weapons status. Three threshold countries, South Africa, Brazil and Argentina (unlike Israel, India and Pakistan) gave up threshold status. Strategic stockpiles have been significantly reduced, tactical missiles removed, nuclear weapons free zones have spread, the CTBT and a host of other positive measures emerged. Now this whole momentum has been seriously damaged with the likely entry for the first time in thirty four years of two

new entrants into the nuclear club encouraging others (e.g. North Korea, Iran and Iraq) to do the same.

Lastly, China will have to view India with new eyes and quietly reorganise its nuclear and strategic preparations and perspectives. China's weapons were not acquired or deployed with India in view but with the ex-USSR and USA in view. Neither in word or deed (only in the abstract speculation of Indian 'experts') has China behaved as if India was a potential nuclear opponent. This is exactly what India has now done vis-a-vis China, and by doing so literally forced it in the direction of becoming such a potential rival. Once again the magic potion of deterrence will be invoked to rationalise such a new dynamic as a great 'security' gain. Nuclear insanity has prevailed.

DRAWING NEW LINES

By Achin Vanaik

In one fell swoop the bomb tests have dramatically altered the terrain of discourse on the nuclear issue. The biggest victims of what has happened are not the anti-nuclearists. Though small, they remain an inescapable part of the debate and will not disappear as long as nuclear weapons themselves do not. It is the ambiguiests whose ranks have been decimated. Their perspectives have been rendered meaningless, their future non-existent, and its practitioners have simply been swallowed up. A few who are appalled may move towards the anti-nuclearist side, most will join the more ardent nuclearists. Yet amazingly, for decades and right upto May 11th, the ambiguiests represented both the large majority and the 'sober middle ground' of decision-makers and decision-shapers on the issue. All it took was, in effect, a violent political coup by a party ruthlessly determined to transform the total character of Indian society to destroy their position. But where do we go now? For anti-nuclearists and even some sections of those who have supported these tests, new lines of defense and struggle have to be drawn in order to fulfil what a sober interpretation of security needs (internal and external) would have us do. The first line of defence requires a permanent end to any further tests. This unavoidably brings up the question of the CTBT. The fact that the last two tests were officially justified in language that referred to their value in enabling future sub-critical testing, obviously suggests that the government will seriously consider signing the CTBT even unconditionally since the treaty does not prevent such non-explosive testing. This would defuse the pressure of sanctions completely.

To talk of renegotiating amendments before signing is nonsensical and the government knows it. This is a finalised treaty (open for review to its signatories in 1999) which emerged out of a prolonged multilateral process. There is no question of negotiations being reopened. At most, India (when talking of "reciprocal initiatives") is putting out a feeler for possible private U.S. help in, say, sub-critical/computer simulation technology as the hidden price for accession to the CTBT. Of course, there is a group within the government that is still opposed to signing the treaty. Their strength should not be underestimated. However, they might come around eventually, particularly since the CTBT does not formally prevent India from going on towards full open deployment of nuclear weapons which the anti-CTBT lobby wants.

Indeed, so many of the same people who not so long ago attacked the CTBT for being essentially worthless as a restraint measure, especially on the USA and also for being discriminatory are now saying it can and should be signed by India as a declared weapons power. What now has happened to the claims of

the CTBT being worthless as well as discriminatory between nuclear haves and have-nots? Or of India's earlier insistence that the CTBT must be connected to a timetable for total global nuclear disarmament? A handful of Indian anti-nuclearists repeatedly argued that the CTBT was (despite its deficiencies) a powerful restraint measure on the USA which is why the Republican party and so many others in the U.S. rightwing were opposed to it. And that unlike the NPT which is discriminatory, the CTBT is not. It was also pointed out that India was not genuine or serious about its insistence on having a timetable linked to its accession to the treaty (which was anyway wrong-making the best the enemy of the good) but was using this as a stall and excuse to oppose the CTBT for reasons not connected to the supposed demerits of the treaty but to its then 'national security' concerns.

Either the former opponents of the CTBT were wrong in considering the CTBT discriminatory (and in their other criticisms) or they are now prepared to be party to a discriminatory treaty as a nuclear-have country. That is to say, what bothered all those who then claimed the moral high ground of opposing discrimination on principle and are now advocating accession to the CTBT was never the principle of discrimination as such but only the fact that India could not benefit from it! The point is not just to expose the moral cynicism and deceitfulness of it all but something more serious. India which says it has now joined the nuclear club has now become part of the problem as far as pursuing global nuclear disarmament is concerned and not part of the solution. But like all nuclear elites, the Indian one will also claim that there is no basic contradiction between the pursuit of national security through nuclearisation and the pursuit of total global denuclearisation. Political and moral hypocrisy on nuclear matters is not the property of one or some members of the nuclear club but is built into the very nature of membership of such a club.

The second line of defence of nuclear sanity requires that we do not operationalise the declared nuclear capability. Of course these tests are integrally connected to a warhead weaponisation programme. But the decision to openly deploy is a conscious political act which has still to, but should not, be taken. A retaliatory Pakistani test should not be reacted to with immaturity and a clamour for open deployment. The existing lobby which wants to push for exactly this is simply waiting to capitalise on the anticipated Pakistani test. Again, Pakistan will not first openly deploy but will only do so if India does it first. The firebreak between testing and deployment/operationalisation is the dividing line between the still relatively stable position of today and the escalating dynamic of a nuclear arms race not only between India and Pakistan but with China.

If today's supporter of these tests is not swayed by current euphoria and is also prepared to admit what is obvious-that these tests had nothing to do with any deterioration in the external environment but were motivated by changed self-perceptions-then there is no urgency whatsoever to the question of deployment. One can even continue preparations for it but without actually deploying. The longer the firebreak is maintained between what has happened and possible deployment the lower will be the nuclear tensions between India and its neighbours as well as in relation to the world community. India will also salvage something of its credibility when it claims to be still committed to pursuing global disarmament. The supposed gains in terms of "status", "prestige" etc. of having broken into the nuclear club are also not affected by not going further.

The third line of defence is in some ways the most important. The Sangh

Combine has shown by this act not only that it means what it says when it comes to the pursuit of its vision of Indian nationalism but that it has no democratic scruples whatsoever. The decision to test was (apart from Fernandes) not discussed or even shared beforehand with its coalition partners. An act of such momentous import was undertaken by the BJP alone although on its own it has no public mandate even to rule. The need for secrecy it will be claimed necessitated this. It did not. The other party leaders could have been told and sworn to secrecy. Yet a powerful political force (which pretends to be only cultural) and which is not in government and is not democratically accountable to the Indian voter was privy to this decision and information-the RSS. The Organiser hits the stands barely one hour after the public announcement with its issue devoted precisely to glorification of the 1974 test ostensibly to commemorate its silver jubilee. The audacity of the RSS-BJP claim that this is a mere coincidence is simply breathtaking! Does the Sangh Combine think, particularly given the regular and systematic manner in which the RSS has intervened in BJP governmental decision-making even in these two months, that it can fool all the people all the time?

The implication of this secretive contempt for all fundamental democratic norms and the revealed closeness with which the RSS-BJP work together is nothing short of frightening. We have been forewarned. A battle for the very soul of Indian nationalism is being fought. They are out to usurp the nationalist discourse and dominate it with their communal, belligerent, Hindutva-related constructs of national security, national interests and national greatness. It is one thing to agree with a particular policy of their's on national security, e.g. these tests. It is another thing to fail to fight them tooth and nail even on this terrain and even when one agrees with their policies but never with their deeper motives and hidden purposes behind those policies. This can only be done by explicitly counterposing one's own constructs of what will secure India's interests and make it great and attacking their constructs. Strategic experts who do this will have to forsake what they most want-to be taken seriously as advisors to this government. But it is a choice one hopes that some will make.

THE BANALITY OF EVIL

By Achin Vanaik

The small and angry minority of anti-nuclearists in India can take some solace from the fact that they are needed now more than ever. They represent the other side of an ongoing discourse and will be around as long as nuclear weapons remain on the face of this earth or that earth itself becomes no longer humanly habitable. The political folly of taking this decision to go nuclear is something that I have been arguing in numerous ways for over a decade. There will be occasion to do so many times again, especially when the shadow of the Pakistan bomb falls on those who can currently only see the 'glow' of the Indian bomb. Here I wish, for a change, to focus on that dimension which has been utterly and contemptuously disregarded by all who supported the testing-the moral question.

The universal glorification of this 'scientific achievement' and the congratulations from all quarters showered on the scientists responsible is nothing less than obscene. Many greater scientists possessing moral courage and integrity of a much higher order, will simply be appalled. Those of the past like Einstein and Oppenheimer who were horrified by what their endorsement of, and association with, the production of the first atomic weapon had done, and spent the rest of their lives opposing this new evil, will now be turning over in their graves. So sensitive were they to the

unique evil represented by such weapons that they insisted not only that what they had earlier justified (needed to fight Hitler) was wrong but that any future production of such weapons be it in the name of national security, or whatever, could never be justified. Joseph Rotblat, recent Nobel prizewinner, simply walked away from the Manhattan Project. Indeed, as they pointed out, if the scientists of the world exercising an independent moral conscience simply refused to make such weapons for their political masters, the world would be free forever of such evil.

A starry-eyed idealism one might say? Once the first bomb appeared other countries felt compelled to do the same. One cannot as strongly blame later scientists for not all having the same moral courage as these scientists-dissidents or for doing as they were told by their political masters. This is true enough, and condemning the scientists responsible for carrying out these Pokhran tests is misplaced and not what is being called for. The issue is the obscenity of glorifying this supposed feat and claiming it to be a scientific accomplishment worthy of evoking national pride. One could have understood it if the supporters of this testing had said that they were fully aware of this moral dimension but that it had to be subordinated to national security considerations. Or that they were forced to produce these weapons because of the threat possessed by others and therefore had to misuse national scientific capacities (as others had earlier done) to produce them. Or that they grieved because instead of using our wonderful pool of scientists and their skills for truly worthwhile endeavours they had to be wasted for producing something which is so evil by the very nature of their being weapons of mass destruction that they must never be used!

One is not demanding here, that those who supported these tests withdraw their support. On the contrary, one is asking the question why not one politician, not one party, not one strategic expert, and so few journalists among all those who supported the stand of the Indian government could nonetheless not even think of making the only honest and accurate characterisation of the relationship between science and nuclear weapons! To have refrained from praising this misuse, to have called it an unfortunate, even if necessary, abuse of science and scientific knowledge and skill would have been to exhibit a real moral sensitivity and balance, to recognise the distinctive dilemmas posed for any country which decides to go in for such weapons and for anybody who rationalises such possession. The view that this act deserved to be praised as a scientific 'accomplishment' was so widespread and so 'natural' that to think otherwise was made to appear immoral and unpatriotic! What an incredible state of affairs and what a statement of the moral character and fibre of our strategic and political elite and of their upper and middle class supporters! Most of them at least, unlike the more perplexed poor, cannot be accused of not knowing what kinds of weapons these are.

And yet the view that anti-nuclearists are morally superior people to pro-nuclearists is simplistic and inaccurate. The problem is more fundamental and frightening. It is not because people who are more morally insensitive than others will somehow naturally gravitate to being pro-nuclear but the other way around. Ordinary people who are naturally moral and sensitive are made much more insensitive by accepting the ideology and practice of nuclearism. The immorality is built into the very nature of nuclear strategic discourse and practice. Nuclear deterrence is a deeply immoral doctrine. The defence of it is always immoral. Persistent involvement in this discourse debases a nation, above all the nuclear elite

and its support base. Moral hypocrisy cannot be avoided. It gets institutionalised and repeatedly surfaces over a whole range of arguments, claims and policy postures. There is the hypocrisy of claiming that nuclear arming by a 'good' country will promote nuclear disarmament and, of course, all national nuclear elites regard their own country as 'good'. A more recent hypocrisy will be shown by those in India who screamed that the NPT and CTBT discriminate between nuclear haves and have-nots but will now say India should sign these as a nuclear weapons state. The NPT is discriminatory, the CTBT is not, but let us leave that aside for the moment. Terrible as it is, the central issue is not the moral hypocrisy of nuclear strategic discourse. Nor is it even the strategic and political incoherence of nuclear deterrence thinking. Now that more people will be forced to think more seriously than ever before on this issue, the strategic-political dividing line will be between those who continue to believe that such deterrence works and those who recognise that it is incoherent, self-contradictory and degenerative in the logic it imposes on the relations between hostile, nuclearly equipped rivals - hence an unavoidable arms race and growing nuclear tension.

It is another inescapable dilemma that is the crux. The pursuit of national nuclear security is simply not compatible with the pursuit at the same time of universal global disarmament. Some pro-nuclearists pretend to themselves and others that it is. The more straightforward of the pro-nuclearists have simply said we can never have complete global nuclear disarmament which is a mirage. However, it isn't. Humans have the capacity to undo this unnecessary evil but to do so they have to abandon the political stupidity and the immorality of deterrence thinking. As long as it holds we are doomed to having the shadow of the nuclear holocaust always upon us. We will not move towards total disarmament through notions of proportionate disarmament so that 'security deterrence' is always presumably maintained till all the nuclear weapons states simultaneously reach the point of complete disarmament. The moral breakthrough has to come first-to think differently and reject deterrence-in order to make the political breakthrough towards institutionalising an irreversible process culminating in total disarmament.

Einstein pointed out the dilemma long ago-" the coming of nuclear weapons has changed everything but the way we think." Moral commitment, integrity, and courage are the need of the hour and the struggle to realise these values is the only way to overcome our fundamental evils be they apartheid, colonialism or nuclearism. The growth and spread of pro-nuclearists reflects the triumph, through banality, of evil.

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To: dkimball@clw.org, mail@rabinowitz.com
From: dkimball@clw.org (Daryl Kimball)
Subject: new CTBT poll results

May 21, 1998

TO: Coalition members and friends
FR: Daryl Kimball
RE: new CTBT poll results

Below is an electronic-text version of the Coalition's news release on the new nationwide CTBT poll that we commissioned from The Mellman Group. The poll was conducted May 15-17 -- after the Indian tests.

The results are, as you can see below, overwhelmingly in favor of Senate approval of the treaty.

Please help disseminate these results and use them in your work.

The full-version of the release with charts describing poll results is available on the Coalition's CTBT site
<<http://www.clw.org/pub/clw/coalition/ctbindex.htm>>

DK

COALITION TO REDUCE NUCLEAR DANGERS

NEWS RELEASE

**"After Indian Nuke Tests, Support for the Test Ban Treaty Remains Strong:
New National Poll Shows 73% of Americans Support Senate Approval"**

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: May 21, 1998

CONTACTS: Steve Rabinowitz (202) 546- 3577; or Daryl Kimball, Executive Director, (202) 546-0795 x136

(May 21, 1998, WASHINGTON, DC) Less than a week after India's shocking nuclear test blasts, an overwhelming majority of Americans support Senate ratification of a treaty banning nuclear tests, according to a new nationwide poll. When asked "Do you think the U.S. Senate should approve a Treaty with 140 other countries that would prohibit underground nuclear weapons explosions worldwide," 73% of respondents say the treaty should be "approved," while only 16% "disapprove," and 11% "don't know."

The treaty, known as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), was submitted to the Senate last year, but the Senate has so far failed to act on the treaty. Just this week, President Clinton reiterated his call for

Senate approval of the CTBT "this year." Sixty-seven votes are needed for ratification. Also, Senators Arlen Specter (R-PA), Joseph Biden (D-DE), and others introduced a resolution calling for prompt hearings and vote on the treaty "as expeditiously as possible."

The results are based on the findings of an opinion survey of 1000 adults conducted by The Mellman Group for the Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers between May 15-17, 1998. The survey's margin of error is plus or minus 3.1 percentage points.

Support Is Higher Among Those Who Have Heard About India's Nuclear Tests:

Almost two-thirds of Americans (63%) claim they have heard about recent nuclear weapons test explosions by India (30% heard a great deal, 33% heard some), while only a third (37%) say they have not heard much or heard nothing at all. India conducted five nuclear weapons tests on May 11 and 13.

Those who have heard of recent events in India support Senate approval of the test ban treaty in larger numbers than those who are unfamiliar with those events. Among those who have heard about the test, 78% approve of the treaty and 15% disapprove (+63% net support). Support for the test ban treaty among those who have not heard about the Indian tests is still overwhelmingly strong (65% approve, 19% disapprove).

Support for the treaty cuts across every demographic group. Men are slightly more supportive of a ban (76% approve, 16% disapprove) than women (71% approve, 16% disapprove).

There is little difference in the level of support for the test ban across the nation. But, those in the West (76% approve, 12% disapprove), North Central region (76% approve, 14% disapprove), and North East (76% approve, 15% disapprove) are even more supportive than those in the South (68% approve, 20% disapprove).

After Indian Tests, Public Support for the Test Ban Is As Strong As Ever:

The Indian tests have renewed debate about how to stop proliferation in regional hot-spots such as India and Pakistan and whether the test ban treaty is part of the solution. The May 1998 survey shows that public support for Senate approval of the test ban treaty remains as strong as it was last fall when the same survey was conducted. A September 1997 survey showed that 70% of respondents supported approval of the test ban treaty, only 13% disapproved and 17% didn't know.

The results of the new survey are also consistent with 10 other polls on the test ban conducted since 1957, when President Eisenhower first sought a test ban. While the poll questions have varied somewhat over the years, support has ranged from only 61%-85%.

"Americans overwhelmingly support ratification of the test ban treaty -- a vital element in efforts to protect our nation and the world from the spread of nuclear weapons and nuclear arms competition in places like India and Pakistan," says Daryl Kimball, Director of the Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers. "The Indian nuclear tests make the value of the test ban treaty

even clearer and the public wants the test ban now, more than ever."

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The Coalition is a non-partisan alliance of the nation's leading arms control and non-proliferation organizations working for a practical, step-by-step program to reduce nuclear dangers and prevent new threats from emerging.

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To: dkimball@clw.org
From: dkimball@clw.org (Daryl Kimball)
Subject: news--India to talk abt. test moratorium?

May 21

TO: Coalition members and friends
FR: Daryl Kimball

India still appears to be sending out feelers about possible adherence to a test moratorium. See story below.

DK

RTf

05/21 0839

India says ready to talk on N-test moratorium

NEW DELHI - India said on Thursday that it was ready to hold talks with world powers on formalising a new moratorium on Indian nuclear testing.

"We are willing to talk with the key interlocutors on the question of formalising our non-testing, that is making the moratorium a formal obligation on our part," Brajesh Mishra, principal secretary to Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee, told a news conference.

India sparked global outrage last week by conducting a series of five nuclear tests, its first in 24 years. Mishra said that with the second batch of the series, on May 13, India's planned tests were over.

"Now there is a moratorium on tests. We would like to formalise the moratorium," he said. "For that, we need to have talks with key interlocutors. We are ready for the talks."

New Delhi has consistently refused to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), saying it would permit the five nuclear powers to perfect their arms with non-explosive techniques like computer simulation, while holding others in check. It said after the tests that it was ready to subscribe to substantive parts of the treaty.

Asked if there had been any communication from the key nuclear powers, Mishra said: "There has been some communication. I am not going to go into details."

Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers

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Return-Path: <jloretz@tiac.net>
Date: Thu, 21 May 1998 10:17:30 -0400
From: John Loretz <jloretz@tiac.net>
Reply-To: jloretz@tiac.net
Organization: Medicine & Global Survival
To: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.apc.org>
Subject: Re: Revised & Updated Version, India-An Opportunity
References: <2.2.16.19980520155944.35efa0da@pop.igc.org>

Howard W. Hallman wrote:

>
> Dear John Loretz:
>
> I hope you won't right off all of us who seek the abolition of nuclear
> weapons based upon our religious conviction that nuclear weapons are morally
> wrong, both for deterrence and for war-fighting. This view was offered to
> the 1998 session of the NPT Preparatory Committee in a statement signed by
> Dr. Konrad Raiser, general secretary of the World Council of Churches, and
> Godfried Cardinal Danneels, president of Pax Christi International. It is
> attached.
>
> Shalom,
> Howard Hallman

Hi Howard,

Although my language was a little harsh, I meant no disrespect to anyone's convictions and of course I would never write anyone off. We are all in this together. I was only trying to make the point, which Ak and Peggy and some others echoed in their own ways, that folks with strongly held religious beliefs have a tendency to express themselves (and why wouldn't they?) in language that strikes a discordant note with those of us who draw our values from different sources. Even the concept of stewardship, which I'm sure seems self-evident and wholly positive to you, is seen as part of the problem from a secular, biocentric perspective. Many of us have very a negative response to the word "missionary" in particular (and you handled getting beat up by us very peaceably).

I think it is fair to say that all of us welcome -- and need -- the support and leadership of people within religious traditions of all kinds. For one thing, those of us who believe that "god" is a creation of the human imagination, and not the other way around, are in a distinct minority from what I can see, and if we don't want to be proselytized, we had better not proselytize anyone else. Also, nuclear weapons won't spare any of us, as far as I can tell, regardless of what story we subscribe to.

Anyway, that's where I'm coming from.

Peace,

John

--

John Loretz
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M&GS on the World Wide Web:
<http://www.healthnet.org/MGS>

Also visit the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) Web site (<http://www.healthnet.org/IPPNW>) for information about the Abolition 2000 campaign, the campaign to ban landmines, and IPPNW research studies and publications.

Return-Path: <owner-abolition-caucus@igc.org>
Date: Thu, 21 May 1998 10:38:09 -0400
From: Lachlan Forrow <lforrow@igc.apc.org>
Sender: owner-abolition-caucus@igc.org
Subject: World Media on India: I
To: abolition-caucus@igc.org
X-Sender: lforrow@pop.igc.org

Below are excerpts from throughout the world of media responses (95 examples from 34 countries) to the Indian nuclear test explosions. With rare exceptions, the idea that this was a "wake up call" for nuclear abolition is hardly mentioned.

We still have a LOT of work to do...

--LF

NORTHEAST ASIA PEACE AND SECURITY NETWORK
***** SPECIAL REPORT *****

Thursday, May 14, 1998, from Berkeley, California, USA

The United States Information Agency (USIA) distributed the following digest of international media reaction to the recent series of nuclear tests conducted by India. The digest is comprised of an overall summary followed by summaries of selected items.

Editorialists around the world reacted with surprise, shock and no small amount of dismay to the news that India had, on Monday, carried out three underground nuclear tests in the desert of Rajasthan near the Pakistani border--followed by two additional detonations early Wednesday morning. The tests, the first that have been carried out by India since 1974, ushered India into the "exclusive club" of declared nuclear states--a status formerly reserved for the U.S., Russia, Britain, France and China. In strongly worded editorials, observers in all quarters judged that India's actions would unleash a dangerous arms race on the Indian subcontinent, and beyond. Joining the many other commentators who decried the Indian tests as a "stupid and dangerous exercise," Toronto's leading Globe and Mail stressed: "An Indian bomb is destabilizing, unnecessary, misguided and dangerous.... A nuclear India spells a nuclear Pakistan, and Pakistan's eastern neighbor is Iran. You see where this is going." Writers from Asia, Europe, and Latin America urged the global community to voice its "strong disapproval" of India's weapons testing, with many endorsing the U.S. move to impose sanctions on India. Munich's centrist Sueddeutsche Zeitung asserted: "President Clinton reacted to the Indian nuclear tests with the only right answer: He imposed sanctions." Turin's centrist La Stampa

likewise headlined that the "correct response" to "New Delhi's double slap" was to impose sanctions. Others, however, pointed out that Russia and France might dampen the move toward sanctions by proffering only "verbal condemnation" of India. Following are highlights of the commentary:

INDIA: 'EXPLOSION OF SELF-ESTEEM'--Very few voices dissented from the dominant view in the Indian media that the country's leaders had done "the right thing" in carrying out the "surprise" nuclear tests. For the most part, pundits welcomed their government's "audacious move," asserted India's right to arm itself as it pleased, and pooh-poohed the threat of sanctions. Many Indian columnists maintained that India's burgeoning market would give it leverage with "the West." The centrist Hindu best summed up that view, saying: "With its large market, India may be in a position to pre-empt the possibilities of a major coordinated move among the great powers to collectively punish it." That paper and others also called for "confidence-building measures" with China and Pakistan.

'ALL EYES' ON PAKISTAN'S RESPONSE--Pakistan's response to the nuclear tests was hotly debated in many quarters, not least in Pakistan itself. Most outside observers were convinced that Pakistan would certainly respond "in kind." And, although many Pakistani opinion-makers also subscribed to that view, a substantial number contended that India's neighbor should refrain from "being provoked" into conducting its own nuclear explosion. To do so, argued leading, Urdu-language Jang and others, "would turn world opinion against us...and would harm us much more than India."

This survey is based on 95 reports from 34 countries, May 12 - 14. EDITOR: Kathleen J. Brahney

SOUTH ASIA

INDIA: "India Rubs It In With Two More Blasts"

The BJP Government's defiance of world opinion by conducting two more nuclear tests on Wednesday overshadowed President Bill Clinton's imposition of "tough economic sanctions" on India on the front pages of all national dailies (5/14). Although most banner headlines were fairly straightforward, there were a few strident exceptions, like the one above in the pro-Congress Party Observer of Business and Politics. Virtually all editorial commentary continued to support the Indian government's decision.

"In For A Penny"

An editorial (5/14) in the right-of-center Indian Express said: "The two further nuclear tests at Pokharan on Wednesday give a clear enough indication that the government's mind is working in the right direction. The signal is heartening, and the tests are

to be welcomed. It seems almost certain that the government wants to go ahead and sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty-- when it is good and ready."

"Damage Control"

According to the editorial (5/14) in the pro-economic reforms Economic Times: "By conducting another set of tests, the government has signalled that it refuses to be cowed down by threats of sanctions by foreign powers.... As far as external reactions are concerned, the first set of tests have already wrought most of the possible damage. The incremental damage from additional tests would not be much.... Having conducted the tests, the energies of the government must be directed towards minimizing the damage.... India's behavior must leave room for the nations imposing sanctions to wiggle out of this hostile posture.... This goes beyond stating a willingness to join the CTBT, and calls for maturity of language and conduct not only on the diplomatic front but also by politicians at home."

"Dissenting View"

The nationalist Hindustan Times ran this opinion (5/14) by academic Achin Vanaik: "India's bomb tests are morally shameful and politically foolish.... (The tests) unleash a political dynamic which is outside India's control and whose ultimate end cannot yet be forecast. More precisely, there will now be tremendous domestic pressure on Pakistan to carry out its own test in retaliation.... Once this happens...the regional nuclear arms race will begin."

"India's Compulsions"

An editorial in the nationalist Hindustan Times insisted (5/14): "The United States and its allies would do well to ponder over the compulsions which made India take the decisive step. One of these is the virtually unstinted help which Pakistan has received, mainly from the United States and also to a large extent from China, in pursuing an uninhibited policy of belligerence toward India.... The central point of both the American and Chinese attitude was to build up Pakistan as a counter to India, whose democracy was an embarrassment to Beijing and whose independent spirit was an irritation to Washington from the non-aligned days."

"Test Of Nerves"

The centrist Times of India's editorial stated (5/14): "Given the hypocrisy which governs U.S. policy on nuclear matters, the imposition of limited sanctions against India was only to be expected.... No country has the right to dictate to another what policies it can and cannot follow.... The U.S. move needs to be condemned in the strongest possible terms."

"Coping With Sanctions"

Strategic affairs editor C. Raja Mohan recommended in the centrist Hindu (5/14): "Preventing the unity of the great powers should then be an important component of India's strategy. There may be some hope on this front, particularly in the wake of the French reaction to the Indian test.... With its large market, India may be in a position to pre-empt the possibilities of a major coordinated move among the great powers to collectively punish it.... India must (also) quickly communicate to...its two nuclear neighbors, China and Pakistan, that it is prepared for extensive engagement on arms control and military confidence-building in both conventional and nuclear fields."

"Test Of Aplomb"

The centrist Pioneer declared (5/14): "Atal Bihari Vajpayee's administration appears to have accomplished the impossible in keeping both tests a closely guarded secret. That the multi-million dollar U.S. spy in the sky too failed to detect preparations is an added source of comfort."

"After Pokharan-II"

Pundit K. Subrahmanyam's analysis in the pro-economic-reforms Economic Times held (5/14): "Our allies in this game are the multinationals looking for big business opportunities in India. Our strategy should aim at interesting as many of them as possible in investments and trade in this country.... Once there is clear realization in the United States and the West that their pressure tactics would not work, they will understand the futility of their stand."

"Worthy Of Congratulation" The above headline led readers of the independent Urdu-language Milap to this editorial (5/13): "Recent nuclear tests were necessitated by several security-related developments in the region which have begun showing ominous signs and doubts about India's capability to defend itself effectively.... One can easily anticipate the strongest reaction from the self-styled world policeman, the United States. With its own history of 1,200 nuclear tests, the United States has no ground on which to lecture India on the subject of peace.... As for sanctions, the United States is free to do whatever it may like. However, it should also know that the projectiles aimed at others do also boomerang."

"Welcome India, Do No Isolate It"

In the editorial opinion (5/13) of the centrist Asian Age: "Washington will be tempted toward punishment in its initial reactions, if only to send a signal to other threshold states. But wisdom will lie in squeezing a solution out of what has

happened. India is now ready to join the rest of the world on the nuclear issue. The rest of the world should welcome India, not isolate it."

"Time For Real Confidence Measures"

K. Subrahmanyam wrote (5/13) in the pro-economic reforms Economic Times, "Now that the Indian bomb is out of the closet and the Pakistani will follow suit, there are reasonable chances of India, China and Pakistan concluding a mutual no-first-use agreement and initiating real confidence-building measures."

"How To Limit Sanctions"

An editorial (5/13) in the pro-economic reforms Economic Times held: "In time, the furor will die down. Remember that Tiananmen Square did not mean the end of China's globalization.

"The main aim of India's policy now must be to reduce the strength and duration of these economic penalties.... The U.S. administration is not keen on really tough sanctions, as mandated by U.S. law. The administration sees India as a great potential investment and trade partner, and would like to find a way round mandated sanctions if possible. India must give it room for maneuver by proposing to sign the CTBT.... Enough of muscle flexing: It is now time for diplomacy."

"U.S. Threats Don't Mean Anything"

Nationalist Jansatta Hindi front-paged this analysis (5/13), "There is no need to get unduly worried about U.S. threats to India, for American memory is short-lived and for them India is a big market."

"Explosion Of Self-Esteem"

The centrist Pioneer had this comment (5/12) by editor Chandan Mitra: "(India's) first successful explosion at Pokhran in 1974 has acquired a new, symbolic meaning today. India has arrived on the threshold of superpower status, literally with a bang."

"A Moment Of Pride"

Under the above headline, the nationalist Hindustan Times' lead editorial declared (5/12): "Twenty-four years after India took the first step on the road to nuclear power and then inexplicably retreated into the policy of ambiguity, the decision to conduct a fresh series of tests on Monday denoted a bold and even audacious move, made all the more startling by its suddenness. The 'smiling Buddha' of 1974 has now blossomed into a new assertion of the country's right to arm itself in a manner which it believes is best suited to its security interests."

"Nuclear Shadow"

The pro-economic-reforms Business Standard had this view (5/12): "The decision of the [shaky] coalition led by the BJP to set off, not one but three, underground nuclear explosions...could turn out to be a rather ill considered one.... Only the hopelessly naive will believe that they will not have an impact on world opinion and that India may not be isolated in a number of important ways."

"A Surprise Test"

Academic G. Balachandran maintained in the pro-economic reforms Economic Times (5/12): "All in all the tests are a welcome development in strengthening India's national security."

"Nuclear Equality Best Way To Stop Nuclear Wars"

The centrist, Hindi-language Navbharat Times front-paged this editorial comment (5/12): "The whole nation should throw its weight behind the Bharatiya Janata Party government for taking this bold and much-needed step. Till such time as there is even one nuclear weapon in this world, no one has the right to stop India from making its own. By taking this step, India has shown great courage, not to mention its scientific and technological might."

"Who Cares About External Pressures?"

Under the above headline, pro-nationalist Hindustan front-paged this (5/12): "Our defense scientists and the BJP leadership need to be patted on their backs for taking this bold step."

PAKISTAN: "India Tests Again!"

Press reaction (5/14) reflected in the daily headlines was almost uniform in depicting India as "defiant" in conducting two additional tests in the face of international condemnation and the threat of U.S. sanctions. The front pages of all newspapers carried news of the imposition of sanctions by President Clinton as well as the responses from Pakistani officials that sanctions may well not be enough, and calls from various political figures--including former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto--for a Pakistani response in kind. In the wake of yesterday afternoon's additional tests, the call for a Pakistani response to the India tests was stronger than earlier in the week, with the Urdu-language press again slightly more vehement in the language of its comments. There were still, in both English- and Urdu-language dailies, voices urging a restrained response in Pakistan's own best interests."

"Fallout From India's Explosion"

The center-right Nation's editorial stated (5/14): "It is ironic

that a large part of the United States' concern is still focused on Pakistan's reaction to India's explosions rather than concentrating on the implications for regional and global security of New Delhi's actions."

"Irresistible Pressure"

An op-ed by Hamid Alvi in Islamabad's rightist Pakistan Observer stressed (5/14): "The mood of the nation is to go for it whatever the cost. The people no longer favor restraint as practiced in the past under Western pressure."

"U.S. Credentials Tested"

The Peshawar-based independent Frontier Post held (5/14): "As expected, the United States is now pressuring Pakistan to show restraint in the face of nuclear tests by India.... Under the circumstances, it (is) tempting for Pakistan to do exactly what the Indians have done: Explode a nuclear device and then say it is ready to sign the CTBT. If the world accepts this hypocrisy, then why not go ahead with it and secure a tremendous advantage?"

"Trying Times"

An op-ed by Imtiaz Alam asked in the centrist News (5/14): "Should Pakistan follow suit and explode its matching nuclear device, as being encouraged by the cunning Indian hawks and demanded by a cross-section of people at home, and share with India wide-ranging sanctions it can least afford for violating

non-proliferation regime? Or should it let nuclear India be damned all alone?"

"Proceed With Caution"

Leading, top-circulation, Urdu-language Jang remarked (5/14): "It is most satisfying for Pakistan that this time, the world community has not downplayed India's intransigence...and Pakistan has not been left alone to shed tears over India. However, against the background of the current world reaction, there are questions on which Pakistan must display a cautious and even positive approach.... As with Israel... in our case, too, no one doubts that Pakistan has the nuclear capability.... Even if we did prove our nuclear capability, it would not benefit us in any substantial way. This much, however, is certain: world opinion, which at present is opposed to India, would turn against us as well, and this would harm us much more than India."

"Best Response To Indian Explosions"

An editorial in leading, mass-circulation, Urdu-language Jang (5/13) concluded, "(The United States) is only interested in keeping nuclear technology out of the Muslim world because it cannot tolerate the notion of any Muslim country acquiring

nuclear technology. That is why it is only Muslim countries like Pakistan, Libya, Iran, Iraq that eventually become the targets of the U.S. sanctions."

"U.S., West Encouraging India"

Popular, Urdu-language Ausaf held (5/13): "We think that the May 11 nuclear explosion in Rajasthan has caused the United States neither any anxieties nor has it truly surprised any other Western country. These countries themselves have been providing nuclear assistance to India for the last oh-so many years. China, the superpower of the future, is the mote in their eyes. They are encouraging the Indian bull to offer a permanent inter-regional challenge to China, and force China to keep busy dealing with regional threats."

"We Must Not Deflect Attention From India As Nuclear Rogue"

Dr. Rifaat Hussain commented in the centrist News (5/13): "While expressing our resolve to defend our national interests with means of our choosing, we must not do anything precipitate which would deflect world attention from India as a nuclear rouge state and erode our credibility as a responsible member of the international community. If all else fails, we as a sovereign nuclear capable state can always take those steps that are necessary to ensure our national security. Indian nuclear tests have revealed the bankruptcy of the American sanction-oriented approach to Pakistan and our stance on the nuclear question stands vindicated. While preparing for our defense we should not forgo the opportunity of benefiting ourselves diplomatically from this new reality."

"We Shall Resist Being Provoked Into Action"

Mujeebur Rahman Shami wrote in leading, mass-circulation, Urdu-language Jang (5/13): "The absolute need of the hour is for India to be completely isolated in its war-mongering and its nuclear obsessions and for the entire world to place full blame where it belongs. If Pakistan immediately conducts its own nuclear explosion, it would help India. We shall, therefore,

resist being provoked into an action which would harm our national interests."

"Pakistan Should Weigh All Options"

The center-right Nation advised (5/13): "To prevent Pakistan from catching up and keeping the Kashmir issue alive, India may also have decided to sign the CTBT, thereby diverting international pressure from itself to Pakistan. It is Pakistan which would then be forced to sign it or be ostracized and isolated. If that be the game, then Pakistan may have very little time to decide whether it too should lay on the table its nuclear cards and thereby achieve a nuclear parity with

India...or wait and see what the international community does to India to blunt its nuclear edge. That should also enable Pakistan to evaluate the cost of going nuclear. The implication being that if India gets away with very little damage, the danger of Pakistan being crippled by sanctions (it is already is suffering from quite a few), would not be much. Pakistan should do what its security requirements dictate and weigh all its options."

"Nuclear Test, Now Or Never"

Zahid Malik, editor-in-chief of the rightist, English-language Pakistan Observer, contended (5/13): "In fact, it is most opportune and appropriate time to conduct a nuclear test. "The policy of 'nuclear ambiguity' which served as an effective deterrent against any aggression has outlived its utility and it is time to demonstrate the nuclear capability to preserve effectiveness of this deterrent in future."

"Declare Pakistan A Nuclear State!"

In a front-page commentary, Ishtiaq Ahmad wrote in the center-right Nation (5/13): "The reaction that matters is American. Before the United States decided to impose sanctions against India, President Clinton had categorically stated that 'very soon' the United States will impose 'comprehensive' sanctions against India. But, simultaneously, he had urged India to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and also stressed repeatedly that India's neighbors should not 'follow suit.'... This uncertain state of affairs about Pakistan's nuclear capability has to end. The sooner it happens, the better it will be for Pakistan. And the only way this uncertainty can end is if Pakistan declares itself a nuclear power, on which depends Islamabad's survival as an independent and sovereign state."

BANGLADESH: "India's Nuclear Test"

Pro-government Janakantha's editorial held (5/14): "It is almost certain that a situation of destabilization will emerge in the subcontinent if Pakistan also goes ahead to prove its capabilities. Pakistan will surely do that.... Much depends on the decisions of the United States and the seven industrial nations, which hold the global political, economic and military balance. It is to be assumed that the United States' decision will be followed by its allies."

"Fuel For An Arms Race"

Anti-West Inqilab maintained in its editorial (5/13): "India's explosion encourages Pakistan to engage in a nuclear race. It is feared that Pakistan will plunge into the race and the international community will have no moral basis to hold it guilty if it succeeds."

NEPAL: "Fears Of Nuclear Arms Race"

The independent Kathmandu Post emphasized (5/13): "Fears of a nuclear race between India and Pakistan have now become even more real. Pakistan's approval of the CTBT had always been conditional and linked to India's compliance. But the tests have now sent jitters among all of India's neighbors. The immediate fallout of the Indian action will obviously be that whatever little may have been achieved through dialogue between the previous United Front government of India and Pakistan will be thrown to the winds.... Prospects of the entire South Asian region falling under the shadow of the mushroom cloud have begun to loom large."

EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC

CHINA: "Stage Set For Indo-U.S. Rift"

According to official, English-language China Daily (5/14): "The swift imposition of sanctions underscores the seriousness with which the United States views the threat of nuclear proliferation posed by the tests, and sets the stage for a long-term rift between the United States and the world's second-most populous country." "Pakistan Will Have No Choice But To Conduct Own Tests"

Chen Xiaofang wrote in intellectually-oriented Guangming Daily (Guangming Ribao, 5/13): "Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. strategy has focused on India while neglecting Pakistan and fostering India to contain China. These nuclear tests pose a serious dilemma for the American so-called 'balanced' South Asia policy....

"Pakistan will have no choice but to conduct its own nuclear tests if India doesn't receive the sanctions it deserves from the international community."

HONG KONG: "More Than One Kind Of Chain Reaction"

The independent, English-language Hong Kong Standard had this analysis (5/14): "It is now clear that India has its own agenda.... India will probably be able to live with the U.S. sanctions and the freezing of aid from Japan, Sweden and a few other countries. But others, like France, may step into the breach to bail India out. It will be the same with Pakistan? Who next after Pakistan? There can be a chain reaction, with one neighbor after another looking to nuclear weapons as the way to respectability and protection against predators next door."

JAPAN: "We Protest India's Nuclear Tests"

An editorial in top-circulation, moderate Yomiuri observed (5/13): "Underground nuclear tests, conducted by India, shook

the foundation of a global nuclear nonproliferation framework. The tests showed utter disregard for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), adopted by the UN General Assembly in the fall of 1996.... We are gravely concerned that Monday's nuclear tests may ignite increased competition between (India and Pakistan) over the development of nuclear weapons. We urge the two countries to sign and ratify the CTBT promptly and pledge that they have abandoned their nuclear ambitions."

AUSTRALIA: "Perilous, Naive And Wrong"

The conservative Australian outlined this view (5/14): "While acknowledging that India is situated in a delicate and potentially dangerous position, the response of a nuclear

weaponry development program is perilous, naive and wrong.... The United States is likely to automatically impose limited sanctions, as required by legislation.... A longer-term solution must be based on engaging and embracing India--and...especially Pakistan and China--within the international community. Such an approach must have the eventual goal of convincing India and others to sign both non-proliferation treaties, remote as it seems at the moment."

"Macho India Struts N-Arms Road"

The national, conservative Australian's foreign editor, Greg Sheridan judged (5/13): "India's detonation of three nuclear devices on Monday as irresponsible, foolish and counterproductive.... Achieving respect only through weapons acquisition is traditionally the route of the...failed or failing state."

Return-Path: <owner-abolition-caucus@igc.org>
Date: Thu, 21 May 1998 10:51:04 -0400
From: "Ross Wilcock" <rwilcock@execulink.com>
Importance: Normal
Sender: owner-abolition-caucus@igc.org
Subject: The Energy Route to Weapons: Can anything be done about it?
To: "Abolition-Caucus@Igc. Org (E-mail)" <abolition-caucus@igc.org>
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V4.72.2106.4

This item received from Surendra who lives in a village in India. (I'm having name & email difficulties) needs to be shared on the list. A BITNET address, I think. anumukti.ilbom.ernet.in!admin@ilbom.ernet.in
Also available formatted at <http://www.pgs.ca/pages/nl/sm980520.htm>

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The Energy Route to Weapons: Can anything be done about it?
Surendra

[Presented at the INESAP conference in Shanghai, September 1997]

Nations like people hanker after security. Rulers of some nations feel that their security is best secured by possession of weapons of genocidal mass destruction. Since as a class, rulers usually have a deadly fascination for insane ideas, and since in our insane world, nations possessing these weapons are accorded prestige and power, rather than the disgust and boycott that they deserve, there are many others who want to follow.

There are many ways for a nation to acquire nuclear weapons.

First of all is the direct route. All the declared nuclear weapons states have followed this path. But like passengers in third class compartments in Indian railways, once in, they are loath to allow others to get in and thus there is now a no-traffic sign put up on especially this route.

Next there is the alignment route. This is the presently approved way for a country to have the vicarious pleasure of hosting nuclear weapons and becoming a target for other nuclear weapons. Nations join military alliances with nuclear weapons powers and that can mean deployment of these weapons on the country's territory. However, this is somewhat unsatisfactory since deployment unlike possession does not imply control. In fact, countries such as Britain and France which were aligned in NATO with USA preferred to develop their own independent nuclear arsenals. However, many nations especially in Europe have tried and are still trying this route.

There is also the bribery, smuggling stealing and outright buying route. Fortunately nobody seems to have successfully traversed this path or if someone has then they have mercifully not advertised the fact. But best of all there is the energy detour. In this what is required are pious declarations that the nation is not interested in weapons at all but only in the "peaceful" uses of atomic energy and will not give up this wonderful source of energy needed so desperately for development.

Having acquired the expertise and the know-how and having a large trained cadre in hand, the country goes on to develop an independent capacity for

the various steps in the nuclear fuel cycle, so that all the elements for a weapons' program are in place and the decision to go overtly nuclear or not is entirely in the hands of the national leadership.

All the threshold nuclear states and a number who are not counted as threshold states have traveled at least some distance on this energy route. But before going into what can be done about the energy path let us first of all, note down some common features amongst all nuclear weapons programs.

1. Fear is the key

All the countries, which went in for a nuclear weapons program, did so out of fear. There was the fear that Hitler might acquire the bomb and with it world domination. There was the fear of becoming a third rate power of little standing after having ruled the world for two centuries. There was the fear of not having an independent voice and becoming an appendage of the Americans. There was the fear of being subjugated to nuclear blackmail in the absence of a credible nuclear deterrence.

2. Impossible without international cooperation

Despite the overwhelming nationalistic fervour, despite the mind stifling secrecy involved in the projects, despite the later jingoistic claims, all weapons programs have been possible only as a result of partnership between individuals and organizations of many nationalities. In fact, without the (usually willing) collaboration of many, bomb efforts would not have succeeded. Thus, for instance, Manhattan project depended on the inputs of European scientists of many nationalities along with the labour of Congolese uranium miners under the rule of Belgium and Canadian refiners. Similarly, the Russian effort gained enormously from the efforts of German scientists and the uranium gathered from the mines of Czechoslovakia and the eastern part of Germany. The British and the French efforts benefited greatly from colonial inputs. The Chinese were initially helped by the Soviet Union.

3. Pregnant with anti-democratic tendencies

By their very nature, nuclear weapons programs give rise to small coterie wielding enormous power who begin to take decisions on their own initiative without any thought of any sort of participatory democratic process. Thus, for instance, even Truman, who was Vice President of US at the time, was deliberately kept ignorant of the whole bomb project and came to know of it only when it became unavoidable following his ascension to the presidency. Similarly, in France, the decision to embark upon a full-fledged nuclear program was not taken by the political leadership but was the result of the initiative of the scientific-military establishment doing things on its own and waiting for a favorable political leadership to emerge.

4. The costs have been borne mainly by indigenous populations.

The real costs of weapons in terms of people's health and the degradation of the environment have been borne disproportionately by indigenous people and sub-nationalities and colonial populations within the nations involved. The French and the British being old imperialists have been the most blatant about this but even the "people's democracies" like the Soviet Union and China have also located their testing sites on lands of indigenous tribes.

5. Acquisition of weapons has not contributed to an increased feeling of security

The country with the most sophisticated arsenal of nuclear weapons feels the most insecure and continues to produce new weapons, new weapon systems, and refuses to give a categorical undertaking of no-first use. Thousands of nuclear weapons were unable to prevent the break-up of the Soviet Union. Besides these common features which are shared by all, the countries specializing in using the energy route to weapons also share at least one

other common feature.

Hypocrisy

While the leaders sanctimoniously and frequently proclaim their peaceful intentions, they simultaneously allot disproportionate resources to dual use technologies and the scientists involved in the effort are placed on a different pedestal and are not held accountable to normal bureaucratic procedures.

The direct route to weapons can be likened to a village pathway. One person travels and makes a clearing. Others feel curious and follow the footsteps. Over time and after a great deal of effort has been expended, a clear pathway can be distinguished. But it is an effort to walk on this route and one needs to be always ready to make a clearing whenever the need arises. This is not to say that more countries besides the ones that did would not have traveled on this route.

The energy route is fundamentally different. It can be likened to a highway meant for efficient forms of transport. So once the energy route became available the temptation to take that was too strong.

How did the energy route come into existence?

The energy route came about as a result of deliberate act of policy. It meant the declassification of enormous amounts of hitherto secret information, much of it of direct relevance to bomb making for example the PUREX process for obtaining weapons useable plutonium from reprocessing spent fuel from research reactors. It involved the training of hundreds and thousands of scientists and engineers from many countries. In essence, it meant the creation of the entire nuclear-industrial complex. This was deliberately done basically for two reasons. One, was to have public acceptance in peacetime for continued and accelerated nuclear weapons program and the other was to win propaganda advantage in the by then deadly Cold War. However, the program itself introduced a new-industrial and commercial-link to what had been hitherto been a politician-military-scientific complex till then.

Atoms for Peace spawned the civilian nuclear power industry. True to the hype and falsehoods attendant upon its birth it has always been a hoax. The passage of time has cruelly exposed its claims of being cheap (Too Cheap to Meter), safe (Defence in Depth) and clean. It no longer is able to compete economically in the marketplace despite massive subsidies and orders for new reactors have dried up in the West. It has always had to invent new excuses (A solution to global warming) as old claims are exposed for the lies they are, to justify continued existence.

Response

There has been no uniform response of the non-nuclear states to the energy route to weapons. Some have not traveled at all either because their threat perceptions have been different or because they have greater democratic control over their scientific and military establishments or because they have evaluated the energy hoax for what it is. Some have not traveled yet but might do so in the future. In fact, there is a very strong commercial effort from nuclear pushers to get new countries hooked on. This is coming about especially in Asia as a result of the demise of the nuclear industry in the West. Again the decisions which prompt new countries from going down the nuclear path are taken by small coterie of power brokers. The major motivating force here are usually the hefty commissions involved. (e.g. Marcos and the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant). But it needs to be added that the people making these decisions are not oblivious to the weapons potential (e.g. Iran or Korea both North and South).

Some countries have traveled some distance along the energy route and then stopped (Sweden) and some have traveled further and then turned back like South Africa or Brazil and Argentina. Deep study needs to be done as to what caused this reaction amongst these nations.

The threshold states are countries who have traveled the route and have gone on and on. Israel is the prime example, though India and Pakistan have not lagged behind at least in intention if not in capability.

Preventive Efforts

Having created the energy route and made all arrangements for all and sundry to travel on it the nuclear powers soon realized that more in this case was not merrier and a proliferative world was a terribly insecure world. Ideas such as deterrence lost whatever little validity they had when the number of players with access to these weapons became much larger than two. Also with the passage of time, the ossification and the final winding down of the Cold War, the original reasons behind establishing the energy route of propaganda advantage and getting public support for accelerated bomb making effort in peacetime, were no longer as compelling. On the other hand were the commercial considerations of nuclear suppliers which are mainly all powerful multinational companies with their origin in these very countries. Hence, since late 1960s there has been an effort to prevent nations from travelling the full distance on the energy route. NPT, London Suppliers' Group, CTBT, Fissban are all parts of this scheme. The attempt is to somehow create roadblocks in the path of international collaboration. However, these efforts are based on two fallacies:

They presume that only the nuclear weapons states have legitimate grounds for fear which need nuclear weapons as a security measure and the security fears expressed by others are not legitimate and are somehow a cover for regional hegemony.

Nuclear energy despite its abysmal failure as a competitive energy source is still a valuable energy source and needs to be promoted. Despite almost 30 years of intensive non-proliferation efforts, nuclear non-proliferation remains a rather fragile entity.

Can Anything Be Done?

The answer unfortunately is; very little in the present paradigm. The nuclear weapons states continue to feel both insecure and feel that nuclear weapons contribute to their security. They continue their efforts to produce new generations of nuclear weapons. They have not taken any real and genuine steps towards nuclear disarmament. Mere reductions from many thousands to a few thousands or a few hundreds are no substitute. Today their actions engender a feeling of insecurity and make for an unstable world climate in which the ruling elite of the threshold states will feel morally justified to continue on their own immoral ways.

Secondly, for the sake of commercial gain, the myth of nuclear technology as a sensible energy option is still being promulgated. Unless, this is debunked and its spread into newer and newer areas curtailed, its proliferation will automatically produce the small undemocratic coteries of power hungry nationalists who given time will become more and more hawkish and force their nations to exercise the nuclear option.

What needs to be done?

Non-proliferation efforts driven by nuclear weapons powers are a sham. The last thirty years have shown that the present is the best that they can achieve. Thus to give more time to the nuclear powers to show the way, is a sure recipe to remain in the present mess.

To get out to a world free of genocidal devices of mass destruction the

initiative will have to come from people.

All nations including the nuclear weapons states will first of all need to realise that like people they too have to confront and address their fears. Secondly, it is high time that the energy route needs to be demolished. It has lost whatever little legitimacy it had in the marketplace and efforts need to be made to channelise international co-operation into sensible and sustainable energy paths.

Surendra

Return-Path: <owner-abolition-caucus@igc.org>
Date: Thu, 21 May 1998 10:38:23 -0400
From: Lachlan Forrow <lforrow@igc.apc.org>
Sender: owner-abolition-caucus@igc.org
Subject: World Media on India: II
To: abolition-caucus@igc.org
X-Sender: lforrow@pop.igc.org

SINGAPORE: "Testing, Testing"

The pro-government Straits Times concluded (5/13): "India has raised the security stakes considerably in the subcontinent and the region. In fact, it could start an arms race that could lead it and neighboring Pakistan down the nuclear-signposted road to greater insecurity.... The United States, Japan and Russia are among the countries that have voiced their disapproval, in differing degrees of severity. Their indignation is understandable. The point is what (can) the powers do?... Countries eyeing a nuclear option will be emboldened if they see that the world can only watch and not act over the resumption of tests. Pakistan, certainly, will seek justification for moves of its own.... What is required is a calibrated diplomatic response which clarifies international disquiet over the move and, simultaneously, prevents an escalation of tension. The world is being put to the test."

SOUTH KOREA: "India's Destabilizing Tests"

Conservative Chosun Ilbo remarked (5/12): "India's nuclear testing has sent shock waves throughout the international community. What worries us most is Pakistan's response.... It seems that the security of all of South Asia has been threatened. China's response to this latest development could also destabilize the region."

THAILAND: "An Ill Wind In The Rajasthan Desert"

According to the moderately conservative Bangkok Post (5/14): "For a country that shares troubled borders with China and Pakistan, the nuclear tests were little more than saber-rattling that is likely to be counterproductive.... In the event of the imposition of sanctions, it will be the ordinary Indians that the BJP claims to represent who will pay the price for a foolish and cynical show of brawn, if not brain."

"Nuclear Tests Uproar: A Global Hypocrisy"

The independent Nation told its readers (5/14): "This week's nuclear blasts have severely undermined India's holier-than-thou attitude....but India's argument that the nuclear powers want to keep their military advantage and deny it to others does hold water."

EUROPE

BRITAIN: "Listen Here, India! Do As Nuclear Nations Say, Not As They Do"

Under the above headline, the centrist Independent had this comment by assistant editor Rupert Cornwell (5/14): "Once again we come to the flaw at the heart of the non-proliferation argument. By what absolute right do Britain, France, the United States, Russia and China insist that they alone should possess

nuclear weapons? If they really want to persuade others not to develop them, they should travel faster and further down that road themselves. In fact, arms reduction talks between the United States and Russia, who together possess more than 90 percent of the world's nuclear arsenal, are at a standstill.... With that sort of example, India is understandably not inclined to take lessons."

"India's Crass Show Of Force"

The conservative Express opined (5/13), "Dismayed, seriously concerned, deeply disappointed--strong language from the international diplomatic community condemning India's decision to resume testing.... Nobody wants to hurt India's poor by

withdrawing aid but Monday's nuclear tests were, by all accounts, a crass display of force designed to boost the popularity of the new government, led by Hindu nationalists--a stupid and dangerous exercise which Pakistan and China claim has plunged them into a new arms race."

"Nuclear Fallout"

According to an editorial in the independent Financial Times (5/12): "India's nuclear test yesterday is dangerous and foolish in equal proportion. It heightens security tensions with its neighbor Pakistan and in the broader Asian region.... The genie is now out of the bottle. India should repair the damage by quickly signing the nuclear test ban treaty. Failing that, it should be left in no doubt of the world's disapproval." FRANCE:

"Nuclear Proliferation Returns"

Georges Suffert opined in regional Nice Matin (5/13): "Asia's geopolitical map is changing right under our eyes....

"India knows that in the long term, the danger will come from China...not Pakistan.... Slowly but surely India will join the world's club of nuclear powers...bringing in its wake other nations, including Pakistan...Israel, South Africa and others. It is once again the age-old question of nuclear proliferation that is coming back."

RUSSIA: "Ambition Costs Dearly"

Vladimir Dunayev judged in reformist Russkiy Telegraf (5/14): "The Vajpayee government's ambition may cost India dearly. The arms race is a costly business. The Soviet Union got ruined taking part in that non-sporting event. Whatever the Indians say about not being afraid of an embargo, they cannot do without foreign aid.... A country that goes ahead with nuclear testing in defiance of world-wide protests may well use an A-bomb against its neighbors. Calling Pakistan and China its main enemies today, India may use this name for Russia tomorrow."

"India Is Risking A Lot"

Reformist Izvestia front-paged this commentary (5/13) by Vladimir Mikheyev: "India is risking a lot. The international community, including non-aligned nations, rejects Delhi's 'build-up-arms-first-and-get-rid-of-them-later' logic. The emergence of a sixth nuclear power, apart from devaluing accomplishments in the disarmament area, may trigger a regional arms race."

GERMANY: "Sanssouci And The Desert Of Rajasthan"

Kurt Kister argued in an editorial in centrist Sueddeutsche

Zeitung of Munich (5/14): "President Clinton reacted to the Indian nuclear tests with the only right answer: He imposed sanctions. Those who, such as Russia and France, only verbally condemn the nuclear detonations will also become guilty. In India, pigheaded nationalists are at the helm, and the rulers in Pakistan are not much better. On the Indian subcontinent, two nations are confronting each other who are ready for a war. And the Indian--and probably soon the Pakistani--nuclear bombs are considered instruments to wage a war. Because of this danger, the world, including Bonn, must find clear words and endorse painful sanctions."

"India Has Not Made Friends In Its Neighborhood"

Werner Adam noted in an editorial on the front page of right-of-center Frankfurter Allgemeine (5/13), "Good Sino-American

relations are one of the reasons for the latest Indian tests: This improvement has created growing unease about the development of a strategic partnership between Washington and Beijing, and about New Delhi not getting sufficient attention in a future 'Asian security architecture.' If India had thought that it can make itself heard as a regional power with this nuclear spectacle, it has not made friends in its neighborhood. On the contrary, as the reaction from Western Europe to the Far East shows...India has ignored all reason...and it can bury its hopes of becoming a permanent member of the UN Security Council."

"Setting Off An Arms Spiral"

Right-of-center Saechsische Zeitung of Dresden made these points (5/12): "Other threshold countries will use this test in the Indian desert as a reason to push their own nuclear programs. This is true not only for the arch enemy in Pakistan. An arms spiral, which brought the United States and Russia to the brink of disaster, could...be set in motion again at a different level and under different portents."

ITALY: "And The Response...Sanctions Of Course"

Andrea di Robilant reported from Berlin in centrist, influential La Stampa (5/14), "Shocked by New Delhi's double slap, Bill Clinton responds with a package of very tough sanctions.... Clinton insisted that India's defiance needs a 'firm' response by the international community. But reactions in other capitals, beginning with Paris and Moscow, already suggest that the front is anything but united. Clinton has no choice, however. The 1994 anti-proliferation law approved by Congress forces him to adopt a series of undoubtedly very serious sanctions.... Beyond his announcement on sanctions, Clinton gave the impression of taking the news of Indian nuclear tests as a sort of personal offense."

""Sleepy' CIA--Will Heads Roll?"

A report from Washington in left-leaning, influential La Repubblica (5/14) read as follows: "Indian nuclear tests, even though not bloody, are about to make victims in America. The heads of the CIA experts who were caught by surprise by the Indian tests and failed to inform the White House in a timely fashion are about to roll."

"U.S. Takes Lead In Protesting Indian Tests"

Franco Pantarelli filed from New York for centrist, influential La Stampa (5/13): "(By imposing sanctions) the United States has taken the lead in the wave of protests which the Indian initiative has prompted all over the world, forcing others to reinforce their indignation. Thus the 'disappointment' expressed Monday by the European Union turned into 'surprise and disgust' yesterday."

SPAIN: "A Worrying Mix"

Centrist La Vanguardia observed (5/14): "India, challenged in recent years by internal centrifugal forces (Sikhs, Muslims, regional Communist governments), has finally reacted in a nationalist way. The nuclear tests are proof of India's will to reassert itself domestically as well as internationally. This threatens to provoke an arms race with Pakistan.... That isn't the only danger since India also has issues with China.... The situation in Asia has become worrying when the economic crisis

and ethnic and religious tensions mix with the nuclear issue."

BELGIUM: "India Is Going Too Far"

Under the headline above, foreign editor Carl Pansaerts's editorial in financial De Financieel-Economische Tijd (5/14) read, "The world must now take sanctions soon and unanimously

against India until New Delhi vows to no longer test nuclear weapons. A few possibilities: Reduce foreign investments in India; reduce official development aid to a minimum; submit Indian tourists and businessmen to strict visa requirements; a sports boycott; and, perhaps, a temporary freeze on World Bank loans to India. These sanctions will not hit only India and, let's hope, make it change its mind in a positive manner, but also make Pakistan and other potential nuclear cowboys think twice before they start testing nuclear weapons. The danger of a new arms race--especially in the very unstable Southeast Asia--is too important not to do everything to avoid it."

"A Very Dangerous Cocktail"

Foreign editor Axel Buyse noted in independent Catholic De Standaard (5/13): "The chance that Pakistan will pay its arch enemy India in kind is very large. In combination with the continuous modernization to which nuclear power China is submitting its armed force, it may become a very dangerous cocktail."

BULGARIA: "World Is Really Becoming Multipolar"

Bulgarian Socialist Party Duma held (5/13): "However, nothing can be done - that's life. Probably at the beginning of the new millennium the world is really becoming multipolar and we have to learn to live with it."

"Delhi Should Keep The Peace"

Mass-circulation Trud observed (5/13): "It's only vanity that made India play the great power, which is very disturbing. In such state of mind, it is not clear where such groundless ambitions may lead. That's why any attempts of that kind should be suppressed in time."

CANADA: "Make India Pay For Going Nuclear"

The liberal Toronto Star judged (5/13): "The shocking decision

by India's Hindu nationalist government to conduct underground nuclear tests...is a grave development, with serious implications for Asia and the world.... (India) is counting on the West's growing appetite for trade to outweigh the moral outrage. It may have calculated wrong. President Bill Clinton has already said he intends to fully use U.S. laws that dictate sanctions as a penalty for nuclear testing.... The world needs to let India know that there is a heavy price to pay for risking a potential nuclear nightmare."

"All India Has Done Is End The Hypocrisy"

The conservative Ottawa Citizen (5/13): "So far, all that India has done is end the governing hypocrisy that allowed countries to acquire nuclear weapons but not admit to it. Hypocrisy is not without its social uses. But unless a newly uninhibited India decides it will not merely reveal its nuclear assets but acquire many more of them, it is not clear the world has become a more dangerous place."

"India's Explosion Heard Around The World"

According to the leading Globe and Mail (5/12): "An Indian bomb is destabilizing, unnecessary, misguided and dangerous.... The Indian government's action is destabilizing because it goes

against that moderate tide, and threatens to unleash a far less pleasant one. Proliferation breeds proliferation and, predictably, arch-rival Pakistan is now mulling over a response.... India's actions yesterday are dangerous because the most terrifying possibility of all--a rogue state or terrorist group in possession of an atomic bomb--increases with the number of nuclear-armed states.... A nuclear India spells a nuclear Pakistan, and Pakistan's eastern neighbour is Iran. You see where this is going."

DENMARK: "We Must Stop India From Becoming New Nuclear Power"

Center-right Berlingske Tidende had this editorial view (5/12):

"Denmark must reconsider its policies towards India following the announcement that the country has carried out three nuclear tests. The U.S. reaction has been to seriously consider implementing sanctions, and Denmark ought to do the same, in cooperation with the United States where possible. Denmark ought to consider freezing its foreign aid to India, even though it is always a hard decision to cut aid to a country in need....

International pressure to stop nuclear testing has been put on both China and France. Now we must work hard to stop India from becoming a new nuclear power."

FINLAND: "A Major Political Defeat For West"

A commentary in leading, independent Helsingin Sanomat (5/14) by senior international affairs commentator Olli Kivinen stressed,

"India's nuclear testing shocked the world because nuclear proliferation is one of the most serious global post-Cold War threats. The testing also says that not all big countries of the world are willing to accept unipolar hegemony, i.e. that of the United States and other industrial countries--especially because the United States and other industrial countries don't show enough sensitivity and impartiality.... The United States has spearheaded efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear

weapons. It has advocated strong measures to stop the development of 'the Islamic bomb.' Its influence, however, is undermined by its special relationship with Israel.... India's nuclear testing was a major political defeat for the West and for the traditional nuclear countries."

HUNGARY: "India Treads Dangerous Path"

Foreign affairs columnist Laszlo Daroczi underlined (5/14) in right-wing Napi Magyarorszag, "It is each individual state's right and responsibility to properly care for its own security, but we fear that in the case of India the motivation is more than just security. India has stepped on a dangerous path, already to be expected when the country did not sign the nuclear arms control treaty. The way out of this crisis situation would be if India revised its position and joined the treaty. The traditional nuclear powers, on the other hand, could partly compensate India for its wounds by treating all states that pose a nuclear threat to peace, from Asia to the Middle East, equally."

POLAND: "India Unmasked"

Centrist Rzeczpospolita carried this analysis by Maria Wagrowska (5/12): "By deciding to conduct the (nuclear) tests, India has issued a challenge to the five powers that legally have nuclear

weapons and want this status maintained.... The Indian tests could lead to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction-- in developing countries first of all, especially because India calls itself their advocate. As a result, a new conflict between the impoverished South and the wealthy North could follow."

SLOVENIA: "India Has Not Violated Its International Obligations"

Left of center Delo commented (5/13): "It is very likely that the tests...will start a new arms race in the region.... The United States' ambition to prevent spreading of nuclear armament is perfectly legitimate; nevertheless, the only superpower could have revealed a more refined feeling for the geo-political situation in this region. Above all, it would be extremely beneficial if New Delhi and Washington as soon as possible got rid of their mutual distrust--which has its roots in the Cold War...and began to communicate. Perhaps even to cooperate."

SWEDEN: "A Gigantic Setback"

Independent, liberal daily Dagens Nyheter maintained (5/13): "India's nuclear tests....constitute a gigantic setback to the disarmament process."

"India Has Joined Club, But As Illegitimate Member"

Conservative Stockholm daily Svenska Dagbladet (5/13): "India's tests of three nuclear warheads...for the first time showed the international community a country openly ignoring the consensus giving the five established nuclear powers exclusive rights to such instruments of destruction. India now has joined the club, but as an illegitimate member.... The international community must show that the cost for giving in to such destructive national instincts will be very high. The United States has warned of sanctions.... That should be followed by others."

THE NETHERLANDS: "One Should Be Indignant"

Influential liberal De Volkskrant (5/13): "Even though the actual radioactive fallout seems to be marginal, the opposite is true for the political radiation.... India is a large Asian power and it wants to be a key player and it thinks, therefore, that it should join the club of nuclear states. This is true, and it is somewhat hypocritical when members of that exclusive and powerful club now express their rage over India.... Nevertheless...The world should use sanctions or good words, or a combination of the two, to convince India to put the nuclear genie back into the bottle quickly."

"This Does Not Make Us Happy"

Calvinist left Trouw said this (5/13): "China is extremely worried and there is reason to expect a Pakistani bomb.... The nuclear tests (give) a new impulse to the arms race in that region."

MIDDLE EAST

ISRAEL: "A Place In The Nuclear Sun"

Analyst Meir Shteiglitz observed in top-circulation, pluralist Yediot (5/14): "This isn't what the world has bargained for. The Indian government this week delivered five defiant and high-visibility nuclear blows which rocked the foundations of post-Cold War international order.... No wonder, then, that President Clinton is angry. But some of this anger should be directed at himself and his Congress. To this very day, the U.S. Congress has not ratified the global nuclear test ban treaty.

Consequently, other powers can hardly be expected to continue to agree to refrain from doing what the Americans are permitted to do."

SAUDI ARABIA: "Israel Is Also A Nuclear State"

London-based, internationally circulated Al-Sharq Al-Awsat declared (5/14), "Israel is a nuclear state. Even its close allies cannot deny this fact.... India's nuclear tests have induced strong reactions. Perhaps this will alert the international community that the principles of the new world order must be reconsidered."

JORDAN: "India's Nuclear Weapons And Asia's Security"

Influential columnist Tareq Masarwah contended in influential, pro-government Al-Rai (5/14): "If anyone has the right to punish India for its nuclear tests, that party is definitely not the United States.... In the Middle East, while Israel possesses nuclear weapons, what is required to check its power madness is a similar Arab weapon, which is why we are pained because Iraq's procurement of such weapons has now been delayed.... We also do not believe that India's step merits sanctions, quite the contrary. We believe that the nuclear capability of India and Pakistan will be guarantees of the stability of Southeast Asia."

QATAR: "Same Standards Should Apply To All"

Semi-independent Al-Rayah's editorial declared (5/13): "We agree with the United States on the necessity of removing weapons of mass destruction...and believe that all countries in the region should sign a treaty banning nuclear testing.... But whenever such crises occur we remember the crooked U.S. standards, we remember that the Iraqi people have been suffering for the last

eight years.... Israel has tens of nuclear bombs...and refuses to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty that Washington now demands that India sign. The United States cannot achieve peace and security in this region unless it applies one standard in dealing with the region's countries.... We invite Pakistan and neighboring countries to exercise self-restraint in dealing with this event."

AFRICA

SOUTH AFRICA: "India's Claims? Pure Humbug!"

Independent Business Day had this to say (5/14): "Claims by the Indian government that it supports international nuclear nonproliferation must be seen as pure humbug in the light of not just one, but a provocative second, round of nuclear tests this week. The tests...raise serious questions about the maturity of India's newly installed Hindu nationalist government. Besides the geopolitical implications, massive investment in nuclear weapons development by a country as poor as India can hardly be defended.... India is cynically gambling on the pull of its huge markets to defuse any sanctions threat, knowing that for sanctions to bite, they must be universally applied. In fact, the bomb is a nationalist virility symbol and a warning signal to Pakistan and its major supplier of nuclear technology, China. The implicit view--that the third world is the victim of 'nuclear apartheid' at the hands of the great powers--must be rejected. Every newcomer to the nuclear club takes the world a step closer to the possibility of an atomic conflagration."

LATIN AMERICA

ARGENTINA: "Indian Decision Confirms Huntington's Thesis"

Oscar Raul Cardoso observed in leading Clarin (5/14): "The most astounding aspect of the daring decision by India's nationalist government is, for those who have closely read Samuel Huntington's provocative ideas...that it confirms his key arguments.... It also contradicts those who strongly believe, as opposed to Huntington, that modern political democratic systems...only have prosperity through trade as their goal."

CHILE: "India: The Dispute Over Nuclear Tests"

In the words of Santiago's influential, centrist La Epoca (5/13), "New Delhi has not signed international anti-nuclear agreements due to its long standing claim of autonomy. At the same time (India) believes, for obvious reasons, that the nuclear moratorium favors countries already within the nuclear club.... Just within the past few hours, Japan and the United States have announced their determination to establish economic sanctions against India. Russia, which exports the technology to India that has been crucial to India's atomic program, has declared that it will take similar action only if there is international agreement on this subject, such as that adopted in the case of Iraq. Moscow is an important trade partner of New Delhi which is reason enough for the caution being shown by Kremlin leaders."

End of Digest

Return-Path: <djroche@gpu.srv.ualberta.ca>
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Date: Thu, 21 May 1998 10:41:13 -0600
To: mupj@igc.apc.org
From: Doug Roche <djroche@gpu.srv.ualberta.ca>
Subject: NPT PrepComm II Analysis

Dear Howard,

I very much enjoyed meeting you in Geneva and benefited from your views on the ecumenical effort needed for the abolition of nuclear weapons. I can tell you that in my private report to the Holy See, your views were fully reflected.

Meanwhile, I send you my public analysis of NPT PrepComm II. It is found at <<http://watserv1.uwaterloo.ca/~plough/98prepcom.html>>.

With best wishes.

Doug Roche

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Date: Thu, 21 May 1998 09:38:14 -0700 (PDT)
From: Alice Slater <aslater@igc.apc.org>
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Subject: anti-nuclear protest at NYC Indian Consulate
To: tinabell@walrus.com, warpeace@interport.net, kcantw9473@aol.com,
lcnp@aol.com, eenloe@afsc.org, falvo@nymc.edu, garyblsp@aol.com,
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>Return-Path: <DSDix@aol.com>
>From: DSDix <DSDix@aol.com>
>Date: Wed, 20 May 1998 13:25:24 EDT
>To: wrl@igc.org, aslater@igc.apc.org
>Subject: anti-nuclear protest at NYC Indian Consulate
>
>SAMAR, P.O. Box 1349, Ansonia Station, New York NY 10023
>
>FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
>
>Contact:
>Chandana Mathur, 212-877-0048
>Satinder Jawanda, 718-622-8487
>
>
>May 19, 1998
>
>
>NO TO NUCLEAR!
>
>
>WHAT: Demonstration AGAINST the recent nuclear tests in India and FOR a
>nuclear-free world
>
>WHEN: Friday, the 22nd of May, at 3 pm
>
>WHERE: Indian Consulate in New York, at the corner of East 64th Street and
>5th Avenue
>
>
>We are outraged by the Hindu fundamentalist-led Indian government's
>decision to conduct underground nuclear tests on May 11 and 13, which have
>ended the hope for peace in South Asia. We also wish to condemn the U.S.
>and the other nuclear weapons states for their sanctimonious responses,
>including the imposition of economic sanctions, and their refusal to

>engage in good faith disarmament processes.

>

>The rickety coalition government currently ruling India was moved by the
>basest of motives: short term political gain internally, and the wish to
>strut around self-importantly on the international stage. Their jingoism
>has uprooted the lines of communication that had only recently opened up
>between India and Pakistan, and severely damaged India's relationship with
>China. In the 50th anniversary year of his assassination, we mourn the
>obliteration of the Gandhian tradition in India through this violent
>nuclear gesture. Those of us who are Indian citizens feel disgraced by the
>belligerent actions of our government, and by its portrayal of these
>nuclear tests as "anti-imperialist" just as it prepares to barter away the
>interests of the Indian masses to foreign capital when it signs the World
>Trade Order.

>

>We are also appalled by the hypocritical posturing of the nuclear nations,
>particularly the U.S. imposed sanctions on India, when these nations have
>blocked every international move towards a nuclear-free world by their
>insistence on retaining their own nuclear arsenals. We agree that lasting
>peace is possible only when the nuclear powers agree to disarm. Otherwise,
>the Indian government's actions will be matched in time by other aspirants
>to the membership of the nuclear nations club. We categorically oppose the
>U.S.

>decision to impose sanctions on India, which will crush the most
>vulnerable sections of Indian society, the sections most likely to have
>opposed the decision to go nuclear. As the citizenry of the world today,
>we demand a just, good faith process towards global disarmament which
>applies equally to all nations.

>

>The SAMAR collective brings out a progressive magazine about South Asian
>issues, organizes actions and creates fora for discussions around
>topical issues.

>

>

Alice Slater

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Dear Vijai,

Do you have the official government announcement on the NAM initiative? If so, please fax or post to the caucus. What are the talks with the "chief interlocutors on CTBT"? Are they trying to cut a deal to put India into the nuclear club? Any official pronouncements you have would be very useful to get out to the press and put our abolition agenda forward. Many thanks.

Regards,

At 09:29 PM 5/21/98 -0700, Vijai K Nair wrote:

>Dear Alice, David, Jackie, Janet, et al,

>

>This is to inform you that the Track-I policy suggested in my Article [fwd to
>you] has been announced by the Govt. Moratorium and talks with the chief
>interlocutors on CTBT. Initiative launched at NAM for elimination of nuclear
>weapons.

>

>This could be the opportunity that the Abolition Caucus's has been looking
>for. We have the NWS suitably shaken and looking for new policies. We need to
>get in before the dig into a new form for retaining nuclear weapons.

>

>Regards

>

>Vijai

>

>

>

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1998 NPT PrepCom Briefing No 2 General Debate Begins

The Second Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) for the 2000 Review Conference of the Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) opened on 7 April at around 11.15 am and swiftly appointed Ambassador Eugeniusz Wyzner of Poland as its Chair. Ambassador Andelfo Garcia of Colombia and Ambassador Markku Reimaa of Finland were appointed Vice Chairs. Additionally it was agreed that Garcia, who had been nominated by the Movement of Non-Aligned States (NAM), should be Chair of the Third PrepCom, due to be held in New York in 1999. To the relief of many, there was no repeat of last year's delays over whether the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and North Korea would be seated as Member States.

The first two days will be devoted to general debate, including a three hour informal session on Tuesday afternoon for non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to address the delegates. General statements were made on the first day by sixteen delegations: South Africa, the United Kingdom for the European Union and others, China, Indonesia, Japan, Switzerland, Myanmar, the United States, Canada, New Zealand, Norway, Turkey, Russia, Bangladesh, Morocco and Iraq.

Some interventions were near-facsimiles of past statements to the 1997 PrepCom, while others were cliché-rich but thin on content, so as space is limited, this summary will seek only to highlight a few of the more interesting issues to emerge. Other themes are likely to be addressed more fully in future NPT briefings, as more delegations put their ideas and concerns on the table.

Nuclear Disarmament

Three of the nuclear weapon states (NWS) spoke. Norman Wulf aimed to give a comprehensive and positive overview of the "numerous practical steps" taken by the United States in support of its NPT obligations, devoting considerable time to Article VI. Referring to the bilateral START process and multilateral CTBT, as classic disarmament approaches, Wulf also outlined arms control measures such as the unilateral reduction of tactical nuclear weapons, detargeting, cessation of fissile materials production and attempts to increase fissile material transparency, saying that the US "wants its NPT partners to recognise and understand the relationship between this range of 'non-classic' arms control measures and the nuclear disarmament process."

Grigori Berdennikov gave Russia's gloomier overview. After enumerating

Russian arms reductions under the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and START I and noting the realisation of "unilateral disarmament initiatives" in reducing tactical nuclear weapons, Berdennikov spoke of Russia's efforts to withdraw plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) from military programmes and welcomed initiatives to make Central and East Europe and Central Asia into areas free of nuclear weapons. Taking aim at NATO's continuing nuclear policies, he reiterated Russia's call for nuclear weapons not to be placed outside the territory of the nuclear States. Referring almost certainly to US plans for modernisation and missile defence, Berdennikov warned that continued progress in nuclear weapon reductions would only be possible "if appropriate guaranties are provided against reproducing the nuclear arms race of the past". He also issued a challenge to Britain, China and France, saying that Russia "would like to see the other nuclear powers joining the efforts to reduce nuclear weapons".

Sha Zukang's statement for China was also rather pessimistic. He accused "some countries" of clinging to a "Cold War mentality" by expanding military blocs and developing "sophisticated hi-tech weapons" and argued that the NWS should abandon nuclear deterrence policies and conclude legally binding no-use and no-first-use agreements. China's concerns about US plans to develop strategic missile defence systems were underlined several times, as Sha noted that such plans "violate the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, jeopardise regional and global strategic security and stability, hamper further progress in nuclear disarmament, and may even trigger a new round of the arms race."

Indonesia, however, castigated "self laudatory" references which "cannot conceal that there are still an estimated 36,000 nuclear weapons with their inherent dangers". New Zealand urged the NWS to take seriously the proposals in the Canberra Commission Report, saying "we want to see progress on steps such as taking nuclear weapons off alert; no first use undertakings; removing warheads from delivery vehicles; [and] ending deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons". Canada referred to START being "at a standstill" and proposed text to reaffirm the importance of the US-Russian bilateral process and further progress on nuclear disarmament, including the engagement of the other three NWS. Several States criticised the lack of a nuclear disarmament committee in the CD. Myanmar called on the Second PrepCom to make recommendations for the CD to negotiate "a universal and legally-binding multilateral instrument... committing all states to the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons". Japan called on the NWS to "share information on various practical issues which they are encountering in their current nuclear disarmament efforts" including financial and technical problems regarding the dismantlement of nuclear weapons.

The British Ambassador, Ian Soutar, spoke on behalf of the European Union (EU) and 13 associated countries. As we have come to expect from committee-drafting by 15 states with diverse security perspectives, the EU statement sounded positive but said little, reduced to making approving noises about the range of issues, utilising the language of the 1995 Principles and Objectives (P&O) so as to avoid controversy among its members. It did, however, express the hope that "START III will be followed by further reductions with the aim of eliminating these weapons globally." We will have to wait until the cluster debates for more substantive

statements from Britain and France regarding their role in the fulfilment of this hope.

FMCT

One issue on which all the nuclear weapon states (and several others from the Western group) seemed to agree was the necessity for getting negotiations on a fissile materials cut-off treaty (FMCT) underway. Japan made a particularly strong pitch, condemning three "wasted" years of deadlock in the CD and calling on the NPT PrepCom to express "as a whole, its firm determination to commence FMCT negotiations" on the basis of the 'Shannon Report' and mandate agreed in March 1995. Norway reiterated its call for voluntary transparency measures from all nuclear capable states, with particular responsibility on the NWS. Although encouraging greater openness with regard to existing fissile material stockpiles, Norway seemed to back away from its 1997 statement calling for declaration, clarification and inspections of stocks. Canada proposed language for a P&O rolling text supporting the FMCT commitment and urging the NWS to increase transparency with regard to military stocks of fissile materials and "increase the amount of fissile material declared excess", putting this under permanent safeguards. Morocco said it was essential for the CD to give utmost priority to a fissile materials ban and castigated that body for "wasting time" on less important issues that were already being dealt with in other fora. Indonesia, however, condemned the NWS who, "while willing to end their production are unwilling to give up existing stockpiles". Indonesia wanted a "ban on existing material which also bans future production of weapon-usable fissile material."

Other Issues

Several statements made obligatory references to "peaceful uses" of nuclear technology and export controls. Many others mentioned security assurances to non-nuclear weapon states, an issue expected to be discussed in greater detail in a specifically allocated session. A number of delegations emphasised the importance of the CTBT, welcoming the early ratification by Britain and France and urging others to follow. While Russia and China made oblique reference to NATO's expansion, Bangladesh was rather blunter, calling the stationing of nuclear weapons on the territory of non-nuclear weapon states a "violation of the spirit of the NPT". Turkey, for its part, informed the PrepCom delegates that "apart from the nuclear umbrella of the NATO alliance" Turkey did not possess nuclear weapons and had no intention of doing so. Reha Keskindepe also emphasised Turkey's concerns about Middle East security but said that it was "disingenuous to single out any one country for the lack of progress" on establishing a nuclear weapon free zone in the region. Iraq accused the United States of exercising a "double standard" because it backed away from implementing the Resolution on the Middle East adopted at the same time as the 1995 decisions on extending and strengthening the review of the NPT.

Strengthening the Review

Several countries underlined that the post-1995 review process was intended to be "substantive" and "qualitatively different". The EU suggested building further on the recommendations in the Chair's working paper from 1997. The United States wanted the "expansion and enhancement" of agreed sections of that paper. South Africa, Switzerland, Canada and Indonesia suggested that it was time to begin to develop a rolling text or document. Canada even provided substantial examples of text on the range of issues

covered by the Treaty and P&O, as "input for [a] possible revised Chair's working paper". Norway reminded delegations that though the NWS bore the primary obligation to fulfil their Article VI commitment, other states should "remain involved, supportive and constructive", providing a context for nuclear disarmament activities. However, on this first day of the Second NPT PrepCom, there were disappointingly few concrete proposals for effective progress in the future.

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1998 NPT PrepCom Briefing No 3 Non-Aligned Positions Set Out

The Chair of the Second NPT PrepCom, Ambassador Eugeniusz Wyzner, announced the likely time-table for the next two weeks. It has been decided to devote 9 sessions to debating issues under the three clusters based on the Main Committee divisions of nuclear disarmament, safeguards and nuclear energy, with three additional sessions specifically devoted to the fissban/FMCT, the Middle East and negative security assurances, as intended by the First PrepCom in 1997.

The continuing general debate was dominated on Tuesday by NPT Parties who belong to the Movement of Non-Aligned States (NAM) and included the publication of a NAM working paper, introduced by Makarim Wibisono of Indonesia. Twelve delegations spoke: Australia, Mexico, Syrian Arab Republic, Uzbekistan, Algeria, Sri Lanka, Ukraine, Iran, Colombia, Egypt, Kyrgyzstan and the Republic of Korea (South Korea). Not all papers were available and since the general debate will conclude on Wednesday, some of Tuesday's statements will be covered in the next briefing.

The NAM Working Paper

In an early move indicative of more effective coordination, the NAM tabled a comprehensive working paper and proposed that "recommendations which have been deliberated upon throughout [the] preparatory process should be forwarded to the Review Conference in 2000 for further refining, finalisation and adoption". The paper comprised 37 substantive paragraphs, related to the Articles of the Treaty.

Nuclear sharing

Under the section dealing with Article I of the NPT, in addition to castigating nuclear assistance which may contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the NAM for the first time unmistakably condemned the stationing of nuclear weapons on the territory of allies, such as in NATO, and called on the NWS to "refrain from, among themselves, with non-nuclear weapons States and with States not party to the Treaty, nuclear sharing for military purposes under any kind of security arrangements". This challenge was reinforced in the paragraph relating to Article II, which would require the corollary commitment by non-NWS to refrain from participation in nuclear sharing.

Safeguards and export controls

Under Article III, the NAM sought to called on all NWS and non-NPT Parties to place their nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards and backed the principle that full-scope safeguards were to be made a condition of new supply of nuclear-related material and equipment. Referring to

export control arrangements such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the NAM reiterated their view that "unilaterally restricted measures which prevent peaceful nuclear development should be removed". However, where previously they had sought to have the IAEA accepted as the "sole" authority for NPT compliance, the statement reaffirmed the IAEA as "an essential element in guaranteeing compliance".

Five paragraphs were devoted to Article IV. In addition to reaffirming NPT Parties' "inalienable right" with regard to nuclear activities "for peaceful purposes", including preferential treatment for developing States in the Treaty, concerns were raised about the vulnerability of nuclear facilities to attack and the need for improved international regulations regarding the shipment of radioactive wastes and spent fuel.

CTBT

Article V's commitment to "peaceful nuclear explosions" was superseded by three paragraphs relating to the CTBT, which banned all nuclear explosions. There was a strong call to all States to sign and ratify the test ban treaty. To "build confidence [in] the full implementation of the Treaty", the NWS were enjoined to "comply with the letter and spirit of the CTBT", to provide "transparency on-site" and to "refrain from conducting all types of tests in conformity with the objectives of the CTBT" -- presumed to be a slightly fudged reference to sub-critical testing and other controversial programmes associated with the ongoing nuclear weapon programmes of at least some of the NWS.

Nuclear Disarmament

Nine paragraphs were devoted to Article VI, representing an uneasy but challenging balance between ideal and pragmatic positions, designed to squeeze the NWS between a rock and a hard place. Thus the call for a nuclear disarmament committee in the CD gave some room to manoeuvre on its initial tasks, while continuing to aim towards "the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, including a nuclear weapon convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, employment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination." Similarly the unanimous ICJ opinion which reinforced Article VI was cited in a context that would involve regular information exchange from the States Parties, but especially the NWS, on their efforts towards implementing their international legal obligations on nuclear disarmament.

Some observers drew hope from a positive call, without preconditions, for the CD to get going on negotiating "a treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons..." and implying acceptance of the Shannon report as a basic mandate.

Security Assurances

The NAM also called for the PrepCom meetings to negotiate a legal instrument on security assurances "to be finally adopted by the 2000 NPT Review Conference as an annexed protocol to the NPT".

Middle East

Nuclear weapon free zones are supported, with particular mention of the Middle East, South Asia and Central Asia, and to "consolidation of the

status of the nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas". The final five paragraphs push for implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and for establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. Efforts to isolate Israel and embarrass its key ally, the United States, are being intensively renewed, aided by the deteriorating political support for the present government and the fact that all states in the region except Israel have now acceded to the NPT.

Central Asia

Two statements focused particularly on the initiative by five countries to establish a NWFZ in Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Calling for international and United Nations support for this initiative, Uzbekistan said that a Central Asian NWFZ would contribute towards international cooperation and universal nuclear disarmament. Moreover the process of multilateral diplomacy in building such a zone was also important: to strengthen the nonproliferation regime, to work out effective measures for environmental rehabilitation and to develop and reinforce regional security measures.

Kyrgyzstan also pledged its support for a Central Asian NWFZ and hoped that the PrepCom would take a positive attitude towards the initiative's progress. Kyrgyzstan also expressed its serious concern about the legacy of environmental damage from nuclear weapons production still being borne by countries such as theirs, long after the end of the Cold War, and called for assistance from governments and international organisations, especially the IAEA, in cleaning up the region and disposing of the radioactive contaminants.

Ukraine

Ukraine, which voluntarily gave up what would have been the world's third largest nuclear arsenal after the break-up of the Soviet Union, also drew attention to the problems caused by the Chernobyl disaster on its territory. Noting that the concept of a nuclear-free world was now on the international security agenda, Ukraine called for the NPT Parties to work towards achieving specific practical steps, including: practical measures to promote the universality of the Treaty; further reductions in nuclear arsenals; entry-into-force of the CTBT as soon as possible; immediate negotiations and early conclusion of a fissile materials cut-off; measures to combat nuclear terrorism; and the comprehensive implementation of NWFZ agreements and the establishment of new zones.

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1998 NPT PrepCom Briefing No 4 NGOs Address the PrepCom

Non-governmental organisations made 13 statements to delegations at an 'informal session' of the Second PrepCom, chaired by Ambassador Eugeniusz Wyzner. The statements were the result of a collective process undertaken during the past months to ensure the participation of many NGOs with diverse views, whether or not they would be able to be in Geneva during the PrepCom. In keeping with this spirit, I shall not highlight the individual names or affiliations of the speakers. My short summary cannot possibly do justice to the rich variety of information and ideas put forward, but the full statements are available at <http://www.itu.ch/ipb/>

Spiritual, Ethical and Humanitarian Appeal

The opening statement noted "the terrible suffering caused by nuclear weapons, their potential for total destruction, and their perversion of the fundamental nature of matter". The NWS and their allies were urged to free themselves of their "self-imposed and self-destructive addiction" with the help of "tough love" from the non-nuclear-weapon states, to help them "embark on a course of action that moves toward nuclear abolition." With regard to Article VI, and the ICJ unanimous ruling in July 1996, it was stressed that "good faith" meant "basic honesty...abiding by one's commitment".

Nuclear colonialism and environmental racism

A representative of Indigenous peoples of the Pacific spoke of how "modern technology has been used to perpetuate the historical devastation of Indigenous lands", and made specific reference to "the superpower nuclearisation of the region, nuclear testing, toxic dumping..." He demanded the "final cessation of these genocidal acts of nuclear colonialism" and called for NPT Parties to support and respect nuclear weapon free zone treaties and contribute to the environmental cleanup of the radioactive waste and contamination, emphasising the importance of ending the transshipment, storage and dumping of nuclear waste in the Pacific and the necessity for ongoing monitoring of contaminated areas and support for test site workers affected by nuclear testing. A number of subsequent statements reinforced this message with documented evidence of the terrible destruction wreaked on Indigenous Peoples and lands during the nuclear age.

NATO nuclear weapons sharing

Concerns were raised about the continued siting of around 150-200 nuclear weapons in seven European countries as part of NATO nuclear sharing arrangements: Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey and the United Kingdom. In view of U.S. plans to transfer control over nuclear weapons to Allied countries and the involvement by additional States in

nuclear planning, such arrangements contradicted "the intent and possibly the letter of Articles I and II of the NPT". NPT Parties were thus recommended to "explicitly and clearly state that the Treaty remains in force in time of war," building on the results of the 1985 Review Conference. In addition, to exclude any possible future development of European nuclear forces through integration of French and British nuclear weapons, EU members should declare that in the event of full political union, the EU would become a non-nuclear member to the NPT.

Fissile materials

Two broadly different perspectives were identified: those who favoured getting a cut-off agreement underway as soon as possible, on the basis of the 1995 Shannon mandate; and those who considered that "without specific disarmament steps" by the NWS, a cut-off agreement would "simply reinforce existing disparities." Both approaches advocated additional steps, such as greater transparency and accurate accounting, as well as designating more plutonium and HEU as "excess", to be put under IAEA safeguards and irreversibly removed from future military re-use. The first sought ways to address stocks in parallel with the FMCT, whereas the second argued for specific disarmament steps to be undertaken together with a fissile materials ban, including the dismantlement of all military materials production facilities and a ban on the production of nuclear pits and tritium. The proliferation risks associated with the commercial use of fissile materials and various options for dealing with plutonium and HEU stocks to minimise the risks of proliferation and environmental contamination.

Health and Environmental Effects

Detailing the "extensive health and environmental damage" resulting from nuclear weapons production and testing, including human experiments conducted without informed consent, the statement emphasised that the effects were not confined to the NWS, but have had harmful effects worldwide. A "Global Truth Commission on the Health and Environmental Effects of Nuclear Weapons, Production and Testing" was proposed, either as a commission of the UN General Assembly, or under the joint auspices of the WHO and the UN Environmental Programme, with the task of documenting and evaluating the health and environmental effects and developing ways to assist the affected populations. Since "the mothers of the world are...often its first epidemiologists", the Commission should also invite the participation of citizens from around the world.

Nuclear Power and Sustainable Energy

In addressing the current status of nuclear power, the sixth statement identified trends and issues to enable NPT delegates and decision-makers to place nuclear power in the overall perspective of energy needs. In particular, the speaker noted that the "nuclear industry is in a period of stagnation worldwide and in actual decline in many countries" due to several factors including: its cost, diminishing political support, a failure to address safety, environmental and proliferation issues, and significant public opposition to nuclear technology in many countries. To meet the growing world-wide demand for energy, it was proposed that "contemporary Article IV" should be taken up, to "promote research, technology transfer and assistance in developing sustainable energy development, including energy efficiency...encourage strengthened forms of cooperation...[and] allow the energy aspirations of the developing world... to be met in a

sustainable manner."

Immediate Steps on CTBT and START

The seventh statement focused on bringing the CTBT into force, implementing START II and achieving deeper reductions in nuclear arsenals. The fundamental importance of the CTBT as both a nuclear disarmament and a non-proliferation measure was stressed, all States were urged to sign and ratify the Treaty, and the NWS were reminded that "the CTBT does not give them a blank check to pursue the development and qualitative improvement of new types of nuclear weapons or modifications of existing weapons types..." In addition, it was proposed that NPT Parties urge Russia to ratify START II without further delay and encourage the United States and Russia to initiate negotiations on START III, with the aim of signing and ratifying it by the year 2000.

Anti-disarmament policies and programmes

The eighth statement raised concern about new weapons and facilities being developed by some of the NWS under the rubric of 'Stockpile Stewardship' and provided details on laboratory testing programmes and capabilities in some of the NWS, with particular emphasis on the United States. The statement called for: full disclosure and public debate on national policies regarding the threat and use of nuclear weapons; the renunciation of policies of threatened first use or massive retaliation; elimination of laboratory testing capabilities; national policies to prohibit the design, development or production of new warheads or modifications for new military capabilities; negotiations leading to the abolition of nuclear weapons.

Next Steps

Emphasising the importance of uniting the non-NNWS in order to "be a powerful irrefutable voice to which the NWS will be compelled to listen", this statement proposed the de-alerting of the current nuclear forces, by removing warheads from operational missiles and long-range warheads, reducing the number of warheads on submarines or cutting the nuclear submarines' patrols. Such measures could be accomplished in the near term, thereby contributing practically to the growing acceptance of the case for abolishing nuclear weapons. The statement further proposed that the final stage before complete nuclear disarmament should be one involving the immobilisation of the remaining (few) nuclear weapons of the declared and undeclared NWS. According to this, warheads and delivery systems would be separately stored under international monitoring. Such a measure would "protect the security interests of the NWS while eliminating all possibility of surprise attack or threats to use nuclear weapons".

Nuclear weapons convention

Describing the reasons for and basic provisions of the model nuclear weapons convention (UN doc A/C.1/52/7), it was proposed that NPT Parties should establish an intersessional working group on implementing Article VI, to consider how to bring about negotiations. It was stressed that now was the time to begin devising a plan for complete nuclear disarmament -- including verification mechanisms -- "to be ready when the political climate is favourable".

Regional Initiatives

Existing nuclear weapon free zone arrangements were strongly supported.

Noting that these were primarily in the South, further NWFZs were advocated in the Northern Hemisphere, in areas such as Central Asia, Central Europe, the Balkans and the Adriatic, and especially in zones where nuclear weapons are currently deployed. International seas and oceans should be free from nuclear weapons. Zones free from all weapons of mass destruction were important, especially in the Middle East, and countries wishing to declare themselves nuclear free should be encouraged.

Security beyond Nuclear Deterrence

Noting that "the security challenges we face now arise from threats to the earth's life-support systems", ranging from economic disparity and misuse of scarce resources to environmental degradation, overpopulation and climate change, it was clear that nuclear weapons were "a security problem, not a solution" and that we need "to shift the image of nuclear weapons from political virility symbol to the stigmatised status of chemical or biological weapons". Arguing that effective solutions will require "cooperation, imagination and vision", the statement concluded: "Cold War alliances have had their day; we must all be allies now if we are to avoid disaster."

A Call to Action

The final statement summarised the main arguments and recommendations and urged fuller NGO participation in the Review Process. Supporting the 1997 Marshall Islands proposal for an inter-sessional working group to start work on preparing the ground for negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention, the NGOs stressed the importance also of immediate, intermediate measures such as taking nuclear weapons off alert and halting sub-critical nuclear tests and the modernisation of nuclear weapons, concluding "It is time to put away these deadly instruments of war, clean up the toxic legacy of the nuclear age, and use our precious resources to provide for the genuine needs of our human family on planet Earth."

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General Debate Concludes

The general exchange of views at the Second PrepCom concluded on Wednesday morning with statements from Viet Nam, Chile, Argentina, Malaysia and also the United Kingdom on behalf of the five declared nuclear weapon states (P-5). In addition, this briefing will cover several statements given during Tuesday's debate.

The debate on cluster 1, dealing with nuclear disarmament, is taking place on Wednesday and Thursday, with the special debate on the fissile material production ban or cut-off (FMCT) scheduled for Thursday afternoon, but likely to spill into Friday. There have been numerous statements with some interesting new proposals, notably from South Africa, Canada and Australia. As the cluster debates are now closed to NGOs, however, it will take a bit longer to collect and assimilate the various interventions that I was not present to hear, so briefings on the nuclear disarmament and FMCT debates will not be ready until Monday.

Review Process

In the General debate, Mexico made clear its view that the Review Process should go beyond the "first exercise" and results of the 1997 PrepCom, in order to put together a coherent compilation of ideas, principles and concrete methods that could serve as recommendations for the full implementation of the Treaty's objectives, and "above all, nuclear disarmament". Sri Lanka emphasised that the PrepComs should be viewed as a "cumulative process that would drive the 2000 Review" and reminded delegates that it was their responsibility to "formulate strategies to influence and accelerate the progress leading to the elimination of nuclear weapons". Sri Lanka stressed that the nuclear disarmament cluster should have priority and be given sufficient focus and time. Iran argued for the establishment of a "follow-up mechanism" to ensure full implementation of the Treaty and recommendations, and proposed creating an "open-ended standing committee" to address all aspects of the NPT, including compliance issues. Chile suggested that the ideal method for progress should utilise the Chair's paper from the first PrepCom and incorporate national positions and new elements with the aim of formulating concrete and constructive proposals. Chile also expressed support and interest in Canada's proposals. Australia backed South Africa's view that it would be "logical and desirable" to work for a new P&O document "which would guide our nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament efforts in the period after the 2000 Review Conference..." Egypt proclaimed that the "ultimate aim of the NPT is universal nuclear

disarmament" and proposed that NPT States should "submit written reports on the progress achieved to date and their future plans to implement each provision of the Principles and Objectives" (P&O). South Korea backed calls for the NWS to be "more forthcoming in informing the international community of the activities and progress in their efforts toward nuclear disarmament".

Principal Issues Raised

Several states proclaimed that nuclear disarmament was of the highest priority. Malaysia and Egypt argued that "outmoded nuclear deterrence strategies and doctrines" must be delegitimised and abandoned. Malaysia regretted that the unanimous ICJ opinion which "unambiguously underscored the States Parties' obligation under Article VI of the NPT" and had twice been endorsed by the UN General Assembly (1996 resolution 51/45M and 1997 resolution 52/38O) "has yet to be responded positively to by the nuclear weapon states".

Several NAM delegations endorsed the non-aligned statement, with Viet Nam and Colombia expressing their fullest backing. Colombia also underlined the priority importance of nuclear disarmament and the ICJ's authoritative advisory opinion. Sri Lanka called on the Review Process to address nuclear smuggling and terrorism, issues of safety and the environment, export-import control of illicit nuclear material, and institutional support from the IAEA. Sri Lanka wanted nuclear disarmament to be addressed in the CD as well as by the NPT review process. Calling on all states to promote the entry into force of the CTBT, Sri Lanka also warned that "if testing continues, under whatever pretext, technical or other" it could undermine the CTBT. Egypt expressed its scepticism that the presidential consultations on nuclear disarmament recently agreed by the CD would bear fruit, citing the lack of political will of some of the NWS. Chile gave its general support to the NAM statement but mentioned that it had reservations on certain paragraphs.

While many delegations affirmed their support for negotiations on the fissban, Australia argued for the PrepCom to make recommendations that would enable the CD to get to work on the FMCT on the basis of the 1995 Shannon Report. Egypt again argued that it supported the general aim of banning fissile materials, but "it can only be effective if it is applied to both future as well as already produced fissile material, i.e. stockpiles".

Malaysia and Viet Nam mentioned the South East Asian NWFZ Treaty (Bangkok), which entered into force on 27 March 1997, hoping that consultations between the NWS and countries in the region would enable the protocols to be signed and ratified by all the NWS. Several countries, particularly Egypt, Syria and Iran, raised concerns about the current obstacles to establishing a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East and hoped that the review process would work out practical steps towards implementing the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East.

Chile and Argentina both raised concerns about shipments of nuclear waste and spent nuclear fuel moving through adjacent waters, wanting coordination in the international fora to strengthen safety regulations. Argentina especially recalled two communiqués in January 1997, from Argentina and from Chile, Brazil and Uruguay, calling for regulations including guarantees on routes, obligations to communicate to coastal states for emergency planning in the event of accident, and provisions for salvage and compensation if such an accident should occur.

Many, including Chile, Colombia, Algeria, Egypt and Viet Nam, emphasised the importance of negative security assurances, which Algeria called an

essential measure to accompany the non-proliferation regime. Although they generally seemed to endorse the goal of an NSA protocol to the NPT, Egypt summed up the dominant NAM support for this work to be done by the recently-established ad hoc committee in the CD, rather than through the NPT Review Process.

Several countries also emphasised the importance of the Article IV commitment to the "inalienable right" to nuclear energy. Chile called for more transparency on export controls and said that the export control regime should be progressively multilateralised in its structure and scope.

Australia called for a "strong but transparent nuclear export control regime". Iran focused a significant part of its intervention on criticising the policies and practices of the export control regime set up under the auspices of the Nuclear Supplier Group, quoting the 1995 P&O regarding the promotion of transparency and claiming that the NPT declaration had recognised the IAEA as the "sole competent authority", although that language was not adopted in any of the consensus decisions. Iran also called for security arrangements to prevent safeguarded nuclear facilities from being attacked.

South Korea gave 'ardent backing' to the activities of the CTBT Organisation's Preparatory Commission and Provision Technical Secretariat in establishing the verification regime, urging all States to sign and ratify. This just preceded a detailed statement on the CTBTO PrepCom's progress towards implementing the test ban treaty, presented by Masabumi Sato, Director of the Legal and External Relations Division of the PTS. South Korea also raised concern about North Korea's "non-compliance with the IAEA safeguards agreement", citing three inter-related elements. In this regard, I would like to apologise to the DPRK for wrongly attributing part of the delay in starting the first NPT PrepCom in 1997 to their request to be seated as an observer rather than a State Party and for implying that they might do the same this year. I now understand that the delay was wholly due to the difficulties over Yugoslavia's seat, and that beyond an initial inquiry, DPRK has not attempted to attend the NPT meetings since 1995.

P-5 Statement

The five declared NWS have continued with the precedent, set in 1997, of presenting a paper with their "shared views" regarding NPT implementation. Read by a British representative, the P-5 statement called on all states to "contribute to the success" of the CTBT and urged immediate commencement of negotiations of a FMCT in accordance with the 1995 Shannon report to the CD. Most of the statement was a bland but collective reaffirmation of support for various aspects of the Treaty, with particular emphasis on the enhanced IAEA safeguards regime and nuclear security and safety issues, including transparency in the development of nuclear energy. The P-5 interest in transparency did not appear to extend to nuclear weapon-related activities, however.

Although they reaffirmed their "determination to continue the pursuit...of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally..." and welcomed their countries' achievements so far in the START process and in steps towards placing fissile materials "no longer required for their defence purposes" under IAEA safeguards, the NWS seemed particularly keen to emphasise the responsibility of other States Parties in implementing the Treaty, including Article VI. The P-5 concluded, however, by promising to "continue to work together for the success of the preparatory process and the 2000 Review Conference and on related issues".[Emphasis added]

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NPT Briefing 6 Cluster 1: Nuclear Disarmament

Around 30 delegations spoke during the closed Cluster 1 debates on nuclear disarmament, of which some 23 papers were made available. Recurring themes included: calling on all States to sign and ratify the CTBT; expediting the start of negotiations on a fissile materials production ban as early as possible (as the subject of a specially allocated session, the FMCT/fissban issue will be addressed separately in NPT Briefing 7); welcoming progress in the bilateral START process and urging the ratification of START II by the Russian Duma plus the encouragement of further measures under the rubric of START III; urging progress involving all the NWS, especially with regard to measures identified by the Canberra Commission for immediate action; increased levels of transparency, confidence-building and information sharing by the NWS; and instituting an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament in the CD, with or without a negotiating mandate.

The NAM working paper reiterated its position from 1997, for the CD to negotiate a phased programme of nuclear disarmament leading to a nuclear weapons convention, a position stressed by several states including Malaysia, Indonesia, Colombia, Mexico and Egypt. As China, Russia and the United States had done in the General Debate, France and Britain outlined the steps they have already taken towards compliance with the NPT obligations on nuclear disarmament. None of the NATO States responded to the criticism by NAM states questioning their compliance with Articles I and II. The NAM have urged the NWS and NNWS to refrain from "nuclear sharing for military purposes under any kind of security arrangements" and Egypt specifically proposed that the PrepCom recommend to the 2000 Review Conference to state in "clear and unambiguous terms that Articles I and II...allow for no exceptions and that the NPT is binding on States Parties at all times".

Implementing the P&O programme

Many of the statements outlined national positions with regard to nuclear disarmament and some proposed language to be included in a 'rolling text' of recommendations to the 2000 Review Conference. Several delegations made direct or oblique reference to item 4c of the P&O, "to pursue systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons", and to the importance of the steps identified by the Canberra Commission which should be undertaken by the five NWS without delay, such as: taking nuclear weapons off alert; transparency measures for nuclear weapons and military stockpiles of fissile materials; restrictions on the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons; opening the ABM Treaty to accession by Britain, China and France; commitments not to

modernise or increase the size of nuclear arsenals, and so on.

Also building on the practical proposals put forward by the Canberra Commission, US National Academy of Sciences and others, South Africa went a step further with a pragmatic proposal for using the NPT Review Process to give the P&O programme concrete content. Taking the implementation of item 4c as its starting point and recognising the need for "a structured opportunity to deliberate on the practical steps" for implementing Article VI and the programme of action outlined in the P&O, South Africa proposed i) specific time to be allocated at the Third PrepCom in 1999; ii) for the 2000 Review Conference to decide to allocate specific time to practical consideration of nuclear disarmament steps at future PrepComs; and iii) the establishment at the 2000 Review Conference of a subsidiary body to Main Committee 1 to provide more structured and focused deliberations on the implementation of the nuclear disarmament provisions of the P&O and Article VI.

The NAM states, including Mexico, have welcomed these proposals as a positive step forwards. Although western countries such as New Zealand, Sweden, the Netherlands and Belgium have expressed interest in this practical approach to addressing nuclear disarmament issues in the review process, others have seemed reluctant, either because they argue that nuclear disarmament gets sufficient attention in the cluster debates, or on the grounds that such focused action by NPT Parties could detract from the work of the CD or the bilateral START process underway. South Africa, however, had emphasised the continued importance of the bilateral reductions (and also future negotiations involving all the NWS). Pretoria's recent role at the forefront of efforts to enable the CD to address nuclear disarmament more effectively also clearly demonstrated its commitment to addressing nuclear disarmament issues in both fora, as is appropriate.

In many ways, the South African proposal to provide a structured mechanism for information exchange between the NWS and NNWS regarding practical steps towards nuclear disarmament is also consistent with growing calls for greater transparency coming from many sides, including the NAM, Japan, South Korea, Sweden, the Netherlands, Australia, Finland and Belgium.

Furthering START

A large number of delegations stressed the importance of furthering the START process and hoped that Russia would ratify soon. While some appeared reasonably satisfied with current progress, others, notably the NAM states, expressed concern that such "limited agreements" did not go far enough. A number of States, including Russia, Sweden, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Germany, Japan, and several NAM delegations have alluded to the importance of involving China, Britain and France more in the future and to encouraging five-power talks on nuclear disarmament issues. Arguing that NPT Parties should be able to take a direct role, as well as evolving text for future review documents, Canada proposed a 'Draft Statement on Current START Standstill', intended to be issued either by the PrepCom or as a Chair's statement at the end of this meeting. The statement built on the 1997 UN General Assembly resolution co-sponsored by the US and Russia (among others), and was intended to encourage START II ratification and further progress on START III. Although Canada's proposal has attracted interest from a number of delegations, Russia and the United States have so far shown

little enthusiasm for issuing such a statement from the PrepCom.

CTBT

Many States also want the NPT Review process to urge all States to accede to the CTBT. The NAM statement further called on the NWS to refrain from "conducting all types of tests" and to "comply with the letter and spirit of the CTBT". While Switzerland underlined the CTBT's role in limiting the development of new or qualitatively improved nuclear weapons, others were even more explicit. Sweden, for example, urged the NWS to exercise the "utmost restraint regarding any activity that could undermine the fundamental objectives of the CTBT, including so-called sub-critical experiments." Canada proposed that the NPT PrepCom endorse calls for the political conference to facilitate the CTBT's entry into force (as per Article XIV of the Treaty) to be convened in 1999, before the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Canada's proposal is supported by many States, although there have been reports that Russia and possibly others are pushing for the Conference to take place after 2000.

CD Nuclear Disarmament Committee

The NAM working paper called explicitly for the CD to establish an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament, "taking into account all proposals which have been submitted by members of the Group of 21...". This would include proposals made in 1997 by Egypt and by 26 NAM members of the CD for multilateral negotiations on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament, including time-tables, and also South Africa's proposal for it "to deliberate upon practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons as well as to identify if and when one or more such steps should be the subject of negotiations..." Several Western States also now back CD work on nuclear disarmament, ranging from support for South Africa's non-negotiating mandate or Canada's proposal for "substantive discussion of nuclear disarmament issues with a view to identifying if and when one or more such issues might be negotiated multilaterally" to Belgium's very mild proposal for an "ad hoc group for reflection and study". Japan called for information exchange and discussion of practical issues in various fora, including the CD and the NPT review process, and hoped that a session of the UN Disarmament Conference in November in Nagasaki would be devoted to practical aspects of nuclear disarmament.

The NWS

China and Russia's positions on nuclear disarmament questions were outlined and reported on earlier. France and Britain both gave similar accounts, which also mirrored many points emphasised by the United States, which elaborated further on its general statement. Emphasis was placed on nuclear safety and security, bilateral negotiations and also French and British unilateral steps to end their deployment of tactical nuclear weapons, as well as increasing transparency and halting fissile materials production. All pushed for commencement of FMCT negotiations in accordance with the Shannon report and mandate, as well as stressing other States' responsibility for making progress on nuclear disarmament possible. Many States have commended the early ratification of the CTBT by France and Britain, of which both were justifiably proud, and the NWS all urged support

for the test ban treaty and its early entry into force. France described closing its Pacific test site and dismantling operations at Moruroa and Fangataufa, and also pointed out that it has taken a further step of decommissioning its plutonium and HEU production facilities at Marcoule and Pierrelatte.

Most of the nuclear disarmament debate was general, with much rhetoric on making further progress. Proposals fell into two categories: text for taking to the 2000 Review Conference, and specific proposals for action to be taken by this PrepCom, such as Egypt and South Africa's recommendations and Canada's proposals on START and the CTBT . However, there was little agreement on how to move forwards.

Written by Rebecca Johnson with thanks to Emilie Hafner for her assistance in gathering documents and getting the report out in Geneva. For more information see our journal Disarmament Diplomacy and our website.

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NPT Briefing 7: Questions on the PrepCom Objectives/FMCT

As the first week of the Second PrepCom drew to a close, questions need to be asked about where this is all leading. After a constructive week of debates, including a number of useful and interesting ideas for facilitating the start of negotiations on a fissile materials production ban and making further progress on nuclear disarmament, the frustration level was high as diplomats from about 25 key NPT Parties emerged from a "private meeting" held under the auspices of the Chair, Ambassador Eugeniusz Wyzner of Poland, late on Friday.

More clarity is needed regarding what NPT Parties want the Review Process to achieve and what they want to come out of this PrepCom in particular. The Polish delegation itself offered some general guidelines, saying that it was necessary for the strengthened review process to meet a "two-fold objective": to review the operation of the Treaty, in order to satisfy the requirements of Article VIII.3; and to "promote the practical implementation of the 'Principles and Objectives' of 1995". Yet as more states put in text to the already heavy compilation of proposals attached to the Chair's working paper in 1997, what is all this profusion of language leading to? Was the entire review process intended to be a four-year gathering of text for the final document or other agreements to be adopted in the year 2000? Much of the language being proposed now and carefully laid down will be redundant by the year 2000. The Main Committees at the 2000 Review Conference will end up reviewing all these issues and will generate even more text. Devoting the review process to elongating the tedious process of accumulating text does not seem a very good use of the time and money and would not adequately fulfil the aspirations of the States Parties in 1995 for a meaningful and strengthened process for reviewing and implementing the Treaty.

What, then, should the review process be doing? A majority of States now seem to agree that the 1995 P&O should stand as a benchmark of its time, but not be revised or amended in the future. Instead, they seem keen to see an updated (new) set of Principles and Objectives being developed for each Review Conference in the future. Not all will be new, of course, as many of the principles in the P&O are enduring and need only to be re-stated. Time-dependent objectives, however, such as the programme of action on nuclear disarmament or references to specific NWFZ, would need to be reformulated and updated. This would seem to be a useful and workable proposal, providing that States agree i) that P&O should be renewed in this way every five years; and ii) that in between the Review Conferences, a primary task of the strengthened review process is to work on implementing the P&O agreed at the preceding review conference. Otherwise, why go to the

bother of adopting them in the first place?

If it is agreed that a major task of the review process is to facilitate the implementation of the preceding P&O, then proposals at PrepComs should go into three categories: i) actions to be undertaken by the PrepCom itself, such as Canada's proposals for the PrepCom to issue a statement on START or endorse holding the CTBT conference on entry into force in 1999; ii) recommendations to the next PrepCom, such as proposals for special time to be allocated for certain issues; and iii) recommendations to the next Review Conference, such as deciding that future Review Conferences should formulate their own set of P&O or South Africa's proposals for a subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament.

Although NPT Parties cannot impose their recommendations directly on other fora, such as the CD or bilateral or regional bodies, a further very important function of the review process should be to provide a sounding board for constructive ideas aimed at resolving obstacles or conflicts that stand in the way of negotiations or activities relevant to the NPT's full implementation. In that respect, the discussion on the FMCT has been helpful, even if NPT parties cannot themselves go further than expressing a formal or informal call for more to be done to facilitate progress. Nevertheless, the ideas can be channelled back to the CD or the bilateral or regional participants in ways that can exert pressure or assist solution-building.

As for accumulating text and recommendations for the next Review Conference, it would seem sensible not to start gathering language for an updated P&O until the 2000 Review Conference itself and to spend less energy on repetitive language proposals for potential review documents that are likely to be out of date before they are even considered for agreement. The strengthened review process deserves to have more relevance than that.

FMCT

Many States spoke positively of the debate on addressing fissile materials. Several useful proposals for getting beyond the 'nuclear disarmament versus non-proliferation' debate have been advanced. While the NWS are still adamant that the first stage should be a limited cut-off treaty, some, including Britain and France, are accepting that the Shannon mandate did not preclude discussion of wider issues within the context of the negotiations. The United States and Russia emphasised what they were already doing to declare some plutonium and HEU as 'excess' and place it under IAEA safeguards.

Although the NAM statement referred to the objective of a treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile materials for nuclear weapons et al, many States took heart from the fact that they did not make their call for the immediate commencement of fissban negotiations dependent on CD negotiations for timebound nuclear disarmament. In a similarly constructive vein, while supporting Austria's February proposal for the CD to start negotiations on the basis of the 1995 Shannon mandate, a number of Western delegations have suggested ways in which the thorny question of asymmetric stockpiles could be addressed in conjunction with a cut-off treaty. Canada reiterated its CD proposal for a Presidential statement to redefine the context of the core Shannon mandate, especially with respect to scope negotiations and entry into force, a suggestion backed by several states.

Norway affirmed the four points in its 1997 proposal for voluntary transparency measures, including cooperative international measures to clarify and confirm the voluntary declarations, with encouragement for the NWS to permit inspections of their holdings and agreed monitored reductions of the stockpiles.

One of the more innovative proposals came from Australia, building on the statement of the Foreign Minister to the CD in February. Recognising that if approaches to a FMCT are to succeed, they must take account of the security situations of the NWS and non-NPT states and their regions, Australia put forward the view of a cut-off treaty not as a stand alone, one-off negotiation, but rather as "a framework instrument which evolves into a comprehensive regime governing the production, stockpiling and disposition of fissile material". Accordingly, Australia proposed that the conclusion of a first treaty codifying a basic FMCT should be followed by "a second agreement providing for greater transparency over fissile material inventories and gradually bringing fissile material stocks under strict and effective international control". Verification would also require "an innovative, multifaceted approach involving a balance of bilateral, plurilateral and appropriate international -- and possibly regional -- arrangements..."

NAM countries, however, including Egypt, Indonesia and South Africa, emphasised the importance of any fissban covering not only future but also past production as well as the management of weapon-usable fissile materials. Indonesia posed five questions to be addressed in fissban negotiations and called for plutonium and HEU from dismantled warheads to be placed in internationally-monitored storage "in order to assure that they will not be re-used for weapons"

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NPT Briefing 8 Safeguards, NWFZ and Energy

The Review Process at Risk

The cluster debates have now covered safeguards, nuclear weapon free zones (NWFZ), including the session especially allocated to the Middle East Resolution, and have begun to consider nuclear energy issues. Additionally, the NPT Parties are grappling with different options for how the strengthened review process should be developing. Beginning last Friday, representatives of around 26 key delegations have begun to hold meetings under the auspices of the Chair of the Second PrepCom, Ambassador Eugeniusz Wyzner, to determine how best to report on the work and outcome of the PrepCom.

This informal 'Friends of the Chair' group, similar to those which assisted Jayantha Dhanapala in 1995 and Pasi Patokallio in 1997, appears to include: Algeria, Australia, Britain, China, Chile, Colombia (Vice Chair), Canada, Egypt, France, Finland (Vice Chair), Germany, Iran, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Malaysia, Myanmar, New Zealand, Poland (Chair), Russia, Romania, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sweden, United States and Viet Nam. At present it is wrestling with how to characterise and transmit the many proposals arising from the first two PrepComs.

There are conflicting viewpoints about the structure and scope of reports or 'products' of the meeting. The major problems hinge on two very different perspectives about the desired role and relevance of the strengthened review process as a whole. The NWS and some of their allies appear to favour a 'minimalist' approach, in which the primary job of the PrepComs is to accumulate proposals for text which would eventually end up in the hands of the Review Conference participants in 2000. In that case, the 1997 model is favoured, in which the Chair's working paper contains a shortish section reflecting generalised affirmations or agreement on certain issues (as in paragraph 3 of the 1997 Chair's working paper), while the rest of the proposals end up in a long compilation, regardless of their degree of backing. In 1997 the compilation was placed as paragraph 4 and extended for 30 pages.

At the time of the First PrepCom, Mexico and some of the NAM countries gave notice that they did not want the Chair's working paper to be relied upon too closely as the basis for future work. Concerned that the PrepComs should have relevance in their own right, and not merely be conveyor belts of text for the quinquennial review conferences, several delegations are therefore exploring ways in which the report(s) could better represent the more substantive role given to the PrepComs in the 1995 decisions on

strengthening the review.

Consistent with its proposals for the PrepCom to issue statements on the CTBT and START, Canada has suggested that in addition to general agreements and compiled proposals, the PrepCom or Chair's report should contain two sections which would specifically reflect the important issues at the time, likely to change with each PrepCom. Thus one part would briefly report on the issues to which special time had been allocated (for this year that would be security assurances, the resolution on the Middle East, and FMCT) and another section would contain collective perspectives or agreements of a time-urgent or more specific nature than envisaged in the general agreements, since the current paragraph 3 is directed more to the 2000 Review Conference.

The intention would be to enable NPT Parties to comment on relevant issues of the day, providing somewhere to highlight calls for the ratification of specific measures, like START II, the CTBT, or the additional protocols to IAEA safeguards agreements, or give support to up-coming activities, such as the political 'entry-into-force' conference of the CTBT or the meeting of five Central Asian states in Bishkek to develop their proposed NWFZ.

South Africa has suggested that the PrepCom should issue three documents: one with recommendations on 'principles, objectives and ways' to implement the Treaty, following the format of the 1995 P&O, updated where necessary; a second with specific proposals and initiatives that had not yet obtained agreement; and thirdly, the procedural arrangements for the review conference, financial arrangements etc. South Africa also suggested that the review conference should focus on producing two documents: a 2000 Principles and Objectives, to be a guide and yardstick for progress towards the next review conference in 2005; and a Final Declaration, to review and evaluate the previous five years.

Though several delegations have expressed interest in looking more closely at these ideas, the focus has so far been weighted towards reproducing the 1997 model. A first draft of a possible Chair's working paper along those lines ran to 46 pages, adding proposals from this year to last year's compilation. As the informal Chair's group began to look at whether certain recommendations in the (paragraph 4) compilation could be 'moved up' into the paragraph 3 section, denoting general agreement, it became clear that such a process would be very time consuming and, possibly, unworkable in the long run.

It would be a pity if the PrepComs are drowned in a sea of proposals aimed at the year 2000 when they themselves have a more direct role to play in contributing to the strength of the non-proliferation regime. The first week of substantive discussion had been characterised by genuine attempts by the NAM and a number of other States, including some of the NWS, to seek more flexible and constructive ways of moving forward on issues such as the FMCT, NWFZ and transparency. Those who backed the special allocation of time to certain issues could see their hopes confirmed to a considerable degree by the more focused and solution-oriented contributions in the session allocated to the FMCT, markedly different from the wider restatements of national positions and exhortations which seem to characterise cluster debates. Such positive developments need to be encouraged, built upon and

reported, so that they can facilitate and feed into bilateral or regional processes or the work of negotiating bodies like the CD. If the PrepComs do not successfully carve out a more relevant and substantive role we are likely to see many NPT Parties begin to lose interest. If that happens there is a danger that the strengthened review process may not last much beyond the year 2000.

Safeguards

The debate on safeguards was short, with little apparent disagreement. States urged each other to accept comprehensive IAEA safeguards and conclude their agreements with the IAEA on the additional protocols developed under the 93+2 programme to strengthen the safeguards regime. Some also urged the non-NPT States to consider applying some provisions of the Model Protocol. Some statements raised concerns illicit trafficking and several urged North Korea and Iraq to comply fully with their NPT obligations and safeguards agreements. There was support for the NWS to place 'excess' fissile materials irreversibly under IAEA safeguards and the EU statement also backed an intended project by France, Germany and Russia to turn excess weapons plutonium into mixed oxide (MOX) fuel. Many also affirmed support for nuclear-related export controls, which Iran and some NAM states have already criticised.

NWFZ

This short debate conveyed general support for the various NWFZ now in existence and called on the NWS to respect their provisions and to sign and ratify relevant protocols where that had not yet been done (notably with respect to the Bangkok Treaty). In the General Debate, Ukraine had reaffirmed its backing for the establishment of a NWFZ in Central and Eastern Europe. Following on from general debate statements from Central Asian countries, Uzbekistan updated NPT Parties on the progress being made together with Kyrgyzstan, Kazakstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, to develop a NWFZ in Central Asia. The next consultations between these five countries, the P-5 and representatives of the IAEA and United Nations are scheduled to take place on July 9 and 10 at Bishkek, with the intention of working out the elements of a Treaty.

South Africa not only endorsed the objective of a NWFZ in the Middle East, but made specific reference to South Asia as well. Noting that the possession of nuclear weapons "provides only the illusion of security", South Africa argued that after destroying its own nuclear capability, it now realised that "security is provided by nuclear disarmament rather than by nuclear proliferation" ---- a lesson relevant for the declared NWS as well as the 'threshold' States.

The Middle East

Although Israel's unsafeguarded nuclear facilities were alluded to during some of the cluster 2 discussions on safeguards and NWFZ, time was specifically allocated to the Middle East in accordance with the intentions of the 1997 PrepCom. The EU and a number of other countries expressed support for the establishment of a zone free from weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East "provided that all States in the region are involved". Egypt proposed several paragraphs for actions and recommendations to implement the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. These included: endorsement of the aims and objectives of the Middle East peace

process; suggestions for studies and action on eliminating nuclear, chemical and biological weapons from the region; reference to the continued existence of unsafeguarded nuclear facilities; calls for Israel to accede to the NPT and put its nuclear facilities under full scope IAEA safeguards; support and assistance from NPT states, the United Nations and the IAEA for "early conclusion of the text of a treaty on a NWFZ as a step towards the establishment of a WMDFZ in the Middle East". Egypt's position was supported by a number of other Arab States. The United States responded that singling out one country would not be conducive to resolving the problems in that troubled region. Little of the debate was available to those outside the closed doors.

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NPT Briefing 9, May 8, Brinkmanship

With just one day to go and facing the prospect of getting even less than in 1997, the non-nuclear-weapon Parties to the NPT are facing a stark choice: whether it is better to have a minimal agreement or no agreement at all. As the President of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference pointed out in a recent article: "the importance of 1995 as a watershed demanding a fundamentally different approach to the review process does not appear to have been grasped and, instead, a 'business as usual' attitude is being self-righteously adopted by some countries." [Jayantha Dhanapala, in the UNIDIR newsletter 37, March 1998, p 9]

An hour short of midnight, delegates to the Second PrepCom of the 2000 Review Conference emerged from open-ended consultations under the auspices of the Chair, Eugeniusz Wyzner of Poland. Some appeared quietly pleased that the PrepCom appeared to be heading for oblivion; some were frustrated or angry, because even the modest gains of 1997 have been put in jeopardy; a few were complacent that the lid would stay on and the PrepCom would close with some form of lowest-common-denominator report; all were hot and tired. Disagreements are sharpest on three issues: the Middle East, security assurances and nuclear disarmament.

During the day three sets of negotiations were pursued among representatives of some 30-35 delegations (in addition to those identified in Briefing 8 are Argentina, Belgium, Italy, Hungary, Netherlands, Morocco, Syria, South Korea, with a few others participating at times). The main consultations focused on trying to get agreement on around 22 paragraphs of compromise language proposed in a Chair's "non-paper" which, if accepted, would probably be destined for inclusion in paragraph 3 of the Chair's working paper. Two other groups met, under the auspices of Andelfo Garcia (Colombia) and Markku Reimaa (Finland), with a view to ascertaining whether agreement would be possible on procedural recommendations to the next PrepCom and to the 2000 Review Conference and to consider Canada's proposal that current issues should be reflected in the Chair's paper or PrepCom report.

After hours of intensive negotiations, 11 or 12 paragraphs had been agreed, with compromise language on universality, non-proliferation, NWFZ, safeguards, illegal trafficking, nuclear energy, safety and transport. Outstanding issues include several paragraphs relating to Article VI on nuclear disarmament, security assurances and proposed language on export controls and attacks against nuclear facilities. Some of the NWS want to dilute a proposed reference to the ICJ opinion 'to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects...' and water down references to fissile material stockpiles. On

security assurances they would prefer to emphasise the assurances associated with NWFZ and their unilateral assurances, as well as UNSC 984 (April 1995), rather than negotiations on a legally binding treaty or protocol to the NPT.

Garcia's consultations concerned the procedures for the Third (1999) PrepCom, including whether to recommend that additional time be allocated for specific issues, as proposed by South Africa on nuclear disarmament and Egypt on the Middle East, and already provided to three issues at this second PrepCom. Despite -- or because of -- the fact that the special sessions on the FMCT, the Middle East and security assurances generated more focused papers and constructive suggestions than the generalised cluster debates, the NWS are reportedly opposing the allocation of time to any issues in the future. Their intransigence is giving rise to concern that they are seeking to roll back the precedents set by the First PrepCom in 1997, which some delegations are determined to defend. Due to further opposition from some of the NWS, Garcia's group was reportedly unable even to find language that would reflect (let alone recommend) the proposal from South Africa for establishment of a subsidiary body at the 2000 Review Conference.

Reimaa's consultations looked at Canada's proposals for the PrepCom to report on the issues which had been given particular time and attention and to have some provision for commenting on relevant issues of the day. The NWS appear set against giving the PrepComs this kind of relevant role or provision, arguing that paragraph 3 could adequately reflect any such issues as were capable of attracting agreement. Despite achieving no agreement on the concept, however, the group attempted to find language that would reflect the special sessions on FMCT, security assurances and the Middle East, the latter being the subject of difficult negotiations between Egypt and others.

The NPT Parties are due to return to the Chair's consultations on Friday morning to try to find agreement on the remaining issues. This will not be easy, as a growing number of delegations are already indicating that they will resist what they see as a concerted attempt by the nuclear weapon states to turn the review process into a mere drafting exercise. While there is still time to show a willingness to engage constructively, build on the work of the first PrepCom, and provide room to make progress on important procedural and substantive questions towards the year 2000, the optimistic mood of the first week has vanished.

Cluster Debate Summaries

The cluster debates finished on Wednesday, with Article IV and the special session devoted to security assurances. Due to the fact that the cluster debates are open only to NPT Parties, it has not been possible to do more than provide a snapshot or gist of the issues, as raised. As more of the interventions become available, however, I hope to provide more extensive coverage of the substantive issues discussed during the Second PrepCom in a longer analysis which will be published in June in *Disarmament Diplomacy* 26.

Nuclear energy

In this short debate, many statements supported the Article IV provision on nuclear energy and called for wider financial contributions to the Technical Cooperation Fund. Austria, however, refused to back nuclear power and

criticised the increasingly common argument that enhanced nuclear energy use is the solution to the problems of fossil fuels and climate change. Some concerns were raised about the environmental and health risks from nuclear operations and the transshipment of radioactive waste and plutonium, and several countries called for wider adherence to the various conventions on nuclear safety, and the safety of spent fuel and radioactive waste, civil liability etc. Many statements welcomed the IAEA's recently published Plutonium Management Guidelines.

Both China and Iran objected to measures that went beyond the IAEA safeguards, arguing that 'peaceful uses' were still being impeded. Repeating its concerns about export controls, arguing that "these unilaterally restrictive measures had negative consequences" on the development of countries, Iran proposed that "effective transfer guidelines" be multilaterally negotiated among all supplier and recipient states. While EU states and others reiterated the importance of the export control regime to enable supplier states to comply with their Treaty obligations under Articles I and II, Britain, as current Chair of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, also reported on the first steps being undertaken by the NSG to provide greater transparency, in line with the 1995 P&O decisions.

In response to a request made by Kyrgyzstan in the General Debate, the IAEA briefly reported on various radiological assessment studies of areas affected by nuclear production, testing, dumping or accidents, including Chernobyl, Tomsk, Moruroa and Fangataufa, Bikini Atoll, Semipalatinsk and the Arctic around the Kara and Barents Seas.

Security Assurances

In the time allocated by the first PrepCom for focusing on security assurances, South Africa called for negotiations on legally binding security assurances "within the NPT umbrella, as opposed to some other forum". South Africa has also issued a working paper on security assurances in which it argues that the beneficiaries of such guarantees should be the non-nuclear weapon parties to the NPT, and that the differences between NNWS which are part of nuclear alliances and those which are not would also need to be reflected. The general NAM position favours unconditional security assurances to all NNWS, regardless. China called for a legally binding international agreement on no use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against NNWS, and said there was "no reason to impose various obligations" on the NNWS. China also called for a no-first-use agreement among the NWS. Despite the frequent references in NAM countries' statements to the ad hoc committee on negative security assurances (NSA) recently established in the CD, there seems to be a growing eagerness among NAM countries to pursue this issue in the NPT context as well. Myanmar argued that a protocol to the NPT or other legally binding instrument on NSA was a goal "achievable in time for the 2000 Review Conference only if the nuclear weapon states show a greater measure of political will."

Although acknowledging the support by many States for a global NSA treaty, the United States said that the time was not ripe, but that it was "useful to continue consideration of this issue" in the CD. In the US view, "the best opportunity to make progress" on NSA was in the context of regional approaches involving NWFZ. Australia agreed, but also would not rule out the option of a protocol to the NPT. Reminding NPT Parties of the

substantive work on security assurances accomplished in 1995 under the auspices of Richard Starr, as Friend of the Chair of Main Committee I, Australia attached his report, although the 1995 NPTREC's failure to agree a Final Document meant that the report could not be formally adopted.

A fuller report and analysis will be published in Disarmament Diplomacy 26. All the NPT Briefings and other Acronym Institute publications are posted on our website.

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**NPT PREPCOM BRIEFING NO. 10, 8 MAY: AGREEMENT DENIED
BY REBECCA JOHNSON, THE ACRONYM INSTITUTE**

The second Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) for the 2000 Review Conference of the States Parties to the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), chaired by Ambassador Eugeniusz Wyzner of Poland, ended after midnight on 9 May with no agreement on substance, recommendations or rules of procedure. After a day of tense and difficult discussions, and despite long negotiations on the Chair's working paper, which managed to achieve compromise language on fourteen paragraphs of substance, the divisions over the Middle East and the role of the strengthened review process appeared only to harden. In the end, just the first part of the PrepCom report was accepted. This described the procedural aspects of the 1998 meeting, which had been attended by 97 States Parties, and confirmed the decision to hold the Third PrepCom in New York, from 12 to 23 April, with Andelfo Garcia of Colombia as its designated Chair.

There was no agreement on background documentation for 2000, which is normally prepared in advance under the auspices of the United Nations and relevant bodies such as the IAEA and the secretariats of the various nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZ), for papers to be discussed and agreed at the Third PrepCom. This means that if official background information is to be prepared in time for the 2000 Review Conference, the decision will need to be taken in 1999, leaving little time for States to review and accept it before 2000, unless a fourth PrepCom is held. Some wanted the documentation to cover the articles of the Treaty only; others wanted several papers following the line of the Principles and Objectives, including universality, non-proliferation (articles I and II), nuclear disarmament (article VI), security assurances; safeguards (article III) and non-military uses of nuclear energy (article IV) and on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) and the various established NWFZ.

The main sticking point was the request by fourteen Arab States, backed by the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), for background documentation dealing with the Resolution on the Middle East. The United States refused, holding that background documents should be limited to addressing the Treaty articles only. The US argued that though the Resolution on the Middle East was

adopted at the 1995 Conference, it was inappropriate to have documentation on an issue that is not referred to in the Treaty itself. This was just one of many clashes over whether and how to refer to the Middle East Resolution. The US appeared to want to distance the review process from the 1995 resolution, arguing that it was a one-off, stand alone resolution and not part of the package of decisions adopted to extend the Treaty and strengthen the review process. Their position drew no visible support from other delegations and outraged the Arab States, who considered that their backing for the consensus decision on indefinite extension had been contingent on the adoption of the Middle East Resolution and that the resolution was therefore an integral part of the 1995 agreements.

There was also no agreement on the rules of procedure. The major block was over rule 34, covering the work of Committees. South Africa wanted the mention of 'working groups' to be supplemented by explicit reference to 'subsidiary bodies'. Backed by the NAM and others, they argued that this was the intention of paragraph 6 of Decision 1 taken in 1995, which stated that subsidiary bodies could be established within the respective Main Committees "for specific issues relevant to the Treaty, so as to provide for a focused consideration of such issues". South Africa wanted the concept to be explicitly in the rules of procedure, although it did not insist on the explanatory language. Russia objected to all mention of subsidiary bodies and claimed that the term 'working group' was sufficient. Attempts to include both terms also foundered. Failing to agree, the PrepCom remitted the rules of procedure for consideration at the 1999 PrepCom.

Although appearing to be over a minor difference in terminology, the conflict represented a much deeper division that ran through the entire PrepCom, and in the end caused it to fail. This debate was about the role, purpose and limitations of the Strengthened Review Process initiated in 1995. Objecting to use of the term 'subsidiary body' in the rules of procedure was another way to slam down South Africa's proposal for addressing nuclear disarmament or security assurances more coherently as part of the review.

Although the participants in the Chair's Consultations had worked long and faithfully on trying to achieve agreement on paragraphs to be added to the 'rolling text' of recommendations on issues in paragraph 3 of the 1997 Chair's working paper, few went much beyond the paragraphs agreed last year, so a number of delegates were not sorry to see these fall by the wayside as well. Wyzner has decided to issue the draft working paper and the compilation of proposals from 1998 as official documents of the PrepCom, so the content will at least be available to inform future deliberations.

A further important factor in the PrepCom's failure to adopt a substantive report was the opposition by the major nuclear-weapon States to the recommendations proposed by Canada concerning reporting on the special sessions and raising current issues, and from South Africa and Egypt for allocation of time in 1999 for priority discussion of nuclear disarmament and the Middle East resolution respectively. Despite the actually more focused debate on the three issues allocated special time in 1998, the United States continued to argue that such sessions were a waste of time. The US and Russia, in particular, seemed to want to roll back the precedents set last year, as part of a concerted attempt to turn the review process into a talk shop and conveyor belt of text for the next Review Conference to consider. Countries such as Canada and South Africa, which had played important roles in achieving the 1995 agreements, were determined that the promise and intentions of those agreements should be developed appropriately

and honoured in the implementation.

REASONS FOR FAILURE

What were the reasons for the failure? There were many components, not all negative. Extreme and ideological positions were less in evidence from expected quarters among the non-nuclear-weapon States. The NAM arrived much better prepared than last year, and organised more effectively around the proposals in the NAM working paper and from individual members, such as Egypt and South Africa. Though they fought hard on issues of importance to them, especially nuclear disarmament, they also offered flexibility and compromise. They were quick to support constructive proposals from western delegations, while at the same time western, including EU countries, expressed qualified support for issues of importance to the NAM. Thus some important bridge building was accomplished, including: recognising that existing fissile material stocks cannot be ignored, supporting a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, the Canberra Commission proposals on nuclear disarmament and 1996 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, more transparency regarding export controls, and so on.

The fact that the NAM came with more coherent and reasoned positions resulted in the real locus of divided opinion being brought into sharper focus: the fundamental incompatibility of the interests of the five nuclear-weapon States (NWS) and those of the vast majority of non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS) Parties to the Treaty. The NWS - prominently the United States - had made a considerable effort to respond to calls for greater transparency and accountability by providing more concrete information on what they were doing to comply with their obligations in terms of controlling and reducing military stockpiles of nuclear weapons and fissile materials, decommissioning and so on. However, they seemed to want to stop there. Acting individually, the NWS appeared to support each other in a primary objective of limiting the potential role and relevance of the enhanced review process.

Russia is enmeshed in its own political difficulties and took an exceedingly conservative position on almost everything. China said little in the procedural debates but was clearly unhappy with the idea of the review process having a role in facilitating and commenting on current issues. In relation to EU positions, France held the line on behalf of itself and Britain to prevent the positions of anti-nuclear partners from being expressed in EU statements, but on the floor of the PrepCom, France was significantly among those seeking constructive ways through the deadlocks. Britain was not positively negative but the absence of new policy (blamed on the delayed publication of the Strategic Defence Review undertaken in 1997) resulted in Britain playing a conservative role and appearing curiously disengaged. Britain had several important hats, as a depositary government, President of the EU and Chair of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. In view of the constructive role it might have played, Britain's forced constraint and passiveness was unhelpful and must be assessed as a real lost opportunity. Another important lesson learned is the necessity for more preparation in advance of the meeting and for the Chair/Bureau to have some game-plans for dealing with the most contentious issues. There is not much that a meeting can do about external events, but some conflicts are recurring or predictable and might be handled differently in the future. Taking place at a time of NATO expansion and START at a standstill, as well as high political tension and the lack of concrete progress in British and US initiatives on the Middle East peace process, the PrepCom was saturated with

the spray thrown up by external political events.

It was difficult for delegations - and not only from the Arab States - to accept the US attempts to marginalise the Middle East Resolution. The existence of unsafeguarded nuclear facilities and non-accession by a small number of countries to the Treaty are relevant issues to the content and scope of the NPT and its review process. The US only undermined its own commitment to non-proliferation by its attempts to exempt Israel's nuclear capability from discussion, although it is also important to prevent the Treaty being misused in the pursuit of wider political objectives. The US became increasingly isolated in its approach, inviting comparison with the ludicrous interventions by Bhutan and Mauritius at the end, in which they attacked the references to South Asia in various NPT documents and the NAM statement.

The general feeling, however at the end of the PrepCom was that although the it could not get agreement, the time was not wasted. Substantive issues were addressed; constructive and interesting proposals were offered not only for the NPT review process, but also to facilitate progress in the CD and in nuclear arms control in general, for consideration by the States directly concerned. The outcome of the Second PrepCom is not (yet) indication of a failing review process, as it foundered on real and relevant political differences. If it acts as a warning to those who would subordinate this important cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime to their narrow national interests and if lessons can be learned and applied, the problems of the Second PrepCom may prove to have beneficial consequences for the NPT regime as a whole. But only if there is the political will on the part of all the States Parties, especially the NWS, to make it work for the good of all.

Dear Editor:

I adamantly condemn nuclear testing by India, Pakistan and all nations. We in the Coalition for Peace Action have worked for 18 years to persuade our own government to stop testing and sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and we are dedicated to stopping the spread of nuclear weapons.

At the same time, I must admit that criticism of U.S. nuclear hypocrisy is valid. The U.S. began the nuclear weapons era with the first nuclear test in 1945, and conducted 1,030 more tests over the next 47 years—more than the rest of the world combined.

Even though President Clinton signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996, his Administration has replaced testing with its so-called Stockpile Stewardship Program that includes development of new nuclear weapons in contradiction to the spirit of that Treaty.

The U.S. retains nearly 15,000 nuclear warheads—immense overkill—nearly a decade after the Cold War ended. Moreover, our government refuses to even begin negotiations to abolish the arsenals of the nuclear “haves”, despite our moral and legal obligation to do so under international law.

Two wrongs never make a right, so this hypocrisy doesn't justify India, Pakistan or anyone else's nuclear testing. But it does suggest that we need to begin by changing our behavior if we want others to take us seriously.

The image that comes to mind is Jesus teaching about dealing with sin and self-righteousness in the Sermon on the Mount: “...first take the log out of your own eye, and then you will see clearly to take the speck out of your neighbor's eye.” (Matthew 7:5)

It is very clear that on nuclear matters, the U.S. is the one with the log, compared to the relative speck in India and Pakistan. If we want to help remove that speck, we need to begin by taking the nuclear log out of our own. Specifically, the U.S. Senate should promptly ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban, and President Clinton should initiate negotiations for a nuclear abolition treaty by the year 2000.

Only in so doing will our call to stop testing have integrity and real influence. Any of your readers who wish to help push for such policies can contact: Coalition for Peace Action, 40 Witherspoon St., Princeton, NJ 08542; telephone (609)924-5022.

Sincerely,

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Project on European Nuclear Non-Proliferation (PENN)
Press Release
April 28, 1998

Non Aligned Movement Demands an End to NATO Nuclear Sharing
At the meeting of the member states of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in Geneva the Non Aligned Movement (NAM) today officially demanded an end to NATO nuclear sharing arrangements. A working paper, representing the position of more than 110 states, demands that "the Nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT . . . refrain from, among themselves, with non-nuclear weapons states, and with States not party to the Treaty, nuclear sharing for military purposes under any kind of security arrangements."

NATO is the only alliance which operates nuclear sharing arrangements.

Under these arrangements, 150-200 US nuclear weapons are deployed in the six European states: Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, and Turkey. As part of these arrangements, these non-nuclear weapon states are involved in nuclear training and consultations in peace time and could use nuclear weapons in wartime. As the representative of Turkey said "Turkey ... apart from the nuclear umbrella of the NATO alliance, does not possess nuclear weapons."

NATO countries have always maintained that NATO nuclear sharing is legal under the NPT because it does not involve the actual transfer of nuclear weapons unless a decision was made to go to war. NATO argues that the NPT would no longer be "controlling" in these circumstances. But the NAM working paper states that the NPT has the aim of "preventing _under any circumstances_ further proliferation of nuclear weapons." (Emphasis added) A number of individual countries also raised NATO nuclear arrangements.

The representative of Ukraine stated its concern that the expansion of NATO would also extend nuclear sharing. Ukraine welcomed NATO's declaration that there would be no "deployment of nuclear tactical weapons on the territories of the expanded Alliance new members." However they added that there is an "urgent necessity" to adopt a "mandatory document on this issue. "

For more information, please contact Daniel Plesch of the British American Security Information Council (BASIC) in Washington on 202-785-1266.

Messages can be left for Oliver Meier of the Berlin Information-center for Transatlantic Security (BITS) on +41 22 731-0812, or Stephen Young of BASIC on +41-22-732-4423, Room 26.

Copies of the speeches, information on the NPT meeting, and background materials are available on BASIC's website at <http://www.basicint.org>.

PENN is a international network of non-governmental organizations concerned with nuclear weapons issues.

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A Spiritual, Ethical, and Humanitarian Perspective on Nuclear Weapons

Mr. Chairman and delegates to the 1998 session of the NPT Preparatory Committee, we in the community of non-governmental organizations greatly appreciate the opportunity to appear before you and provide information on vital issues that are on your agenda. My role is to offer some ideas by the Religious Working Group for Nuclear Abolition.

You meet at a propitious time. With a new millennium rapidly approaching, this people of this planet would like to enter the new century free from the threat of nuclear holocaust. In the next two weeks you delegates here assembled have a great opportunity to take decisive action to set the course for the abolition of all nuclear weapons on Earth.

The moral grounds for nuclear abolition are expressed in a statement by Godfried Cardinal Danneels and Rev. Dr. Konrad Raiser, which you have received. Their words reflect a broad consensus within the world's religious community. They state:

Nuclear weapons, whether used or threatened, are grossly evil and morally wrong. As an instrument of mass destruction, nuclear weapons slaughter the innocent and ravage the environment. ...As an instrument of deterrence, nuclear weapons hold innocent people hostage for political and military purposes. Therefore, the doctrine of nuclear deterrence is morally corrupt.

This view stems from a belief in the sanctity of life, a perspective shared by other world religions: Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism.

I believe that most of you today, who come from different faiths, in your heart of hearts, in the deep recesses of your mind, also understand the moral depravity of nuclear weapons. The challenge to you is to let your moral judgment guide your actions.

A statement developed by religious leaders in the Czech Republic for this conference offers a pair of reasons for the total rejection of nuclear weapons: first, the threat to Creation and, second, the contribution to moral degradation.

"Nuclear weapons," say the Czechs, "fundamentally differ from all other weapons because of their potential to destroy all life on this planet. They are terminal in relation to Nature. They can destroy the divine Creation....They take from God the sole power to end the created order, and thus usurp the divine prerogative....Nuclear weapons stand

condemned because they can destroy 'the sacred gift of life' and are thus innately demonic and blasphemous."

Secondly, the Czech statement notes, "The terrible suffering caused by nuclear weapons, their potential for total destruction, and their perversion of the fundamental nature of matter have contributed immeasurably to the moral degradation of humanity in our time." This moral decline has escalated from the mass slaughter of World War I to the Nazi concentration camps to the mass bombing of cities in World War II to the development of nuclear weapons and their use on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the 1945. Since then, "the East-West nuclear confrontation with the readiness of states to commit global genocide further hugely contributed to the moral de-sensitization of our age, now so evident in many aspects of contemporary life."

From an ethical perspective, Judge Mohammed Bedjaoui, when he was president of the International Court of Justice, stated: "The nuclear weapon, the ultimate evil, destabilizes humanitarian law which is the law of lesser evil. The existence of nuclear weapons is therefore a challenge to the very existence of humanitarian law, not to mention their long-term effects of damage to the human environment, in respect to which the right to life must be exercised."

Judge Bedjaoui spoke in connection with an unanimous ruling by the International Court of Justice that under Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, "There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all aspects under strict and effective international control."

Note the words "good faith", two terms with deep religious meaning. In this context they refer to basic honesty, to abiding by one's commitment. You delegates have it within your goodness to act decisively on behalf of all us: humans, animals, plants, the whole community of life. We have faith that you will show yourself worthy of this trust.

Even if no other nuclear bomb is exploded, the Earth will remain scarred by the nuclear weapons era. Earth and its people have suffered grave harm in the mining of fissionable material, in production of nuclear warheads with the byproduct of radioactive waste, and through nuclear testing in the atmosphere and below the ground.

Beyond harm to people and environmental damage, nuclear weapons have taken an enormous economic toll. Since the 1940s the nuclear weapon states have spent more than \$8 trillion to develop, test, produce, transport, deploy, and safeguard their nuclear arsenal. This vast waste of resources brings to mind the words of U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, himself a former general, words deemed so important that they are engraved beside his tomb in Abilene, Kansas. "Every gun made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed....This is not a way of life at all....Under the cloud of threatening war, it is humanity hanging from a cross of iron."

The great irony is that the nuclear weapon states through these

vast expenditures have failed to produce the security they seek. Indeed, it is their own people who are at greatest risk due to their doctrine of mutually assured destruction. Citizens of the allies of nuclear weapon states are themselves vulnerable to nuclear attack because of the military doctrine of the nuclear powers. Any other nation gaining nuclear weapons would join the ranks of the insecure.

Tragically the nuclear weapon states and their allies are victims of a self-imposed and self-destructive addiction to nuclear weapons. Yes, an addiction. Like many other addictions cure can come in two ways.

First, the addicted can exercise self-will, can renounce the addictive substance or orientation, and can through great determination and inner strength free itself from the addiction that is sapping its vitality. In this case, the nuclear weapon states can say individually or join together in a covenant that says, "We renounce the use of nuclear weapons for war-fighting purposes. We renounce nuclear deterrence as an instrument of foreign and military policy." Renunciation would remove the fundamental blockage to carrying out a series of actions that lead to nuclear abolition. Other speakers on this program will describe the steps that can be taken along this road.

Second, friends of the addicted can apply "tough love". They can talk firmly and insist that the addicted take the necessary steps leading out of addiction. In the matter at hand, you delegates from non-nuclear weapon states can exercise tough love by insisting that the nuclear powers embark upon a course of action that moves toward nuclear abolition. You can even develop a plan in the form of a nuclear weapons convention to outlaw and abolish nuclear weapons. Even if you are part of a political bloc with one or more nuclear weapon states, true friendship requires you to apply tough love by acting independently and supporting measures leading to nuclear abolition. Beyond that, each and every one of you has a higher loyalty to all of humankind, to the well-being of all peoples on Earth.

As you prepare to meet the challenges before you during this session of the NPT Preparatory Committee, I invite you to pause and observe one minute of silence. Draw upon the perspective of your personal faith and use this minute to reflect upon the human suffering caused by nuclear weapons in their more than fifty years of existence: the victims at Hiroshima and Nagasaki; the indigenous people and other inhabitants living in the vicinity of test sites in the western United States, Algeria, Russia, Kazakhstan, China, the South Pacific, and Australia; persons far away from test sites but harmed by drifting radioactive fallout; the people who have suffered by the side effects of mining operations and weapon production facilities.

In silence we can remember all who have suffer. We can share together feelings of regret and contrition. You who are delegates can also use this moment to reflect on what you can accomplish in the next two weeks. You can re-dedicate yourself to working courageously and with imagination to find ways to end the nuclear arms race and rid Earth of this horrible plague on human existence.

May we pause now in silence.

[After one minute.]

In the spirit of renewal and re-dedication, the NGO community this afternoon would like to offer you ideas on steps that can be undertaken to achieve the abolition of nuclear weapons, an achievable goal that humankind longs to accomplish. Although NGOs have various perspectives on the issues presented, we have collaborated in preparing these statements. We hope that our ideas will be useful to you in your deliberations. Throughout your session we will be available to you to elaborate on what we have presented today. We look forward to further exchange of ideas in the period leading up to the year 2000 NPT review conference.

Lastly, I want to thank you personally for the privilege of speaking to you.

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Nuclear Colonialism and Environmental Racism: An Indigenous Perspective

Distinguished members of the NPT review panel, I am thankful for this opportunity to represent NGOs for a nuclear free and independent Pacific and all colonized people in the world to communicate our sentiments and positions towards the long overdue need for the abolition of nuclear weapons.

I would like to speak to you today as an Indigenous person from the South Pacific. For peoples from my region and for indigenous peoples all over this planet, the effects of the nuclear fuel chain are an assault upon our lands, our lives, our cultures. Native communities in Canada, Aboriginal communities in Australia and bushmen in Namibia are still waiting for justice concerning their inherent right to self-determination, as promised by the UN Declaration of Human Rights.

For a dozen millennia, the vast Pacific has been our home. As island peoples, we have lived in our mother's keeping and she in ours. But with the dawning of imperialism, our islands have been overrun by Europeans, by Americans and by Asians. The power and might of these colonial powers were crucial in exploiting and maintaining the Pacific as the nuclear arena, testing ground and dumpsite of nuclear materials.

The colonial stranglehold began with the taking of ports and bases in the 18th and 19th centuries. It escalated with the Second World War and it continues with superpower nuclearization of the region, nuclear testing, toxic dumping, ocean and land mining, and the latest form of exploitation, mass based corporate tourism. This is what we mean when we describe Nuclear Colonialism. It describes the use of modern technology to perpetuate the historical devastation of Indigenous lands.

In my island nation of Belau (Republic of Palau), we determined to create a nuclear-free island nation. That seemed like a noble idea, but as soon as we began to set in motion the building of our nation, our U.N. Administering Authority made a mockery of our genuine practice of democracy. We conducted more than ten referenda to deny the American Pentagon's plans to strike down our nuclear-free Constitution. We soon found out that the promotion of democracy was a mere rhetorical ploy. We said "NO" each time we had a referendum on the question of allowing nuclear weapons in our territory. Our first president was assassinated, and the results of each subsequent referendum were thrown out, the reason being that military imperatives took precedence over the democratic wishes and aspirations of a nation and people.

The phrase "environmental racism" is of relatively recent origin, but the practice of siting hazardous waste production and disposal in communities of colour is nothing new. Environmental racism is a continuation of the discrimination people of colour endure at all levels of society, from housing and education to employment, health care and legal services. Environmental racism forces people of colour, in the words of Rev. Ben Chavis Jr., "to bear the brunt of the nation's pollution problem." Examples of environmental racism abound. Called by some "human sacrifice zones", these are areas where mining occurs, where pesticide use is rampant, and of course where the pollution of the military, the biggest source of pollution on earth, accumulates and is stored.

Nuclear weapons, the focus of the NPT, are not possible without digging uranium from the earth. We believe that uranium should be left in the hands of Mother Earth - no other force is capable of containing the toxic menace of radioactivity. 70% of the world's uranium resources are located in the lands inhabited by Indigenous Peoples in Africa, Asia, Australia, and North and South America. These people are severely affected by the negative impact of mining activities.

The nuclear cycle connects the Indigenous and independence struggles with each other: Uranium mining begins on Aboriginal and Native American land; testing has been carried out on Moruroa, Fangataufa, the Marshall Islands, Kazakhstan and Nevada; MX missiles are ejected into Kwajalein waters; toxic wastes are disposed in the Northern Marianas; US military bases are located in Guam, Hawaii, Okinawa, South Korea, Australia, and until 1991, the Philippines; US military spy bases are located in Aotearoa-New Zealand, Australia and the Antarctic.

Jabiluka is a proposed uranium mine which lies within the physical (although not legal) boundaries of Kakadu National Park in the Northern Territory of Australia. The traditional owners, the Mirrar people, have categorically stated they oppose the construction of the Jabiluka mine. Yvonne Margarula, senior traditional owner of the Jabiluka region, has this to say about the mine: "The Jabiluka deposit is ten minutes from our communities, 500 metres from a major wetland system and is enclosed within Kakadu National Park. One spill from the proposed mine will mean that natural and cultural values of Kakadu National Park would be obliterated forever....We want the Australian government to understand and act on obligations which belong to all of us to protect our country."

We reaffirm the correctness and relevance of the 1997 Moorea Declaration by Abolition 2000 which states that "colonized and indigenous people have in the large part, borne the brunt of this nuclear devastation - from the mining of uranium and the testing of nuclear weapons on indigenous peoples land, to the dumping, storage and transport of plutonium and nuclear wastes, and the theft of land for nuclear infrastructure."

We therefore come here to the table as victims of the nuclear age. While it is difficult to transcend the nature of what it is to be the sacrificial lambs of military imposed "peace," we seek to transcend mere victimization in demanding and calling for a final cessation to these genocidal acts of nuclear colonialism. We are inspired by the work of the recently-deceased Brazilian educator Paulo Freire, who spoke of strategy on

behalf of oppressed peoples working to liberate themselves from the oppression that dehumanizes both the oppressor and the oppressed. Being the victims of the nuclear age, we ask you to listen to the suffering voices silenced by attribution of priority to a precarious "peace" maintained by military means. The Pacific, like most Indigenous communities around the world, is heavily militarized. Genuine peace can only begin to emerge when the nations of the world start to dismantle military and nuclear installations now dominating the entire Pacific from Guam to Hawaii to French Polynesia.

Nuclear disarmament can begin to heal the wounds imposed on communities not only in the South, but in the Northern countries as well. The theory and practice of nuclear deterrence have been extremely hostile to democratic practice. Nuclear disarmament and demilitarization will allow communities to participate more fully in both the political sphere and civil society. National military strategies, on the other hand, have often required the absence of free democratic thought. As you meet here, we urge you to take strong and courageous leadership in de-legitimizing what, for a whole generation, gripped our imagination as we tottered in so close a proximity to total nuclear annihilation. As we have heard oftentimes, the end of the Cold War has provided a historic opportunity to rid ourselves of this "near-death" experience with planned obsolescence of the human race.

Both the NPT and subsequent efforts to re-visit it, including the 1995 review, produced many promises which you all undertook to achieve. Integrity in this instance is crucial, and we urge you all to be true to those promises. With the next formal Review of the NPT in the year 2000, it will not only be logical to set ourselves on a new footing in human history; it will also be a crucial symbol for beginning a new millennium with serious efforts to begin negotiations toward nuclear disarmament.

Discussions on nuclear stockpiles must eventually give way to development issues. In the Pacific and in many Indigenous communities worldwide, it is crucial that forms of political autonomy, liberated from the dominance of military and nuclear installations, be the basis of this new discourse of development. In connection with nuclear disarmament therefore, we urge you to support bringing to pass the end of colonialism, and our right to decolonization. Self-determination of peoples and their communities must be the basis of state relations in the coming millennium.

I am saddened by the absence of many Pacific Island nations here. Marshall Islands Ambassador Laurence Edwards called attention, at last year's NPT PrepCom, to the inability of many small island nations to come to Geneva. But he called for the creation of an Intersessional Working Group which would set in motion negotiations toward nuclear disarmament. This will be the most significant accomplishment of this NPT, and we strongly urge you to do this. The South Pacific Forum, in Rarotonga last September, expressed their support of the enhanced NPT review process, and called for more action to be taken on pursuing other efforts to proceed with the current efforts under NPT. We urge you to do the same.

Distinguished members of the panel, within the next two weeks we also urge you to make the following steps that will pave the way to

disarmament and our liberation from nuclear colonialism and racism:

1. For parties to the treaty to support and respect the Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaties in the South Pacific and Southeast Asia as an important disarmament measure. In the spirit of Article VII of the Non-Proliferation Treaty which upholds that it is the "right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories", the NPT Prepcom should support the process of establishing such zones. Protocols must be signed now without further conditions.

2. As an expansion of the international cooperation outlined in Article IV of the NPT, with due consideration for the needs of our areas of the world, we recommend that the PrepCom urgently request parties to the Treaty in a position to do so to contribute to the environmental cleanup of the radioactive waste and contamination that are the inevitable consequence of the extraction and use of nuclear materials.

We wish to assert our right to preserve the nature of our relations with the earth, as we have for generations as Indigenous peoples. The fate of the earth rests on the proper care of the lands and waters, not by threatening to destroy the earth and its inhabitants in order to maintain dominance and hegemony. The wisdom of Indigenous peoples' relationship to the earth is the reciprocal obligation to care for the land, as it will in turn care for us. The voices of Native peoples, much popularized in these frightening times, speak a different language than old world nationalism. Our claims to uniqueness, to cultural integrity, should not be misidentified. We are stewards not of weapons stockpiles but of the earth, our mother, and we offer an ancient, umbilical wisdom about how to protect and ensure her life.

The following are words from the Final Communique of the Pacific Islands Non-Governmental Forum, meeting in parallel with the South Pacific Forum Summit in Rarotonga, Cook Islands in September 1997:

"Our waters are sacred waters which sustain all life forms. The sea is where all life comes from. The ocean unites us all, as peoples of the Pacific. The land is our life, our history, our culture, our future generations.

Our ancestors cared for these life forms, respected them and were their guardians. They are our guardians still.

Our air and waters are sacred - we are not the dumpsite of the world.

The end of nuclear testing in the Pacific does not mean the end of the nuclear age. We will return from Rarotonga to our homes, to press for an end to the transshipment, storage and dumping of nuclear wastes in the Pacific, the clean up and ongoing monitoring of contaminated areas and support for test site workers affected by nuclear testing."

Thank you.

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NATO Nuclear Weapons Transfers

Mr. Chairman, we would like to draw attention to a case of nuclear proliferation that has been moving up the diplomatic and political agenda since 1995. Under NATO nuclear sharing arrangements, 150-200 US nuclear weapons remain deployed in Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. Under NATO nuclear sharing arrangements, these countries are involved in consultations on the possible use of these weapons and training for employment of these weapons of mass destruction. It is also clear that the other member states of the Alliance - Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Luxembourg, Norway, Portugal, and Spain pursue diplomatic policies which support the nuclear policies of the three nuclear weapon states in NATO, France, the United Kingdom and the United States. The three candidate members, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, have adopted the same approach.

We believe that these arrangements - which enable some non-nuclear weapon states to be actively involved in the nuclear weapons policies of the Western nuclear powers - are contradicting the intent and possibly the letter of Articles I and II of the NPT. It is therefore timely and appropriate for these issues to be addressed in the NPT Review Process. NATO nuclear weapons and the associated arrangements represent a major hurdle to further and substantial steps toward nuclear disarmament.

The continued deployment of these weapons in Europe and the continued practice of nuclear sharing harms the nonproliferation regime in several respects:

First, it runs counter to the NPT's main purpose of limiting access to nuclear weapons. It actually widens access to nuclear weapons for training purposes in peacetime and use during wartime. NATO's system of nuclear sharing enlarges the number of states who participate in nuclear planning. Currently, all NATO member states who wish to do so can participate in discussions on nuclear planning and doctrine. With the planned enlargement of the Alliance, the number of states eligible to participate in these arrangements will increase.

Further, in case of war, the United States still plans to transfer control over nuclear weapons to Allied countries. Current NATO policy increases the number of countries with the capability to wage nuclear war. Six states, which claim non-nuclear status under the NPT have that capability. As the distinguished delegate from Turkey said yesterday in his prepared statement, "Turkey...apart from the nuclear umbrella of NATO Alliance, does not possess nuclear weapons."

Secondly, NATO nuclear sharing arrangements are also harming the NPT because they represent a dangerous precedent. Upon signing the NPT, the US and several European states argued that the treaty could not be interpreted in such a way that it could hamper European integration.

Already, some in Europe are arguing that NATO nuclear sharing is a precedent for joint nuclear sharing arrangements in a future EU state. At the same time, European Union member states are postponing the question of what will happen to French and British nuclear weapons, when the process of European integration continues. Up to now, the European Union has not stated that it wants to become a non-nuclear weapons state under the NPT.

Further, the Amsterdam Treaty states in Article J.7 that "The policy of the Union in accordance with this article shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defense policy of certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain Member States, which see their common defence realized in NATO, under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that framework." This close linkage of the common foreign and security policy of the EU to NATO's defense politics means in fact that the Europeans would be forced to organise any common defence inside NATO and inside a nuclear framework. Thus, the EU will not become non nuclear unless NATO becomes non nuclear. This makes denuclearisation of NATO politics even more urgent.

Mr. Chairman, we believe that the political arguments made in support of NATO nuclear sharing are unsound and that the legal arguments are highly questionable. Politically, NATO nuclear sharing, including a first use option, is an anachronism. Legally, it can be questioned whether the reservations made by the United States and other Western states at the time of the signing of the NPT are sufficient to construct an exception to the general prohibition of nuclear sharing under the NPT.

We therefore believe that the NPT Review Process should openly discuss whether NATO nuclear sharing violates the spirit and intent of the NPT. NATO nuclear sharing is an appropriate topic for this year's PrepCom because the mandate includes discussions on such issues as negative security assurances. In addition, NATO nuclear sharing is an obstacle for the fulfillment of Art. VI commitments.

Including NATO nuclear sharing in the work of the NPT Review process is especially timely, because NATO is in the process of entirely revising its strategy. This process is taking place in secret. NATO's new Strategic Concept is supposed to be finished in April 1999 shortly before the Third PrepCom for the 2000 Review Conference of the NPT. Statements from NATO countries indicate that there are no plans to change the key nuclear aspects of the Alliance's policy: nuclear deterrence, nuclear sharing arrangements and the first use policy. If NATO will not change the nuclear paragraphs of its current Strategic Concepts, current NATO nuclear policies will be extended for the foreseeable future. NATO's strategy will not reflect the on-going changes in Europe, nor the commitments made at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. In particular, the expansion of NATO, and the extension of the nuclear guarantee that implies, are

antithetical to the commitment to pursue "systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons" as agreed in 1995 in the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament.

This PrepCom and the coming twelve months represent unique opportunities to influence this process of reformulating NATO's nuclear policies. States should seize this opportunity to discuss and seek consensus on the status of NATO nuclear sharing and expansion under the NPT.

Making NATO nuclear sharing a high priority of the work of the NPT Review process is especially urgent, because there is a danger that the role of nuclear weapons will be expanded again. The Alliance is moving increasingly toward planning to use nuclear weapons to counter the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Overcoming this trend is one prerequisite for the elimination of nuclear weapons, the nuclear weapon states' commitment under the NPT.

Mr. Chairman, there are a number of ways in which NATO nuclear sharing can and should be addressed in the Review process.

First, we think it is timely for the NPT to explicitly and clearly state that the treaty remains in force in times of war. By doing this, one major ambiguity about the interpretation of treaty clauses could be closed. The PrepCom could build on the results of the 3rd Review Conference, where it was agreed that "the strict observance of the terms of Articles I & II remains central to achieving the shared objectives of preventing under any circumstances the further proliferation of nuclear weapons".

Secondly, the PrepCom should urge EU members to declare that eventually the EU will become a non-nuclear member to the NPT. By doing so, the development of European nuclear forces through integration of French and British nuclear forces would be excluded.

Whether NATO nuclear sharing arrangements are compatible with Articles 1 & 2 of the NPT is one of the open questions that must be dealt with in the Review Process. This issue has repeatedly been addressed by a number of states before and after the 1995 decision to extend the NPT indefinitely. Questions were raised about the legality of these arrangements and criticisms leveled for extending nuclear privileges to some non-nuclear weapon states. The issues at the heart of the debate have never been resolved. We believe that now is the time to clearly state that ending nuclear sharing would be step that would strengthen the NPT.

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Fissile Materials, Controls, Inventory and IAEA Safeguards

Towards universal, comprehensive and transparent accountancy, safeguarding and disposition of military and civilian fissile materials.

This paper addresses fissile materials. This is a complex issue and among NGOs, as among Governments, there are some significant areas of disagreement. It is widely accepted that the control of fissile materials plays an important role in the transformation of the non-proliferation regime into a nuclear-weapon-free world regime. The crucial question is how a reduction of unsafeguarded stockpiles of fissile material can be managed in a way that a nuclear-weapon state or a nuclear threshold state can move towards becoming a non-nuclear-weapon state. For declared nuclear-weapon states this transformation will be linked to the destruction of the last remaining nuclear weapons. A clear method for the undeclared nuclear states to join the cut-off and disarmament process needs to be worked out. One component of this would be for them to reduce the upper limit of their stocks of nuclear-weapon-usable materials while the recognised nuclear-weapon-states further reduce their nuclear arsenals. The last step would involve placing all remaining stocks of fissile material in all countries under international safeguards.

Banning the production of fissile materials for weapons: an NPT pledge

At the first NPT PrepCom in New York in 1997 it was proposed that special time should be reserved in the NPT review process to discuss the cut-off issue. In this short statement we would like to focus on what delegates might consider during this specially reserved time. It should be kept in mind that the participation of the undeclared nuclear states, which are not Parties to the Treaty, is central to this discussion.

Progress towards a cut-off agreement at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) is currently deadlocked. One important reason for this is that insufficient connection has been made between a cut-off treaty and progress on disarmament, which includes the asymmetry of existing stockpiles. There are two broadly different perspectives for how to make progress, though with some cross-overs. Some NGOs consider that a cut-off agreement should be one of the very next steps towards non-proliferation and disarmament and that negotiations should commence as soon as possible on the basis of the mandate agreed by the CD in March 1995. Others hold that without specific disarmament steps on the part of nuclear weapon states a cut-off agreement would simply reinforce existing disparities. Both perspectives offer constructive ways to move forward, which we will try to represent in turn.

i) The first view: getting the FMCT underway

The first view considers that most of the nuclear weapon and threshold states will not be prepared to allow a cut-off treaty to reduce their existing military stocks. In recognising such problematic realities, incremental steps at other fora could be considered, enabling progress in parallel with the FMCT negotiations. The main purpose of these incremental steps would be to reinforce the moratoria of countries that have ceased production, to increase transparency, and to increase pressure on countries that continue production for nuclear weapons. Last and not least, the nuclear weapon states need to demonstrate in this process their commitment to take real steps towards nuclear disarmament, such as the de-alerting of nuclear forces, some kind of tritium control, establishment of an ad hoc scientific group to consider the technical aspects of nuclear disarmament, and a disarmament discussion process at the CD.

It might, however, be possible for the nuclear weapon states to discuss a declaration of stockpiles or a commitment to minimise non-military stockpiles outside of safeguards. All civilian fissile materials and military material declared excess to weapons requirements should be placed under IAEA safeguards. Other steps in this preliminary process could be:

* There should be a full and accurate accounting of the location, amount and form of all fissile materials in each country, without exception. This will reduce the danger of withdrawal of materials at a later stage. Some advocate that imposing criminal penalties on national leaders for failure to fully account for fissile materials would aid complete declarations. Others believe that this would be impractical and imprudent.

* Verification can follow upon declarations and does not need to be simultaneous with it. Safeguards can be gradually introduced while non-intrusive methods are used to verify stocks outside of safeguards. When an inventory becomes subject to international safeguards the prior declarations can be checked by undertaking a full physical inventory measurement and by applying the methods of nuclear archaeology.

* All military materials production facilities, whether currently active or not, should be shut down and dismantled. The dismantlement of facilities should probably follow agreements on transparency and verification. This is because the facilities contain physical evidence of total production.

* At this interim stage, special arrangements may need to be negotiated if some countries want stand-by or even new tritium production capacity. Verification arrangements would need to be agreed for such facilities.

ii) FMCT linked to nuclear disarmament

The second school argues that a cut-off agreement should only have a significant impact on nuclear disarmament and the nuclear weapon states should undertake the following steps as part of the process:

a) each NPT nuclear weapon state to unilaterally formalise its existing freeze on fissile material production for nuclear weapons and make a full and accurate accounting of the locations, forms and amounts of fissile

materials;

b) all military materials production facilities to be shut down and dismantled;

c) a ban on production of nuclear pits;

d) the excess stocks of weapon-usable materials to be placed under international safeguards;

e) a ban on tritium production.

With these commitments on the part of the nuclear weapon states a meaningful coupling of the non-proliferation and disarmament aspects of a fissile materials ban could be achieved.

Dealing with plutonium and HEU stocks

International transparency for plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) inventories is critical for achieving a successful non-proliferation regime. The guidelines on plutonium management that were agreed by nine countries in late 1997 constitute a modest step in that direction though several issues have not been resolved satisfactorily. A special problem is that annual plutonium balances are required only to within 100 kg accuracy. This leaves a lot of room for potential diversion. International transparency must be complemented by national materials management strategies.

The risk of fissile material should be thought of not simply as arising from material produced for weapons purposes, but extend to a broader category of weapons-usable materials, which includes almost all plutonium. Stocks of unirradiated plutonium should be minimised. One immediate step is to put a moratorium on the reprocessing of spent fuel at least as long as separated plutonium is still available for commercial purposes. From the non-proliferation point of view it is desirable to ban civilian reprocessing. Economic and ecological arguments already speak against the use of plutonium for fresh fuel.

Safeguarding of plutonium at bulk-handling facilities can never be perfect. Besides proliferation risks posed by state actors there is always a terrorist threat. This applies even to plutonium in unirradiated MOX fuel. Reactor-grade plutonium can be used for nuclear weapons and may even be of advantage for designing a crude nuclear weapon because no external neutron source is required to start the chain reaction due to the enhanced neutron background of plutonium-240 and higher isotopes.

Stocks of HEU - both military and civilian - should be reduced to the lowest levels practical, and civilian use of HEU should be eliminated. Nuclear-weapon states should put excess HEU under safeguards. The blending down to low enriched uranium needs to be accelerated and carried out under verified conditions.

How can plutonium be disposed of? As a first step, the metal pits can be made unusable, e.g. by squeezing them out of shape and transforming them into oxide. The plutonium can then be militarily guarded and stored to

the same standards of security that are desirable for nuclear weapons. A further step recommended by many NGOs is to immobilise plutonium into non-weapon-usable form, for example in glass or ceramic, mixed with radioactive waste.

Some NGOs also believe that irradiating plutonium as a mixed oxide (MOX) nuclear reactor fuel would be an acceptable option for putting plutonium into non weapons useable form. However, very few NGO representatives accept this MOX strategy. One argument put forth in favour of reactor irradiation is that it downgrades its isotopic composition. But this degraded form of plutonium can still be used for making nuclear weapons. Finally, an approach to transmuting plutonium without simultaneous power generation has also been advocated by some. This presents great research challenges especially if it is to be accomplished efficiently and without the use of existing or new reprocessing technologies.

Mr. Chairman, distinguished delegates, you can see that our debates reflect the difficulties of actually controlling weapons useable materials in a practical and equitable fashion. But we are all convinced that doing so will ultimately be required for achieving lasting non-proliferation and disarmament.

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Health and Environmental Effects of Nuclear Weapons Production and Other Aspects of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle

I will speak about the health and environmental effects of nuclear weapons production and other aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle.

Nuclear weapons production and testing has involved extensive health and environmental damage not only in the weapons states, but throughout the world. One of the most remarkable features of this damage has been the readiness of governments to harm the very people that they claimed they were protecting by building these weapons for national security reasons. In general, this harm was inflicted on people in disregard of democratic norms. Secrecy, fabrication of data, cover-ups in the face of attempted public inquiry, and even human experiments without informed consent have all occurred in nuclear weapons production and testing programs. This has been and will continue to be one of the great tragedies of the Cold War.

The most extensive damage, in terms of the populations affected has been from the atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons, which began in 1945, with a US test, and ended in 1980 with a Chinese test. For instance, children who drank milk were specially exposed to high radiation doses in the immediate aftermath of such testing due to the deposition of iodine-131, a highly radioactive short-lived fission product that concentrates in milk and then in the thyroid gland. The US National Cancer Institute estimates that between 10,000 and 75,000 additional cases of thyroid cancer will occur in the United States alone due to US atmospheric testing at the Nevada Test Site.

Sadly, the United States coordinated its atmospheric testing program with Kodak and other makers of photographic film, so as to protect the film from the effects of fallout. But they did not inform the producers or consumers of milk that it would be contaminated with iodine-131, increasing the risk of cancer and possibly other diseases of the thyroid and those caused by thyroid hormonal deficiency.

The damage from atmospheric tests also extended to other parts of the world. This was clearly understood at the time, as the following excerpt from a 1960 editorial in the alumni magazine of the University of California, Berkeley, School of Engineering shows: "The increase in radiation one receives from fallout is about equal to the increase one receives from cosmic rays when moving from sea level to the top of a hill several hundred feet high. . . . It means, though, your babies' chances of having a major birth defect are increased by one part in 5,000

approximately. Percentage-wise, this is insignificant. When applied to the population of the world, it means that nuclear testing so far has produced about an additional 6,000 babies born with major birth defects.

"Whether you choose to look at "one part in 5,000" or "6,000 babies," you must weigh this acknowledged risk with the demonstrated need of the United States for a nuclear arsenal." 1

Perhaps it is not coincidental that the University of California was and continues to be the main contractor to the US government working on nuclear weapons physics and design.

There was also global damage from US testing in the Pacific area, as well as from Soviet, British, French and Chinese testing.

Iodine-131 was only one of the radionuclides involved. Among the long-lived radionuclides that have produced and will continue to produce increased cancers risk for decades and centuries to come are: carbon-14, cesium-137, zirconium-95, strontium-90, ruthenium-106, tritium, and plutonium-239. Some of these substances, notably carbon-14 and tritium, cross the placenta, become organically bound in developing cells and hence endanger fetuses.

It is estimated that between 100,000 and almost half a million premature cancer deaths will have resulted from all atmospheric weapons testing by the end of the next century worldwide. About four times as many premature deaths are estimated to occur if all radiation doses from carbon-14, which has a half-life of 5,730 years, and other very long-lived radionuclides are taken into account. 2

Many armed forces personnel were also subjected to severe risks. They assisted in nuclear weapons testing and in exercises simulating nuclear war conditions. When they became ill, their governments all too often turned their backs on them. Throughout the world, the lands and lives of indigenous people have been the most severely affected by both nuclear weapons testing and by uranium mining and milling.

Nuclear weapons states have also inflicted harm on non-nuclear states though uranium mining and milling. Both worker and population exposures are involved. The environmental damage was in the form of air pollution and water pollution with uranium, radium-226, thorium-230, and radon gas (via its radioactive decay products). There is also contamination by non-radioactive toxic materials such as arsenic and molybdenum. Uranium mill wastes, known as tailings, will continue to pose health and environmental risks for thousands of years.

It is also noteworthy that commercial nuclear power production has also inflicted similar damage from uranium mining and milling and also from other parts of uranium processing and enrichment. What is less known is that the world's commercial nuclear power program is more an artifact of the Cold War than of the search for clean and long-lasting economical energy sources. In the aftermath of the President Eisenhower's 1953 "Atoms for Peace" speech to the United Nations, which was a harbinger of the NPT, the Chairman of the US Atomic energy Commission said that nuclear energy

would one day be "too cheap to meter." But the AEC's own studies of the time showed that nuclear power would either be too expensive or at best competitive with coal. 3

As with nuclear weapons, so with nuclear power, safety and environmental considerations took a back seat. While more than one nuclear power plant design has been proclaimed by industry to be "inherently safe," these are highly misleading claims that are more in the realm of propaganda than technical fact. Underlying both the weapons and the power programs was the idea that plutonium could be well safeguarded, that threats of back black markets would not be substantial, that both nuclear superpowers would remain stable and essentially unchanged forever. The safety and public acceptance of disposal of highly radioactive waste from weapons and power production was also an underlying assumption. None of these major assumptions have stood the test of a few decades of time -- a period far shorter than the 24,000 year half-life of plutonium.

Nuclear weapons states as well as those using nuclear power plants have obtained uranium from many countries, including Canada, Congo, East Germany, Namibia (in violation of UN resolutions until Namibia's independence), Niger, and Australia. In the weapons programs, the most severe effects on workers from nuclear weapons production were due to uranium mining. In reviewing data from the United States and the former Soviet Union, independent research shows that radiation dose and/or health data were poorly kept. 4 As a result many epidemiological investigations have yielded questionable results, at best. For instance, until 1989, radiation doses records of nuclear weapons workers in the United States did not include information due to internally deposited radioactive materials. These data were kept separately and not provided to workers even when they asked for their radiation records. One investigation, revealed that despite official denial, a majority of workers at a uranium processing plant were overexposed during the 1950s and early 1960s. At least two million workers, and probably far more, were involved worldwide in nuclear weapons and related production. Besides radioactive materials, many other toxic materials such as carbon tetrachloride and other organic solvents, chromium and other heavy metals, hydrofluoric acid and fluorine gas, were involved. As regards internal radiation doses, similar problems have afflicted worker dose records until the early 1990s in the US commercial sector. Finally, human experiments were conducted without informed consent.

Most is known about the damage inflicted by US nuclear weapons production and testing, because the United States has made an important beginning in making public many Cold War documents. The most dramatic single breakthrough for democratic practice came on December 6, 1993, due to a great act of statesmanship and courage by then-US Secretary of Energy, Hazel O'Leary. In a press conference she announced that the United States government had done radiation experiments on its own citizens, some without informed consent. Documents on the health and environmental effects of nuclear weapons production, many of them amounting to a sort of electronic truth commission, have been posted on the Internet. It is important other nuclear weapons states institute openness programs that go as far or preferably farther than the US program, which still has many gaps.

The environmental damage has from other parts of the fuel cycle has also been severe and will continue for centuries. Highly radioactive wastes are stored in tanks at many sites. Many are at some risk of fires and explosions. One such explosion actually occurred in the Soviet Union on September 29, 1957. Over 10,000 people were evacuated from their homes over a period of two years, but they were not told why. The Soviet government only acknowledged the accident in 1989. Plutonium separation in chemical factories called reprocessing plants, both military and commercial, has been responsible for the generation of large amounts of liquid radioactive wastes. Much of this waste has polluted the seas. Some of the rest has polluted inland water bodies and soil. Storage of highly radioactive waste in liquid forms in several countries still threatens large areas with the risk of fires and explosions, though with increasing awareness measures have been taken to reduce that risk. The most important means of reducing that risk is to put the waste in a glassy form using a process called vitrification.

Recommendations

While no amount of democratic practice can compensate for the harm already inflicted on people, the NPT Review conference should recommend that a Global Truth Commission on the Health and Environmental Effects of Nuclear Weapons Production and Testing be created. Such a commission could be established in various ways. For instance, it could be an ad hoc commission of the UN General Assembly, or it could be under the joint auspices of the World Health Organization and the United Nations Environment Programme. Some work has already been done on these issues by UN agencies. Indeed, the NPT review conference mechanism might itself be a vehicle for establishing such a commission.

It is a lamentable commentary on the state of the world that more than half a century after the start of the nuclear arms race, nuclear weapons states have still not systematically acknowledged to the world's people the harm they have inflicted on them. The appointment of the Global Truth Commission will not only be salutary for global democracy and accountability on the part of the world's most powerful countries, it could also be a powerful force for nuclear disarmament. It is not widely realized that most nuclear weapons plants in the United States were shut in the late 1980s and early 1990s as a result of health and environmental concerns, and not due to any treaty. The key was increasing knowledge and action by the people of the United States, most notably the people living in the shadows of these plants, of the immense harm inflicted on them without their informed consent under cover of national security.

Ideally, the work of the Global Truth Commission of the Health and Environmental Effects of Nuclear Weapons Production and Testing should be funded by the declared nuclear weapons states, which also happen to be the permanent members of the Security Council. But they may not do it. It will be fitting if it were funded from voluntary contributions of member states and of philanthropists.

The NPT Review Conference should urge the nuclear weapons states to turn over to the Commission copies of documents relating to health and environment. But much of the work of the commission, such as taking

testimony from affected populations, can begin even without such documentation.

At least one publicly accessible repository for documents should be established in a non-nuclear weapons state on every continent (except Antarctica) for all official public documents relevant to the matter. There should also be one repository in every nuclear weapons state. The documents should also be made available on the Internet, so far as possible. The undeclared nuclear weapons states should be encouraged to join the process. Israel, India and Pakistan are not signatories to the NPT, but cooperation in the work of the Commission should not require accession to the NPT.

The Commission should undertake to evaluate more comprehensively than has been done the health and environmental effects of nuclear weapons production and testing. As the work of the commission reveals health needs, mechanisms to assist the affected populations should be created. The public in both the nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states should be invited to participate in the work of the commission by providing materials, documents, testimony, and expertise. The mothers of the world are, after all, often its first epidemiologists. Finally, it is imperative that the greatly disproportionate harm done by nuclear weapons testing and by uranium mining and milling to indigenous peoples be addressed by the work of the Truth Commission.

We also recommend that this PrepCom put on the agenda a call for environmental damage caused by nuclear weapons states in non-nuclear weapons countries to be repaired, to the extent possible. The worldwide public awareness of the profound damage to future generations that has already been done due to past nuclear weapons production and testing could increase the political and moral pressure towards disarmament from large numbers of people. Today, nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation seem like esoteric subjects fit for technocrats and diplomats. But that view of the matter disregards the silent damage that is daily being inflicted upon the Earth and its children. It is time to change that. It would be fitting if this conference, charged with setting the agenda for non-proliferation and disarmament, seizes the moment to begin to put that damage into full view.

Footnotes

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3. Arjun Makhijani and Scott Saleska, The Nuclear Power Deception: U.S. Nuclear Mythology for Electricity, "Too Cheap to Meter to Inherently Safe Reactors, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, Maryland, USA, 1996.

4. Nuclear Wastelands, op.cit., Chapters 6 and 7.

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Nuclear Power and Alternatives for Sustainable Energy

Mr. Chairman, distinguished delegates,

This statement addresses the current status of nuclear power. It identifies several trends and issues which we consider are essential considerations for decision-makers in placing nuclear power into an overall perspective of how best to meet the growing demands for energy in a sustainable manner. This includes addressing the question of how a sustainable energy future might be achieved. Further and more detailed information, which complements the points raised in this statement, may be found in a background paper which is also being distributed to delegates.

Mr. Chairman, distinguished delegates

The 26th of April, just two days ago, was the anniversary of the worst-ever accident to-date at a commercial nuclear power plant - the disaster at Chernobyl in 1986.

In the former Soviet Union alone, it is estimated today that at least 9 million people have been effected by the Chernobyl disaster: 2.5 million in Belarus; 3.5 million in Ukraine; and 3 million in Russia. The incidence of thyroid cancer amongst children in these countries has escalated dramatically, and other health problems are widespread amongst those effected by the accident. In these three republics, over 160,000 km² of land was contaminated. And the contamination spread over much of the northern hemisphere also.

The lesson of Chernobyl is clear - the knowledge of the awesome power available through the use of atomic energy must be tempered by the knowledge of what can and does result when things go wrong. We must remain aware that all nuclear reactor designs can suffer catastrophic accidents on the same scale of Chernobyl - even if the exact nature of the design-weaknesses giving rise to these risks may be different for each major design type.

But the health and environmental consequences of nuclear power is only one part of the picture. The actual performance of nuclear power as a technology, its economics, its relation to nuclear proliferation, and the availability of alternative sources of energy must be considered also.

Mr. Chairman, distinguished delegates

The nuclear industry is in a period of stagnation world-wide and in

actual decline in many countries.

Between the end of 1996 and the end of 1997, the total number of reactors in operation world-wide fell from 440 to 430 units. In this time, the total operational generating capacity fell by some 5,000 MW(e). The reasons behind this decline are clear - nuclear power has failed to establish itself as a clean, cheap, safe, reliable or acceptable source of energy.

It now seems likely that there will be a continuing decline in orders for nuclear power plants. It is also likely that the total number of reactors in operation will decrease as plants get older and are closed without being replaced by new nuclear reactors.

There are a number of factors underlying this poor outlook for nuclear power:

- * the high cost of nuclear power relative to alternative sources of energy;
- * the difficulty of accommodating nuclear technology in increasingly competitive electricity supply systems;
- * the lack of financial resources and diminishing political support to provide the resources required to develop new nuclear technology;
- * a failure to adequately address safety, environmental and proliferation issues. This also includes considerations related to: the safety of reactors and other types of nuclear installations; spent fuel management (with reprocessing being of particular concern) and other radioactive nuclear waste management; international transports of nuclear materials; and liability and compensation for damage arising from nuclear accidents;
- * the opposition to nuclear power technology felt by a significant proportion of the populations of many countries.

In summary, these factors combine to make it likely that, over the coming years, few reactors are likely to be built and an increasing number of nuclear reactors are likely to be shut-down - perhaps even before the planned end of their 'economic' lives.

Mr. Chairman, distinguished delegates

The nuclear industry is currently desperate to find a valid rationale and justification to increase public support and to obtain renewed state support and funding for nuclear power.

With this in mind, the nuclear industry currently stresses the fact that nuclear power plants do not emit carbon dioxide (or CO₂), the major 'greenhouse' gas responsible for climate change. The self-serving conclusion the nuclear industry promotes, is that switching from fossil fuels to nuclear power is the only way to cut CO₂ without radically changing consumption patterns and deal with expanding global demands for energy.

However, even the most basic examination of the issue reveals that nuclear power has no real role in tackling global climate change. In fact quite the opposite is true - any resources expended on attempting to advance nuclear power as a viable solution to climate change would inevitably detract from genuine measures to reduce the threat posed by climate change.

Two other strategies being pursued by the nuclear industry to try secure itself a future. Firstly, as traditional markets for reactor construction have 'dried-up', there is now aggressive export marketing of nuclear reactors - especially, but not only, to Asia. Secondly, the pursuit of potentially lucrative contracts for refurbishment of nuclear reactors built to designs and/or standards no longer considered 'acceptably safe'. However, neither of these strategies have produced sufficient work to-date to reverse the overall decline of the industry. The economic down-turn in Asia may well postpone for the foreseeable future the realisation of many of the ambitious plans for nuclear expansion in this region, as less investment-intensive energy strategies are pursued instead. Nonetheless, the aggressive marketing of nuclear power remains a source of concern, especially where standards and procedures that would be required in the exporting State may not be adhered to in the desire to capture contracts.

Mr. Chairman, distinguished delegates

In deciding how best to tackle global warming and in determining how the world's future energy needs may be met, we have to take into account the availability of alternatives to nuclear power, their environmental impact and their impact on global security. If all these factors are considered, nuclear power is simply not a viable option - let alone the best one.

In the 1990s, major developments have been made in generating energy through the use of renewable sources of energy - wind, solar, and biomass. These energy sources are sustainable and do not involve the environmental and proliferation concerns of nuclear energy. They are also increasingly competitive - both technically and economically. The performance of the latest generation of some of these renewable energy technologies at least equals and may even surpasses nuclear power for reliability and competitiveness, if the full costs of nuclear power are taken into account. In addition, investment in energy efficiency is an extremely cost-effective and less environmentally-threatening means of providing energy. For those few countries, highly dependent on nuclear power (especially where this involves the operation of particularly 'unsafe' reactor designs) natural gas may offer a suitable transition fuel to allow a relatively swift phase-out of nuclear power.

It is often stressed that the NPT enshrines the right to develop and obtain the benefits of the peaceful nuclear energy. It should be noted that less than one-fifth of NPT States Parties actually have civil nuclear power programmes and that for health, environmental, economic and proliferation reasons, an expansion of nuclear power is undesirable. Indeed, a phase-out of existing nuclear power programmes is what is needed.

However, giving up the nuclear power option does not mean giving up

the potential benefits arising from medical, scientific and industrial applications of nuclear technology.

Finally, in order to meet growing world-wide demands for energy, a 'contemporary' Article IV would promote research, technology transfer and assistance in developing sustainable energy development, including energy efficiency. It would also encourage new or strengthened forms of co-operation, financial and institutional arrangements to allow the energy aspirations of the developing world, in particular, to be met in a sustainable manner.

The energy challenges we face amount to a decision on the type of world we wish our children to inherit. Do we want our children to live in a world in which the inseparable links between military and civil applications of nuclear power exist in every nation and where the environment daily deteriorates ? Or, do we want to give them opportunities for development based on an energy infrastructure for society which is sustainable ? If we are to give them a future, it means that we have to bring about a world in which energy is both used efficiently and is generated through the use of sustainable renewable energy systems. Such a future holds no place for nuclear power.

The choice is ours and we need to make it now.

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Article VI: Immediate Steps on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and Strategic Nuclear Arms Reductions

Thank you Mr. Chairman and delegates for affording the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) the opportunity to communicate their views and recommendations. We wish you success in your efforts at this important gathering.

I work with NGOs that seek rapid progress on nuclear arms control and disarmament measures that are essential to creating the conditions for a sustained and effective program of action to reduce and ultimately eliminate nuclear weapons. We believe that a combination of pressure for total elimination of nuclear weapons, practical initiatives for achieving deep reductions, as well as broader adherence to the obligations of the nuclear non-proliferation regime is necessary to achieve the elimination of nuclear weapons.

My remarks focus on three vital, immediate steps within the scope of Article VI: bringing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) into force; implementing START II; and achieving deeper reductions through START III negotiations. I should add that my remarks do not necessarily represent the views and analysis of the many other NGOs who contributed to this statement.

The Preparatory Committee meeting for the year 2000 Review Conference of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) offers an important opportunity to help advance Article VI goals. To attain those goals, we call on all states attending the PrepCom to take concrete steps to strengthen the Treaty regime. At this time, we call for strenuous efforts by NPT states parties and by other states to work together to clear away obstacles to the fulfillment of CTBT and START objectives, which are essential to the reduction and elimination nuclear weapons.

The first issue is the implementation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. While we applaud and recognize the historic United Nations approval of the "zero-yield" Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, its signature by 149 nations, and its ratification by the United Kingdom, France, and eleven other nations, we are deeply concerned about the prospects for its entry into force.

A small handful of states have, unfortunately, failed to sign the CTBT. A number of other states have not yet ratified CTBT. Timely ratification of the CTBT by the U.S. is by no means certain. These obstacles make the Treaty's full implementation unlikely prior to September

1999, when a special conference may have to be convened to expedite the Treaty's entry into force.

We call on all states to promptly sign, and those that have signed, to ratify the Treaty, and if necessary, be prepared to pursue additional steps to ensure its early entry into force after September 1999. The CTBT is a central part of the 1995 NPT "Statement of Principles and Objectives" and is essential for the phased reduction and elimination of nuclear dangers posed by the existence of nuclear arms and their proliferation. As retired General George Lee Butler has said in support of the Treaty, "I think that it [the CTBT] is a necessary, but not sufficient, additional step along the path to abolition"(1).

The CTBT is both a nuclear disarmament measure and a non-proliferation measure: it would reduce the ability of existing nuclear weapon states to make qualitative improvements in the military capabilities of their arsenals and would create an additional barrier to the acquisition of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear weapon states.

But the declared nuclear weapon states must also acknowledge that the CTBT does not give them a blank check to pursue the development and qualitative improvement of new types of nuclear weapons or modifications of existing weapons types to enhance their military capabilities through means other than nuclear test explosions. Some nations and many non-governmental organizations are concerned that advances in nuclear weapons research and design technology, such as those outlined in the United States' "Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship" program may not allow the CTBT to completely fulfill its objective, as stated in the Preamble, to "[constrain] the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ... development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons."

This objective, which is fundamental to the process of nuclear weapons elimination, cannot be attained without the CTBT, which all five nuclear weapon states have voluntarily signed. Whether or not there is agreement on the capabilities of these new nuclear weapons design programs, additional measures can and should be taken to reinforce the value and the credibility of the CTBT in this regard. Specifically, the nuclear weapons states should also clarify that they will not develop or produce new nuclear warhead types or modifications of existing types that will endow them with new military capabilities.

Pending the entry into force of the CTBT, the nuclear weapon states are obligated to exercise "utmost restraint" in connection with nuclear testing (2) and each CTBT signatory is obligated under Article XVIII of the Vienna Convention on Treaties not to take any action that violates the "purpose or intent" of the Treaty. To build confidence that no such actions occur, the nuclear weapon states should refrain from actions at their test sites, including underground subcritical experiments, which may also aggravate the global CTBT ratification process. In addition, to clarify any questions that may arise about conformance with the CTBT, all states who have conducted nuclear test explosions should voluntarily adopt new transparency measures at their test sites.

Forty years ago this October, the first formal negotiations to end

nuclear weapons test explosions began here in Geneva. We respectfully urge this body and individual member nations to reiterate their commitment to the CTBT and take the actions necessary to ensure early entry into force.

The second and third points concern the fulfillment of the START process. We respectfully call upon NPT states parties to urge Russia to ratify the START II Treaty without further delay, and urge the United States to approve the protocols for START II and the ABM Treaty agreed to by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin in 1997. Although implementation of the START II agreement, signed over five years ago, is long overdue, its importance to advancing nuclear disarmament by deep reductions of existing U.S. and Russian strategic arsenals cannot be overemphasized, and its future implementation cannot be assumed.

Further, this body should encourage the United States and Russia to promptly initiate and promptly conclude negotiations on START III. These negotiations can and should achieve reductions in actively deployed strategic nuclear forces far deeper than those provisionally outlined at the 1997 Helsinki summit (2,000-2,500 strategic nuclear weapons). The negotiation and ratification of such an agreement by the beginning of the year 2000 is a worthy objective.

The START III agreement is also important in that it affords the chance for agreement on important questions that have not heretofore been covered by the START process, including: "measures relating to the transparency of strategic nuclear warhead inventories and the destruction of strategic nuclear warheads;" and "placement in a deactivated status of all strategic nuclear delivery vehicles which will be eliminated under START II by December 31, 2003" (3). In combination with declaring more fissile material as excess and placing this material under safeguarded storage, such measures would build confidence in the irreversibility of warhead elimination, help prevent theft or diversion of nuclear materials, and create barriers to re-use.

Ratification and implementation of START II and negotiation and fulfillment of START III would greatly reduce the threat of these weapons and facilitate progress toward multilateral talks that could further reduce the nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia, as well as the nuclear weapons of the other nuclear weapon states.

The continuing threat posed by nuclear weapons and nuclear proliferation, coupled with the obligations of each adherent to the NPT require that renewed focus and energy be directed toward rapid implementation of the CTBT, START II and START III, even as you address other vital nuclear risk reduction initiatives.

We hope you will give careful thought to these points and to our recommendations to improve international efforts to prevent and reverse the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all of its aspects. Thank you for your time and attention.

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3. Joint Statement by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin on Parameters on Future Reductions in Nuclear Forces, Helsinki, March 21, 1997.

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New Nuclear Weapons Development and Anti-Disarmament Policies

Mr. Chairperson, delegates, and non-governmental observers,

Last October, John Deutsch, recently retired Director of the United States Central Intelligence Agency described the world we live in as a "Trident world." He was referring to the fact that as we meet here today, between eight and eleven U.S. nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, carrying thousands of the most powerful, long-range nuclear weapons ever built, are patrolling the world's oceans, ready to strike targets around the globe within a matter of minutes -- a rate equal to that at the height of the Cold War. The U.S. weapons laboratories are now working on upgrades to the Trident warheads and missiles - upgrades that may make a disabling first strike more feasible. At the same time, the United States recently deployed the B61-11 earth penetrator bomb, a weapon modified -- without underground nuclear testing -- to significantly improve its military capabilities.

Other states possessing nuclear weapons are also capable of launching attacks on short notice and are upgrading their strategic and tactical nuclear forces. Russia, which re-introduced a first-use policy in 1993, is now considering options for re-deploying tactical nuclear weapons, in a partial reversal of the 1991 Bush-Gorbachev initiatives, and is also modernizing its long-range missiles and bombers. China is reported to be upgrading its strategic forces. France is developing a new-generation nuclear submarine and a new submarine-launched missile, and is also modernizing its air launched missile, to be carried by a new fighter-bomber. The United Kingdom is building its fourth Trident submarine, and may have manufactured as many as 150 warheads for the MIRVED missiles carried by the submarines. This less visible, slow-motion arms race is occurring in a context where the declared nuclear weapon states appear to be expanding, rather than reducing, the military role of nuclear weapons. Why?

Many important arguments were presented to the International Court of Justice during the historic hearings on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons in November 1995. Among them was a statement by Mayor Takashi Hiraoka of Hiroshima, Japan, that provides a straightforward yet profound explanation for the situation we find ourselves in today -- nearly eight years after the end of the Cold War -- three years after the indefinite extension of the NPT -- and less than two years from the beginning of a new millennium.

"History is written by the victors," he explained. "Thus, the heinous massacre that was Hiroshima has been handed down to us as a perfectly justifiable act of war. As a result, for over 50 years we have never directly confronted the full implications of this terrifying act for the future of the human race."

The denial of history continues into the present, as the nuclear weapon states claim to be complying with Article VI. The reality of their policies and programs is far different.

A comprehensive statement of the U.S. intention to replace every nuclear weapon in its "enduring" stockpile can be found in a passage from a current official United States planning document. As stated in the newly-declassified version of the October 1997 Department of Energy (DOE) Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan: First Annual Update, known as the "Green Book":

"The requirement to maintain the capability to design and engineer new weapon systems to military requirements [was] stated in the DoD [Department of Defense] Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). Nuclear weapons in the enduring stockpile will eventually be replaced. (New system development may be needed even to maintain today's military characteristics.) This work is anticipated to begin around 2010. In the meantime, future national policies are supported for deterrence by retaining the ability to develop new nuclear options for emergent threats... Miniature, modular building blocks for nuclear weapon systems are being developed to reduce life-cycle cost, improve reliability, and adapt to future military infrastructure. We are practicing weapon system engineering and demonstrating manufacturing expertise by proof-of-principle tests for new system concepts... In parallel, proof-of-principle flight tests will demonstrate alternative concepts to address new threats and will provide the technology for new approaches to deterrence, should the nation ever need them, as well as attract and retain new nuclear weapon system engineers." (p. 7-34)

The proposition that rebuilding a huge nuclear weapons research, development, testing and production complex and planning to maintain it for decades to come is essential if the U.S. is to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and thus to meet its nonproliferation objectives has been asserted as an unquestionable axiom in every official American public discussion on the future of nuclear weapons. What is behind this seemingly incongruous idea is a Faustian bargain*. The nuclear weapons laboratories and their allies in the military and Congress, it is hoped, will accept a ban on full-scale underground nuclear explosions (which on the surface appears to mark the beginning of the end for nuclear weapons) in exchange for a nuclear weapons research and testing program of Cold War proportions that will keep nuclear weapons in the arsenal, in the budget, and in the career paths of scientists well into the next century. This upgraded nuclear weapons infrastructure will provide design capabilities greater than those available during the Cold War, and will encompass a test site capable of rapid resumption of full scale underground testing and a substantial nuclear warhead production capacity intended to allow rapid, flexible warhead prototyping and production, computer-integrated with a new suite of state-of-the-art experimental facilities at the weapons

laboratories. In addition to maintaining the existing arsenal, it is officially, and explicitly, intended to maintain the capability to design and develop new weapons.

In the U.S., nuclear weapons design will be advanced through simulations carried out using superfast computers costing hundreds of millions of dollars, coupled with archived data from more than 1000 past tests, and new diagnostic information obtained from inertial confinement fusion facilities, including the National Ignition Facility (NIF), pulsed power and chemical explosive driven pulsed power fusion experiments, aboveground hydrodynamic explosions, including at the Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrotest Facility (DARHT), and subcritical "zero yield" underground tests. Over the next decade, the U.S. plans to invest \$45 billion in the deceptively named "Stockpile Stewardship" program an amount well above the Cold War annual spending average for nuclear weapons research, development, testing, production and disassembly directly comparable activities.

Several of the declared nuclear weapons states have similar programs, and a high level of cooperation is taking place among them. For example, the U.S. and Russia are conducting an extensive joint program of explosive pulsed-power experiments. The U.S. is working closely with France in building the "Megajoule" laser, the French version of the NIF. France is investing four hundred million francs in its own lab testing program, which also includes the "Airix" accelerator. Airix, like its U.S. counterpart, the DARHT facility, will allow sophisticated flash x-ray images of hydrodynamic explosions to be produced, thus allowing physicists to see "inside" surrogate nuclear explosions. A close relationship continues between the U.S. and British labs, even though joint underground nuclear testing at the Nevada Test Site has stopped. And nuclear cooperation between the British and French is growing. Although we have little information about China, it reportedly has purchased U.S. computers to support its own "stewardship" program.

Such programs represent the antithesis of the NPT Article VI obligation to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race and an early date and to nuclear disarmament," which was unambiguously reaffirmed by the nuclear weapon states in the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament adopted in conjunction with the NPT extension decision taken in May 1995. In fact, expanded laboratory-based experimental programs in the nuclear weapon states fundamentally are intended to ensure that nuclear disarmament does not occur as a consequence of the ban on full-scale underground nuclear tests. Moreover, new nuclear weapons designs, modifications and improvements directly contravene the "cessation of the nuclear arms race" Article VI requirement and fly in the face of the April 1995 Declaration by France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States in connection with the NPT that "the nuclear arms race has ceased." (CD/1308, 7 April 1995) In fact, the close interconnections between research, design and testing of thermonuclear weapons and other forms of advanced weapons research have the potential to ignite an entirely new arms race.

For example, research into inertial confinement fusion, coupled

with other experiments, could lead to the development of pure fusion weapons -- a frightening prospect for many reasons, including that because they would not require fissile materials, they would entirely bypass the present non-proliferation regime focused on those materials. Hans Bethe, a prominent Manhattan Project physicist, while not certain that such weapons can be developed, is concerned enough to call for the U.S. to stop working on fusion and other new types of nuclear weapons. He explained, "it is our own splendid weapons laboratories that are, by far and without any question, the most likely to succeed in such nuclear inventions". But even if such development does not occur, modifications and "improvements" of existing weapons types can have serious and destabilizing military consequences.

A May 1997 Department of Defense report discloses the existence of a "collaborative Navy/DOE effort to maintain the capability to jointly develop replacement nuclear warheads for the W76/Mk4 and W88/Mk5" sea-launched ballistic missile warheads carried on Trident submarines. There are strong indications that anticipated upgrades may allow improvement in accuracy for large portions of the submarine-launched ballistic missile force. It was this kind of "upgrading" of nuclear forces that raised fears of a "first strike" during the Cold War and was a driving force in the arms race. And it appears that the U.S. military has sufficient confidence in its near-term "stockpile stewardship" capabilities to seriously consider developing and deploying these improved nuclear weapons designs without underground testing, while the US simultaneously proclaims that the CTBT will severely constrain the further development of nuclear weapons by the nuclear weapons states.

Already, the B61-11 bomb, developed using elements of the new "Stockpile Stewardship" program for nuclear weapons testing and production, vigorously flight-tested (25 times, most recently in Alaska in March 1998), has manifested continuing efforts by the world's leading nuclear power to upgrade both its nuclear warheads and the delivery systems which carry them. Other U.S. nuclear weapons projects not previously mentioned here include an upgrade to ICBM warheads, upgrades to strategic bombs, nuclear glide bombs, and a nuclear warhead for theater defense missiles designed to intercept and incinerate biological and chemical warheads.

The 1997 Green Book provides information about "hedge" production plans and "demonstrations" that, if implemented, would allow U.S. nuclear weapons production to quickly increase to "cold war levels of building." (p. 6 - 18). This involves massively expanded plutonium pit manufacturing capability, which will add to the 12,000 unused pits currently in storage, as well as the 12,000 in the current weapon arsenal. In addition, the U.S. is preparing to resume production of tritium, which was shut down in 1988 for safety reasons. The current U.S. supply of tritium could supply a stockpile of 1,000 nuclear warheads for the next 50 years, and a smaller stockpile until the end of the 21st century. Nonetheless, the DOE has declared its intent to operate new tritium supply facilities "well into the middle of the next century."

These new nuclear weapons research, development testing and production activities are not happening in a policy vacuum. There is ample and growing evidence of a renewed commitment to reliance on nuclear weapons

by the nuclear weapons states. A new Presidential Decision Directive (PDD), while not made public, was the subject of extensive media reports in the U.S. at the end of 1997. The first U.S. nuclear policy review since the 1995 NPT extension decision, it reaffirmed policies which have been at the center of the U.S. nuclear posture for decades. Robert Bell, a special National Security assistant to the President, told the Washington Post, as reported on 7 December 1997, that the PDD re-commits the U.S. to policies of threatened first use and threatened massive retaliation, and that it affirms "that the U.S. will continue to rely on nuclear arms as a cornerstone of its national security for the 'indefinite future'." There are other reports that the PDD contemplates nuclear retaliation against the use of chemical or biological arms, and publicly available Joint Chiefs of Staff documents indicate that the U.S. has not ruled out the preemptive use of nuclear weapons in such circumstances. In reality, the PDD represents no less than a rejection of the basis upon which the NPT was extended in 1995, because it embraces reliance on nuclear arms for the indefinite future.

As mentioned before, Russia has adopted a first-use policy like that of the United States, and is seriously considering increased reliance on tactical nuclear weapons. Both France and the United Kingdom have announced policies of "sub-strategic" uses and threats in defense of "vital interests". China is the only bright spot, at least rhetorically, if not programmatically, in continuing to adhere to a policy of unconditional no first use and early conclusion of an abolition convention.

The Canberra Commission had it right in recognizing that the essential prerequisite for a solution to the nuclear problem is a true commitment by the nuclear weapon states to the elimination of their nuclear arsenals. The anti-disarmament policies now pursued by those states evidence the opposite: commitment to the indefinite maintenance and improvement of existing arsenals underpinning the expansion of laboratory capabilities, and continued reliance on nuclear weapons as core instruments of foreign policy. We will know that the nuclear weapon states are on the right track when a commitment to comply with Article VI is demonstrated by measures such as the following:

- full disclosure of national policies regarding the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons so that these policies can be subjected to public debate regarding their morality, wisdom, and compliance with Article VI and the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice;

- renunciation of policies of threatened first use and threatened massive retaliation, and implementation of de-alerting measures to drastically reduce the nuclear threat;

- the elimination of laboratory testing programs and capabilities that threaten to turn the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, once envisioned as a major step on the path towards disarmament, into the Partial Test Ban Treaty II, a technical exercise as the nuclear weapon states rush to put in place the means to maintain and improve their arsenals for decades to come;

- closure of nuclear test sites

- adoption of national policies that prohibit the design, development, or production of new nuclear warhead types and modification and/or "repackaging" of existing warhead types to endow them with new military capabilities;

- initiation of a multi-lateral process leading towards an abolition regime, including through establishment of an intersessional NPT working group to assist in the commencement of negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention

As Mayor Hiraoka explained, the history of the first fifty years of the nuclear age has been written by the nuclear weapon states. It's well past time to start writing a different history. To do so we must start by understanding and acknowledging the reality that despite the CTBT and bilateral arms reductions, the nuclear weapon states are presently on a path intended to preserve and enhance, not diminish or still less eliminate, their nuclear monopoly.

*Extensive additional information can be found in a report by the same name, released at this PrepCom, which is being provided to delegates along with this statement: A Faustian Bargain: Why 'Stockpile Stewardship' Is Fundamentally Incompatible With The Process of Nuclear Disarmament, April 1998, by Andrew Lichterman and Jacqueline Cabasso, Western States Legal Foundation, Oakland, California, USA.

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>Next Steps: Dealerting, No First use & Confidence-Building Measures.

>

> Mr. Chairman, I am speaking today for those NGOs who are working on
>or who support programs of radical, deep cuts in all nuclear arsenals,
>going far beyond bilateral reductions now planned between the U.S. and
>Russia, as a necessary precursor to elimination of nuclear weapons. We
>believe that only a combination of pressure for total elimination of
>nuclear weapons and practical programs for moving to deep reductions can
>succeed in reaching the objective. We use the term "practical" as
>shorthand for programs that are technically workable and that take into
>account that the nuclear weapon states must be convinced by the details of
>these programs that their implementation would improve the security of the
>weapon states as well as that of others.

>

> The most important single development with regard to future action
>on nuclear weapons that could come from the current Prepcom meeting of NPT
>parties -- or from the NPT review conference in the year 2000 -- is
>agreement by non-nuclear weapon NPT parties to support a common program of
>proposals to the weapon states.

>

> The united strength of over 180 countries behind a joint program
>would be a powerful, irrefutable voice to which the nuclear weapon states
>will be
>compelled to listen. Up to now, that force has been divided between those
>governments which focus on demands for total elimination of nuclear
>weapons and those which advocate specific steps. Only when these two
>strands are united, only when the people of the world can back a message
>which sets forth what they want, total elimination of nuclear weapons,
>together with a clear program of how that objective can be achieved, will
>the objective in fact be reached.

>

> That is why we appeal today to the delegates of countries without
>nuclear weapons to use the time between now and the review conference in
>the year 2000 to hammer out such a unified program.

>

> We want now to describe two possible components of such a common
>program in addition, of course, to a powerful statement of the case for
>total abolition of nuclear weapons.

>

> The first of these components is de-alerting, taking steps to
>prevent immediate launch of nuclear-tipped missiles. It is a dangerous
>anachronism that the nuclear strategy of Russia and the United States
>continues based on deterrence of surprise attack through deployment of
>hundreds of missiles ready for rapid launch. This is a situation where

>human or technical error can bring accidental or unauthorized launch of a
>few missiles followed by massive
>exchange that could still obliterate most of the Northern Hemisphere, with
>possible fall-out extended to a still wider area.

>
> Consequently, the governments of all states with nuclear weapons
>should be urged by all other NPT parties to eliminate reliance on
>continuously available weapons and to take actions which delay launch of
>nuclear-tipped missiles.

>
> This approach is recommended by the Canberra Commission and the
>United States National Academy of Sciences. The United States and Russia
>are already committed to one of these actions in the context of the START
>treaties -- "deactivation," or removal of warheads from operational
>missiles and long-range aircraft, and placing them in storage. Other
>de-alerting actions would call for reducing the number of warheads carried
>by submarines or reducing the number of missile-launching submarines on
>patrol.

>
> These actions, which are reversible if there is need, need not be
>part of formal disarmament agreements. They can be put in place fairly
>rapidly, without extensive negotiation. They could cover all strategic
>nuclear forces or, if verification proves a problem, all but a small,
>designated fraction of strategic forces. Large-scale de-alerting will
>compel revision of strategic planning based on deciding within a
>compressed few minutes to go to massive retaliation. Large-scale
>de-alerting would provide a practical and self-enforcing basis for
>no-first-use commitments by the weapon states.

>
> A second component of a common program of all NPT states without
>nuclear weapons would be agreement on a practical concept for the last
>stage of negotiated nuclear disarmament, the stage just prior to total
>elimination of all nuclear weapons. Several similar proposals for this
>last stage have been made in recent years, to the effect that the arsenals
>of the nuclear weapon states should be reduced to low equal levels of
>100-200 warheads each and immobilized by separating permitted warheads
>from delivery systems and placing both in protected storage sites under
>international monitoring. A similar approach could be used with the
>threshold states. All excess warheads and delivery systems would be
>destroyed. Weapons could be withdrawn in national emergency, but not
>without giving warning.

>
> This program would protect security interests of the weapon states
>while eliminating all possibility of surprise nuclear attack or threats to
>use nuclear weapons. If it worked satisfactorily over a period of time,
>the world would be much safer. Moving to complete elimination would be the
>next logical step.

>
> Mr. Chairman, a common program of non-weapon NPT parties which
>contained as its three main elements the case for abolition, early
>de-alerting, and a practical final negotiated stage of nuclear
>disarmament, would be a very powerful instrument in moving the nuclear
>weapon states to fulfillment of their Article VI pledge to eliminate their
>nuclear weapons. We hope that Prepcom delegates will give serious thought

>to this suggestion.

>

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Nuclear Weapons Convention: Why and How

Mr. President, delegates and non-governmental observers,

I will present non-governmental perspectives on the need for a nuclear weapons convention -- a treaty for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons. There is a range of opinions regarding negotiations leading to the conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention, the role of NPT Review in this process, and how to pursue the goals of a nuclear weapons convention.

Why Pursue a Nuclear Weapons Convention?

Article VI of the Non Proliferation Treaty obliges all State parties to negotiate in good faith on effective measures for nuclear disarmament. In reaffirming and clarifying this obligation, the International Court of Justice, in its advisory opinion of July, 1996, found unanimously that there exists an obligation to conclude negotiations on nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.

The United Nations General Assembly called for the implementation of the ICJ opinion specifically through the immediate commencement of negotiations leading to the conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention. This call was supported by the European Parliament in March, 1997.

If progress is not made towards the goal of elimination we face the following threats:

- * Use of existing nuclear weapons, whether by accident, mistake or design
- * Proliferation of weapons to other States, regions or non-State entities
- * Greater dependence on policies and means [methods] of military might, including fourth generation nuclear weapons and military uses of space
- * Increasing environmental and health problems from the production and handling of nuclear materials required for the production of nuclear weapons.
- * Constant threat of mass destruction

Incremental steps are the only way to address many of the details on which effective nuclear disarmament depends. To date, progress in

disarmament has been incremental, following long-sought negotiations and hard-earned compromises. Recently concluded treaties and IAEA improvements are key steps towards nuclear disarmament. Other efforts, though currently deadlocked, also point in the right direction.

But these incremental steps are interlinked. A comprehensive approach is necessary to coordinate these steps. Large scale verifiable reductions in nuclear arsenals will require an unprecedented degree of collaboration, across political bodies and various industries.

Thus, the call by the United Nations, European Union and others is for the commencement of negotiations leading to a nuclear weapons convention.

How to Achieve a Nuclear Weapons Convention?

The most important ingredient to achieving a nuclear weapons convention is political will of the nuclear weapon States. This will is currently lacking, but could be garnered through the urgent call by States parties to the NPT for the immediate commencement of such negotiations. [If such negotiations have not begun by the year 2000, this should be a principal call of the year 2000 Review Conference.]

But States parties can do more. You need not wait for the nuclear weapon States to agree to negotiations. You could establish, through a decision at this preparatory committee meeting, an intersessional working group on implementation of Article VI to consider how to bring about negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention. This proposal has been made in the Chairman's working paper, Annex II of the Report of the Preparatory Committee on its first session, and should be supported by all delegations. Such an intersessional working group could, if it decided, consider technical questions regarding the elimination of nuclear weapons, such as verification, that could be developed even before nuclear weapon states have agreed to negotiate a nuclear weapons convention.

Negotiations leading to conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention could focus initially on such steps as the establishment of a registry of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons usable material, placing all nuclear weapons usable material under international control, taking all nuclear forces off alert and removing warheads from delivery vehicles, ending production of nuclear warheads and their components, and reducing stockpiles.

How Would a Nuclear Weapons Convention Work?

Recently, at the request of Costa Rica, the United Nations circulated a Model Nuclear Weapons Convention (MNWC or model NWC, UN doc A/C.1/52/7) as a discussion draft. The model, drafted by an international team of lawyers, scientists and disarmament experts, offers a plan for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons in a series of graduated verifiable steps.

The purposes of the model NWC include demonstrating the feasibility of the elimination of nuclear weapons and encouraging governments to enter

into nuclear disarmament negotiations.

The MNWC assumes a political climate ready for the elimination of nuclear weapons, an assumption which requires some suspension of disbelief. Security policies based on the threat of mass destruction are deemed necessary for the foreseeable future by Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) and some allies. However, engaging in the process of designing a Nuclear Weapons Convention is useful in a number of ways: (1) It can help identify policies that are inconsistent with the goal of nuclear disarmament; (2) It can help overcome some of the barriers that make nuclear abolition appear utopian; and (3) It can help prepare us for the day when the political will to begin negotiations emerges.

We encourage all delegations to study and discuss the MNWC, whether informally or in the context of an intersessional working group of the NPT. The drafters welcome responses. In the past year there has been considerable feedback on the political and technical questions that must be resolved for verifiable and coordinated large-scale nuclear disarmament to begin. Areas that present the greatest uncertainty about developing a regime for elimination of nuclear weapons, the open questions and critical issues, include the following:

* Will the elimination of nuclear weapons mean a different international security system? Yes. Some governments still consider the threat of nuclear weapons to be a vital component of their security. This posture will have to change before they agree to eliminate these weapons, and this change will help create a different security system, with greater reliance on non-violent conflict resolution, demilitarization and international law. Existing international security mechanisms may be strengthened and new ones created in the process, but these are not necessary prerequisites to implementation of a plan for the elimination of nuclear weapons. The NWC should not try to prescribe the elements of an alternative security system. Rather, as it evolves, the NWC should seek to incorporate and reinforce developments towards demilitarization and less reliance on force as a method of international conflict resolution. Enforcement is a particularly difficult issue in this context, as the NWS are also the permanent members of the Security Council. An alternative security system must address the meaning and extent of the right of self-defense.

* How can the NWC prevent breakout? The key to breakout is irreversibility of the disarmament process. A concerted effort to eliminate not only nuclear weapons but the infrastructure behind them will require sequenced reversible measures leading to a world in which developing nuclear weapons will mean starting from scratch. Such a program will become increasingly difficult to conceal as the infrastructure is converted or allowed to erode. But the potential for a state to break out of the NWC and pursue a nuclear weapons program will exist as long as there is the nuclear material, including that produced by use of nuclear energy.

* Do Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) and Non-Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS) have different roles in nuclear arms control and disarmament? Yes. The asymmetry between NWS and NNWS in the current non-proliferation regime will mean different functions and obligations on their respective parts in

the move toward elimination of nuclear weapons. Although the NWC should overcome existing inequities, disarmament and verification will of necessity involve greater NWS responsibility and access to certain information as long as nuclear weapons exist. NNWS will likely require concrete reassurance that material and key information is being handled as agreed.

* The knowledge of nuclear weapons cannot be dis-invented. The genie is out of the bottle. True, nuclear physics cannot be unlearned. In fact, it would be foolish to base any non-proliferation regime on the assumption that knowledge is lacking. Indeed, the knowledge of making chemical and biological weapons also cannot be dis-invented. Yet that did not prevent the world from making a commitment to ban them despite the fact that verification of compliance is much more difficult for those weapons of mass destruction than it would be for nuclear weapons.

Current proliferation risks are not merely a result of the splitting of the atom. They are also the end product of long-standing policies to exploit this discovery for military purposes. Making nuclear disarmament irreversible will therefore involve a gradual dismantlement of the entire nuclear weapons infrastructure, beginning with greater, not lesser, awareness of the potential risks posed by scientific discoveries.

Conclusion

A recurrent response to the demand for a NWC is that it is premature, that in today's political environment it is premature to consider and discuss a framework for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons. It is indeed premature to expect agreement on the objectives of the NWC or the details of its verification regime. But it is not premature to begin devising a plan for complete nuclear disarmament, to be ready when the political climate is favorable. Nor is it premature for States to begin developing the verification mechanisms for nuclear disarmament. For many years, a CTBT seemed beyond reach; yet verification mechanisms were studied by a scientific group of the CD and this helped the negotiations once they began.

In light of the ongoing threat posed by nuclear weapons, and the damage, both direct and indirect, that they cause, discussions of a Nuclear Weapons Convention should be seen as an urgent need rather than a premature wish. The model NWC is offered to States and NGO's in the hopes that it can inspire and enrich this discussion.

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Regional Initiatives

This presentation will deal with a question of special concern to people's of several regions who strive to ward off deadly nuclear threats by establishing Nuclear Weapon Free Zones (NWFZs). We expect that the official policies of NPT states will positively respond to NGO discussion of this question. The NPT Review and Extension Conference of 1995 adopted a Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non Proliferation and Disarmament" emphasizing the conviction of NPT states that "the establishment of internationally recognized NWFZ...enhances global and regional peace and security". The Conference also endorsed a resolution calling for "the establishment of an effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction". These are politically binding commitments by all NPT states.

Mr. Chairman, the refusal of the nuclear weapons states to start negotiations in good faith on effective measures leading to complete nuclear disarmament has made the establishment of NWFZs a matter of utmost urgency. They express the political will of the countries of a region to refrain from acquiring, producing, testing and storing nuclear weapons, to prevent nuclear states from deploying these weapons on their territories and to distance the people of the region from nuclear threats.

Already, NWFZs have covered several regions and continents including territories under jurisdiction of big powers. We call on those states that have not already to ratify the Nuclear Weapons Free Zones treaties in existence. Taking them together enables a great part of the Southern Hemisphere comprising Latin America, Africa, South East Asia, the South Pacific and the Antarctic Continent to remain outside the nuclear arms race. In addition to these internationally recognized treaties, hundreds of cities and towns have been declared NWFZs by their local authorities. Other initiatives to expand areas free from nuclear weapons are on the agenda of NGOs with the hope that PrepCom delegates will take them in due consideration.

Among them is a NWFZ urgently requested by the countries of the independent republics of the Former Soviet Union in Central Asia. A conference last September was held to this end in Tashkent with the full support of the regional governments. Practical steps are expected to build towards establishing this zone before the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

Another zone which requires due consideration is envisaged to release tension engendered by NATO expansion. NATO member states promised in their Founding Act with Russia of May 1997 that they have no intention

of deploying nuclear weapons in the territory of the new NATO members located in Central and Eastern Europe. However, legally binding measures are stipulated by the Founding Act to prevent such eventualities in future. Only a legally binding commitment by an internationally recognized treaty on the establishment of a NWFZ between Russia and NATO could release this tension. This zone may expand in the future, instead of NATO expansion, to strengthen peace and security in Europe.

It should be noted that Europe was the cradle of NWFZs. Efforts to establish these zones in Central Europe, in the Balkan and the Adriatic regions, and in North Europe has been made long before the establishment of the Latin American Zone. The reason why they failed to achieve their targets has been eradicated of late. Confrontation between the US and USSR does not exist any more, the Warsaw Pact has been dismantled and no nuclear threat is leveled at the US and its allies. Similar to what has already happened to the former Warsaw member states in Central and Eastern Europe and to the European Republics of the Former USSR, Non-Nuclear Weapons State members of NATO, US-Japan Alliance and other military alliances can also be transformed into Nuclear Weapon Free Countries. All nuclear weapons together with their delivery systems deployed in the territories of all Non-Nuclear Weapon States of nuclear capable alliances should be eliminated.

Mr. Chairman, at the time of the Cold War, NGOs together with many governments called for the removal of nuclear weapon capable fleets from the Baltic, Adriatic and Mediterranean Seas, and from the Indian Ocean to avoid possible nuclear confrontations between US and USSR fleets. These slogans have almost disappeared since the end of the Cold War. However, another danger is looming at present. Huge capable fleets carrying effective land and air nuclear capable forces are freely moving in seas and oceans ready to intervene in defence of the so called "vital interests" of certain powers. To inhibit these operations, Third World countries try to acquire Weapons of Mass Destruction. Consequently, the nuclear Genie is re-released and grown uncontrollably beyond any region. Establishing NWF Seas and Oceans particularly those close to regions of tension is a matter of urgency. International water is the heritage of the entire human family and should benefit all peoples.

Finally, regional "security" based on the deployment of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction has been triggered by conflicts between the two Koreas in North East Asia. Under the pretext of safeguarding national security a state involved in the conflict tends to acquire nuclear weapons or seeks the nuclear umbrella from a "friendly" NWS. To counter this act, other countries make every effort to possess weapons of mass destruction. Moreover some Nuclear Weapons States pursue a double standard policy condoning the possession of nuclear weapons by their local allies and threatening, at the same time, to prevent other countries by force, conventional and non-conventional, from acquiring any weapons of mass destruction. A deadly connection between conflicts and these weapons has emerged.

In this connection, we welcome your decision to place on your agenda the question of establishing a Middle East Free from Weapons of Mass Destruction, hoping that your effort will prompt the parties concerned to

immediately start negotiations to achieve this target.

Mr. Chairman, the components and targets of this programme are of a special nature. They seek to establish NWFZs in the Northern hemisphere after many zones have been established in the South, to start the establishment of zones where nuclear weapons are deployed (whereas the former zones had been established in regions already free from nuclear weapons), to free the international water of seas and oceans from nuclear weapons while former zones had been only established in the territories of several regions, and to establish zones free from all Weapons of Mass Destruction, as well as, nuclear weapon free countries to be added to NWFZs.

These new types of zones will give a powerful impetus to the efforts now underway to eliminate all nuclear weapons and conclude a Nuclear Weapons Convention.

Combined efforts by NGOs and NPT states are very much needed to implement this programme.

Thank you.

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Security Beyond Nuclear Deterrence

Mr. Chairman, Distinguished Delegates,

A number of the presentations you have heard in this session have focused on specific issues relating to nuclear weapons and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. This presentation considers the question of nuclear deterrence and of how we can move towards Global Security in the future without reliance on such a dangerous and unprovable construct. The time available necessarily means that it will be an overview but it is hoped that it will stimulate action towards the essential creation and implementation of new security concepts which have no need of nuclear weapons.

Nuclear deterrence theory has dominated discussion about nuclear weapons for decades. It was at the core of nuclear thinking during the Cold War but even after the end of that historical era it has continued to underpin nuclear decision making. It is time to let it go. In the words of General Lee Butler USAF (Ret), Commander in Chief Strategic Command 1992-94 in charge of all US strategic nuclear forces: "Sad to say, the Cold War lives on in the minds of those who cannot let go the fears, beliefs and the enmities born of the nuclear age. What better illustration of misplaced faith in nuclear deterrence than the persistent belief that retaliation with nuclear weapons is a legitimate and appropriate response to post Cold War threats posed by biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction as well as by conventional weapons, and not just nuclear weapons. What could possibly justify our resort to the very means we properly abhor and condemn? Who can imagine our joining in shattering the precedent of non-use that has held for over 50 years? Would we hold an entire society accountable for the decision of a single demented leader? How would the physical effects of the nuclear explosion be contained, not to mention the political and moral consequences?...It is wrong in every aspect. It is wrong politically. It makes no sense militarily. And morally, in my view, it is indefensible."

Even those who support nuclear weapons have doubts about the utility of nuclear deterrence against a "rogue" regime or terrorist group armed with nuclear, biological or chemical weapons. In a speech on 16 November 1993 entitled "UK Defence Strategy: A Continuing Role for Nuclear Weapons?", the then British Secretary of State for Defence, Malcolm Rifkind, said: "...(I)t is difficult to see deterrence operating securely

against proliferators." One has only to think of a scenario where the 1991 IRA mortar bomb attack from a van in London against the British Gulf War Cabinet had involved instead a threat to use even a crude nuclear device, to realise that a threat of nuclear retaliation is utterly incredible. Yet a greater threat to the government of a nuclear weapon state could barely be imagined.

There is a fundamental logical and moral objection to relying on nuclear deterrence. If conventional deterrence failed, the damage would be confined to the belligerent states - and the environmental damage would usually be repairable. What is at stake from deterrence failing between nuclear weapon states is the devastation and poisoning of not just the belligerent powers, but potentially of all forms of life on the planet. President Bill Clinton speaking at the UN General Assembly on September 27, 1993 said that the use of nuclear weapons "could turn a local conflict into a global and environmental catastrophe."

Letting go Cold War-style deterrence doctrine would enable essential steps such as de-alerting to take place. De-alerting would effectively replace it with the concept of "existential" deterrence. However, to obtain real security, the security of people, reliance on nuclear weapons must be replaced by a new approach. Nuclear weapons undermine security - both of those who possess them and those they are meant to deter. Indeed, they are a security problem, not a solution. The Theory of Deterrence must be replaced by the Theory of Reassurance which recognises the reality of global interdependence and addresses security from a new perspective.

The security challenges we face now arise from threats to the earth's life-support systems, extreme economic disparities, the proliferation of small arms as well as weapons of mass destruction, conflict over scarce resources, and the terrorising of civilian populations by domestic factions. Political commitments have been made to address these enormous threats; what is needed is appreciation of the security dimensions of cooperatively working together to solve our collective global crisis and the political will to carry through on commitments by those in power.

The 'security' system which obtains at the end of the 20th century, whereby 180 separate countries have armed forces with offensive capabilities,(a tiny minority of which are nuclear) has to change. The following are some of the reasons why change will take place:

Changes in power relationships:

Power shifts are altering the nature of international relations

UN membership has grown from 44 to 185 in just over 50 years, and some observers predict 1000 member states by 2050. The financial turnover of multinational companies such as General Motors, Shell or Matsushita exceed the GNP of medium-sized economies such as Pakistan, Nigeria or Egypt.²

Economic disparity:

The poorest fifth of the world earn less than one twentieth of what the richest fifth earn. 400 multimillionaires have more wealth than half the world's population. 78% of people in the world live in poor countries.³

Energy consumption:

Per capita consumption of non-renewable energy sources is still 9 times as high in industrial countries as in developing countries.

Global communications:

The development of electronic communications means that all information is instantly accessible anywhere on the planet, leading to rising expectations.

Scarcity of resources:

Shortages of non-renewable resources are becoming more acute. For example, 80 countries, with 40% of the world's population, already suffer severe shortage of fresh water. The World Bank predicts water to be the main cause of conflict in the 21st century.

Forced migration and refugees:

One definition of security currently offered is the number of people who feel safe and happy to stay at home, because their needs and aspirations can be met there. Many regions of the world do not fulfill those criteria; a European Union study group has described the demographic and ecological situation emerging in North Africa as 'catastrophic' and 'a major threat to EU security'. The number of refugees in transit increases yearly.

Transboundary pollution:

What happens for example in the event of a nuclear reactor accident combined with unwillingness of a neighbouring country to allow refugees to cross the border? What could happen to the 80 hulks of the Russian submarine fleet which are still afloat with nuclear fuel cores inside?

Environmental degradation:

20 million people die each year because their locality no longer provides a life-supporting environment.⁴

Climate change:

55% of the world's population live in coastal or estuary zones that will be most affected by rising sea levels.

Population growth:

More people have been added to the world's population in the past 50 years than in all the previous millennia of human existence.

Change in the nature of conflict:

Conflict is increasingly within states rather than between states, "Wars within states vastly outnumber wars between states."⁵

Risk of nuclear accident or terrorism

84 suitcase-sized nuclear bombs are missing from Russian military inventories. 4% of high-grade fissile material is unaccounted for world-wide.⁶

These challenges are not news; forward thinkers and some enlightened leaders have been aware of them for some time. In the context of discussion of nuclear weapons the obvious question is: how can a nuclear weapon deal with any of these problems? Do we want to live, in the words of

Edward Brookes 25 years ago, on " a crowded glowering planet of massive inequalities of wealth, buttressed by stark force, yet endlessly threatened by desperate people"? The option of trying to keep the lid on with the threat of force is a recipe for disaster...

Effective solutions will require cooperation, imagination and vision, not nuclear threats and coercion. The 'hardware' approach of the Cold War must change to a 'software' solution which replaces present military-based notions of security with cooperation, confidence-building, transparency, disarmament, conversion, demobilisation and demilitarisation. The meeting rooms of the UN are familiar with these concepts. Implicit in the agenda of all the UN World Conferences in the 1990's beginning with the Children's Summit in New York and including the Earth Summit in Rio, the Beijing Women's Conference and Habitat II, is a refocussing on how human security can be achieved.⁷

These conferences generated thorough agendas, embodied in very specific programmes and political commitments reached by consensus with the intense engagement of civil society. These workable programmes will remain unfulfilled and the crises of human suffering increase unless the monetary commitments required are not forthcoming. The tragedy is that these very serious problems increase in magnitude each day whilst military coffers remain bloated.

Military spending in all developing countries exceeds \$125 billion per year. The Human Development Report suggests that 12% of that amount would provide primary health care and safe drinking water for all; 4% would provide universal primary education and educate women to the same level as men.⁸ The United Kingdom is spending over £1 billion per year on the maintenance of the Trident nuclear weapon system whilst its people fear for the future of their health and education services.

One hundred and fifty states adopted, by consensus, the following accurate description of security in the Final Document of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, Paragraph 14 (UN, A/Conf. September 11, 1987.) "Security is an overriding priority of all nations. It is also fundamental for both disarmament and development. Security consists of not only military, but also political, economic, social, humanitarian and political aspects. Enhanced security can, on the one hand, create conditions conducive to disarmament and, on the other provide the environment and confidence for the successful pursuit of development." Your discussions over the next two weeks should take place in the context of that understanding of security and not be limited by narrow definitions.

It is clear that issues of non-military security need to be addressed. We take our cue from Einstein that a new approach to conflict is needed. "One cannot solve a problem with the same kind of thinking that gave rise to it." A serious effort to implement the promise of nuclear disarmament in Article VI of the NPT would be a major contribution to moving the world to a new security system capable of addressing the challenges that we all face.

Einstein also said: "The unleashed power of the atom has changed

everything except our way of thinking." In the event of nuclear blackmail, the only way to deal with it is by negotiation. By far the best solution, however, is to shift the image of nuclear weapons from political virility symbol to the stigmatised status of chemical or biological weapons.

We need a new understanding of security: as a safety net for all, not a 'win-lose' military game. It is about fostering a just, sustainable world order which meets human needs and tackles the root causes of insecurity. We will not be secure while the global environment is at risk, nor while the risk of regional nuclear war is growing. Military strength is useless to starving people. No nation can feel secure if its neighbour feels threatened. Unprincipled arms sales cause or fan regional conflicts. People in the developing world will eventually tire of living on the edge of survival while the West preserves its comfortable way of life at their expense. Cooperative global action is the only way the biosphere will escape destruction. Cold War alliances have had their day; we must all be allies now if we are to avoid disaster.

Thank you.

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7. See UN Briefing Paper, The World Conferences, Developing Priorities for the 21st Century. ISBN:92-1-100631-7, March 1997.
8. Human Development Report 1994 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), pgs. 50-51.

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Closing Presentation - A Call To Action

Mr. Chairperson, distinguished delegates, NGO representatives,

You have just heard a series of statements representing the diversity of opinion and expertise within the NGO community. In this concluding statement we wish not only to sum up, but want to underline a few specific ideas we believe require your urgent action. Because we are committed to the realisation of the World Courts unanimous view that the NPT requires the achievement of nuclear disarmament, we are here, working to ensure the fulfillment of the promises made over a quarter of a century ago when the treaty was agreed. We ask you to take substantive measures over the next two weeks in order to sustain the world's hope and belief in those promises.

We appreciate that you have agreed to hear NGO views early in the PrepCom. We would urge that you consider expanding the process of broader NGO participation by creating, at next year's PrepCom, an NGO delegation with observer status, similar to the NGO delegation from the International Campaign to Ban Landmines which contributed so substantively to the CCW Review Conference and subsequently, the Ottawa process. Just as NGOs fully participate in UN meetings on Social, Economic, and Human Rights issues, so too should we be welcomed at disarmament talks.

The NPT regime is clearly capable of accelerating the process of disarmament. At the NPT Extension conference, Nuclear Weapons States were called to conclude negotiations on the CTBT in 1996, and a CTBT was indeed negotiated and signed in 1996. Under the enhanced review process agreed in 1995, Prepcoms are to hold substantive as well as procedural discussions and must now begin this forward looking work. Paramount among the many issues this session of the PrepCom must deal with, is the obligation under Article VI, re-affirmed by the ICJ, to call for negotiations leading to a Nuclear Weapons Convention to begin immediately. We support the proposal made at last years Prepcom by the Marshall Islands to convene an inter-sessional working group to advance these discussions.

Mr. Chairperson, with two years remaining before the new millennium, it is unthinkable that we will enter the 21st century without a signed treaty banning nuclear weapons.

You now have in your hands a Model Treaty, drafted by a network of civil society organisations with the help of leading legal scholars, scientific experts and diplomats which proposes steps and methods for dismantling the nuclear scourge and monitoring and verifying compliance.

For those who say it cannot be done, we urge you to use this document as a starting point towards the commencement of negotiations. Test its premises and assumptions and start bringing your own expertise to bear on what it would take to ban nuclear weapons. Let us learn from the experience of the Republic of South Africa, the only state to have rejected nuclear deterrence and dismantled its nuclear weapons stockpile. Chemical weapons, biological weapons and anti-personnel landmines have now been banned. We must do no less with nuclear weapons. The work must begin anew this year.

While the Nuclear Weapons Convention is clearly on our horizon, taking nuclear weapons off hair trigger alert is an important early step towards that goal. As many of you know, in January 1995 a rocket was launched off the coast of Norway on an exploratory mission to study the Aurora Borealis. This launch caused the Russian President to open, for the first time, the dreaded nuclear suitcase and brought the world very close to a nuclear exchange, closer than at any time since the Cuban Missile Crisis. Lengthening the time between threat and use to allow for diplomacy and rational decision making as well as verification, will truly make this a post-Cold War era. We urge you not to leave this NPT PrepCom without assurances from the Nuclear Weapon States that immediately, this year in 1998, they will take their nuclear weapons off alert.

A plethora of similar steps towards nuclear safety and non-proliferation is available such as the removal of warheads from their delivery systems so perilously poised to wreak destruction and havoc on the planet; declaring a production halt on fissile materials including tritium production which is planned to ensure the endurance of lethal arsenals; and the common sense step of making an inventory of all weapons usable radioactive materials, military and civilian.

We have argued that computer simulated nuclear tests and so called "sub-critical" nuclear tests are not consistent with the obligations and spirit of the CTBT. The non-governmental community is convinced that blowing up plutonium 1000 feet below the desert floor in Nevada, and beneath the fragile Arctic permafrost in Novaya Zemlya; designing weapons and testing their earth penetrating capacity in Alaska, in other words, the ongoing qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, makes a mockery of the long sought CTBT and violates the Article VI obligation to pursue "good faith efforts" towards nuclear disarmament. The European Parliament shares our concerns.

Proliferation of nuclear technology and nuclear materials is a direct consequence of the so-called "peaceful uses" of nuclear energy. This is immediately apparent when we examine the unique requirement for entry into force of the CTBT which requires the signature and ratification of the 44 nations in possession of nuclear reactors. The drafters of the treaty knew well that every nuclear reactor is a bomb factory.

There are other readily available and sustainable energy sources which would enable all of us to enjoy life equitably on our planet. To stop nuclear proliferation, to stop further production of nuclear waste, to stop further havoc to health, to stop environmental racism and colonialism, we are going to have to rely on the only safe nuclear reactor we have -- our own radiant sun. Better sooner than later, before we have added

perilously to the existing deadly pollution on Earth.

Mr. Chairperson, overwhelming majorities have indicated in public opinion polls, by petitions, and by joining the movements to abolish nuclear weapons, that we want a swift end to the nuclear age. Humanity has created the circumstances by which intentionally or accidentally, life can be obliterated. This proximity to annihilation for some is a form of power and euphoria - emotions we believe history will deem psychotic. Many in this room, on the other hand, are galvanised into action by these existing threats.

Mr. Chairperson, we consider the strengthened NPT review process a forum for change. The enormity of this task dawns on us all. It is difficult, transfigurative, and will require a deep patience and determination. While many problems created by the splitting of the atom are still begging for lasting solutions, the elimination of nuclear weapons is feasible and attainable within our lifetimes. Its achievement will demonstrate the capacity of the human species to act collectively for its own preservation, in short, to evolve. It's time to put away these deadly instruments of war, cleanup the toxic legacy of the nuclear age, and use our precious resources to provide for the genuine needs of our human family on planet earth.

Thank you.

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